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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years much attention has been focused on the
Italian Communist Party ( Partito Communista Italiano , or PCI)
and the limelight is well deserved. Outside of communist-
controlled countries it is the largest and most important
communist party in the world. It has enunciated what has
been called a "new" form of communism, Eurocommunism. This
"new" form is primarily geared to tailoring the Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary strategy to a modern industrial society
without losing the attachment to international communism.
The success in developing a large party as well as the
independence from, and criticism of, the CPSU has led to many
analyses of the PCI. It has been dissected and probed but
never looked at as the unique organization that it is. Un-
fortunately, the studies have tended to focus on minute
aspects of Party life or projected future occurrences without
presenting a factual analysis of the character of the PCI.
This lack of a detailed study has led to many false assump-
tions about the ultimate goals and desires of the Italian
Communists. Most studies either portray them as plodding
party hacks who are clandestine subversives or, more recently,
respectable politicians who are really social democrats. The
first stereotype has generally been ruled out because of the
tendency of communism as a whole to become Africanized, or
Asianized, or in this case Europeanized. The second

characterization of the PCI is the most popular and has be-
come the norm (especially for most major U.S. news services).
The main reasons for this second characterization have been
the expansion of detente and Western desires to guage the PCI
in democratic terms. Unfortunately, this "democratic cognitive
set" has led the West to blur the struggle between the liberty
of Western civilization and the "mediation of earthly paradise"
of Marxism. Because of a lack of knowledge many Western elites
have been unable to clearly discern the nature of the Commun-
ists' commitment to the total transformation of society and to
the demise of the political state in Italy as it now exists.
This in turn has led to a tendency on the part of the West to
accommodate the PCI within the existing system.
The official U.S. position as stated by Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger has been that the inclusion of the PCI in the
Italian government would be detrimental to the interests of
the U.S. and the West. The strong showing by the PCI in the
national elections of July 1976 has heightened this anxiety.
Numerous scenarios depicting the results of PCI governmental
participation have been voiced by Secretary Kissinger. Re-
grettably, the lack of a strong analysis of the character of
the PCI has precluded a firm contextual basis for scenario
construction and subsequent concrete policy formulation. This
confusion over the nature of the PCI has led to criticism of
U.S. policy as unrealistic. A concise characterization of the
PCI was needed to add credibility to U.S. policy.

There is ample evidence available to provide a character-
ization but the salient features have not been sorted out and
presented in a succinct form. This paper proposes to fill
this void by presenting a specific body of identifying fea-
tures with which to evaluate the Italian Communist Party.
The concern, therefore, will be not in describing what we
perceive the PCI to be but what it is and what it will become,
The Syntopicon of the Great Books of the Western World states
the problem thusly:
It is difficult to describe the character of anything
because the verbal character of anything is an imitation
of the real character and hence subject to the interpre-
tation of, many people and therefore may or may not be
correct
.
In order to guard against such false interpretations factual
evidence such as Party statements and historical facts will
make up the main body of evidence and only after the nature
of the Party becomes apparent will conclusions be drawn.
Also, standard terminology will be used to describe these
attributes and in any areas where misunderstanding may occur
a definition will be given. Perhaps the first and most im-
portant term which needs defining is "character." Webster's
Dictionary defines character as a "distinctive trait, quality
2
or attribute" which has an "essential quality or nature."
It is further distinguished by Black's Law Dictionary as that
Hutchins, Robert Maynard, et al . Great Books of the
Western World
,
Vol. II (Chicago, 1952), p. 193.
McKechnie, Jean L. Webster's New Twentieth Century






which something is, and not what it is reputed to be. It
is therefore necessary to distinguish between ideological
being and aspects of the PCI which are of a tactical or
strategic nature. Also, the Party and the movement must be
separated to differentiate between the hard core and fellow
travellers
.
Since the PCI is a complex organization, it has interests
and purposes which seem to be at odds with each other, but
the question is whether this is by design or by happenstance,
and if by design, has there been a continuity in the over-all
plan of the Party? Words like change, revisionist and de-
radicalized have described these ends and means of the PCI
and as such imply a historical process. Therefore, the start-
ing point of the analysis of the character will be with the
history of the Party. If there is a strong continuity of
history and purpose, a unique character will be easily dis-
cernible .
From that starting point the political and socioeconomic
goals of the Party will be analyzed to answer certain questions
such as: is it revolutionary; is it democratic; is it nation-
alistic; is it independent from the USSR and international
communism; and is it some sort of social democratic party?
Once these questions have been answered, the structure,
organization, leadership and membership will be examined to
determine if the ideology is believed internally and if it
can be effectively carried out.




By following such a pattern the analysis will be conducted
on three levels: factors determining beliefs; actual politi-
cal beliefs; and the resultant political actions. In dealing
with the character on these three levels and sticking to
specifics, the pitfalls which have plagued earlier attempts
at characterizations should be avoided. These earlier prob-
lems involved: too much generalization; insufficient histor-
ical perspective to show continuity; and a failure to see the
interaction, but differences between ideology, strategy,
organization and international relations.
In summary, the objectives of the investigation are as
follows: to briefly trace the origins and development of the
PCI and show their effects on the present Party composition
and ideology; to analyze the unique ideology, strategy and
tactics of the Party; to determine the structure and compo-
sition of the Party so as to gauge its effectiveness; to show
a continuity in the ideology and purpose; to concisely define
the major distinctive characteristics of the Party; and pre-
sent some recommendations for the future. To review all the
details of the PCI goes beyond the scope of this paper but
rather the more important traits will be dealt with in order




Plus qa change, plus c'est la meme chose
.
Alphonse Karr, Les Gu§pes
, January 1849
These words have added meaning for the PCI. Written
during the formative years of socialist theory in Italy they
foretell the future of the ideology of the Party. Although
history and cultural changes had a powerful influence on
socialist/communist theory in Italy there remains a solid
continuity in goals and policy which tie together the Italian
communist movement. As party theorist Antonio Gramsci wrote
while in prison, "We must feel solidarity with the old men
of today, who represent the past still living among us... "4
By highlighting the origins of the communist movement and
analyzing the crises which beset the Party one is better able
to determine what the nature of the Party is and why it has
become so.
It is important to realize that although the means of the
Party have changed during the course of time, the revolutionary
ideals have not. What is perhaps just as important is the fact
that the theories of Gramsci, worked out in prison around 1930,
have been applied throughout the history of the Party. The
theories of Gramsci have been modified slightly to conform to
the unique situation in Italy at any time.
4 John M. Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of
Italian Communism (Stanford, 1967)




In contrast to most European countries where Marxism was
introduced from external sources and then modified by internal
forces, Marxism in Italy became the modifier of the unique
brand of Italian socialism formed in the middle of the nine-
teenth century. As Sergio Segre, PCI Central Committee member
remarked
:
The autonomy of the party... had historical roots: it did
not just base itself on translations of Marxist-Leninist
texts. It has its own seminal thinkers in the figure of
Gramsci and others. Italian communism was not an import.
It had developed in the tradition of the previous Italian
culture
.
The PCI has tried to follow the "Italian Road to Socialism."
Many people have interpreted the "Italian Road to Social-
ism" to mean that the PCI has abandoned the basic tenets of
Marxism-Leninism. This is simply not the case at all. As
Central Committee member Gian Carlo Pajetta wrote in Rinascita
on 28 November 1975:
Marx was not really buried--as some affirmed at the begin-
ning of the century- -if it is true that there is a new
and growing demand everywhere for socialism consisting
of thought and militancy ... .Marxism is alive precisely
because its teaching is permeated by the dialectic of
history. It is alive because Lt teaches us the need for
continuous process of renewal.
The Utopian goals of Marxism-Leninism have not been lost and
are even more applicable today when the economic structure of
Italy seems to be approaching the theoretical crisis predicted
by Marx
.
Daniel Yergin, "A Letter from Rome," The New Republic
,
LCXXIII, No. 18 (1 November 1975), p. 12.
Gian Carlo Pajetta, Rinascita (28 November 1975), p. 1-2
Pajetta was explaining that the Italians had not rejected Marx




The birth of socialism in Italy can be traced back to
around the time of Risorgimento or unification. Perhaps the
earliest leader of this movement was Mazzini. In Italy he
was more well known than Marx and even today he is an impor-
tant source of ideology. But like most communist parties in
Europe, the PCI was a product of inner conflicts in the
socialist movement. These conflicts are normally a product
of or are affected by crisis within the country. These
crises not only set the context in which the party is first
born, but also are critical in determining the future course
of the party. It is essential that one have a knowledge of
the history of the party to make any accurate analysis or
assumptions. Economics, war, industrialization, and Fascism
are all reflected in the PCI's ideology.
It is assumed that most people have an adequate knowledge
of Marxism- Leninism so the historical analysis will be limited
to the growth of the "Italian Road to Socialism." It is a
turbulent story but perhaps Pajetta said it best:
...the truest and simplest thing to be said is that exper-
ience—the obstacles faced and the successes achieved- -has
now impelled us toward a search for a new road toward
socialism which would recognize national specifics and at
the same time would consider common elements in nations
which historical tradition, relationships between politi-
cal forces, social structures and ways of realizing- civil
life, present so many and such profound analogies.
7
Ibid, p. 1. This is part of Pajetta's explanation of
the focus of Italian ideology mentioned previously.
13

III. CREATION OF THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY, 1800-1895
The historical roots of the Italian Socialist Party are
two: the great national movement of the nineteenth century,
which was concerned not only with the achievement of national
unity but also with the plight of the masses; and the anar-
chical tendencies of the Italian peasant which led to the
success of the Bakunist movement.
The unification process ( Risorgimento ) was precipitated
by the breakup of Italian feudalism which was accompanied by
demands for political representation by the entrepreneurial
and middle classes. As industrialization began, the growth
of economic well being was accompanied by a desire of the
working masses to follow in the footsteps of the middle
classes in their demand for a more meaningful role in the
determination of public policy. The Risorgimento swept away
centuries of authoritarian tradition and replaced it with
progress and liberty. Most of us would probably have called
the new Italian state conservative but for the newly- liberated
Italians it was liberal. The key to the new liberalism was
parliamentarianism. However, one finds that even though the
unification process proceeded quickly, once parliamentary
practices were established the social revolution was slow in
coming. The state remained strongly centralized while ideas,
values and attitudes were still deeply rooted in regional
traditionalism. It was not until the workers began to clamor
14

for their rights that the move to replace liberalism with
socialism began.
The movement for socialism was designed to curb indi-
vidualism, socialize the economy, abolish restrictive forms
of private property and curb the differences in classes.
The guiding light in this movement was Giuseppe Mazzini.
Mazzini was deeply involved in the unification movement
even to the point of heading the new Constituent Assembly
in 1848. He was part of the movement which proclaimed a
Republic in July 1849.
Mazzini's original followers were a quasi-military group
whose primary aim was unification. His first organization
was founded in 1831, La Giovane Italia . It was a group some-
where in that intermediate stage between a secret society and
a political party. The initial goal of unification would be
followed by sweeping social reforms. The protagonist was,
as in Marxian theory, the society as a whole. However,
unlike Marx, Mazzini was against anything that was devoid of
nationalism (especially when talking of Italian nationalism)
.
His nationalism and primary focus on the process of unifica-
tion to the detriment of social reforms would prove to be
his downfall later.
Like Marx, Mazzini voiced the idea that the worker was a
slave who lived in misery. He saw the crisis of capitalism
and its replacement by associations of nations of the work-
ingmen. The nations themselves would be formed out of
regional workingmen's associations. These "leagues of
15

proletarians" would be the fighters against tyranny, but in
the name of nationalism and not class struggle.
In the 1850's these workingmen's associations began to
crop up as a logical extension of the guild system. They
were called Mutual Aid Societies in Italy. These societies
were open to everyone, even the bourgeosie. They were dedi-
cated to cooperation and association designed to stem the
abuses of the workingman, his wages, working hours, and
welfare
.
In 1860, Massini launched a serious campaign to harness
the Mutual Aid Societies to a political program. His program
was designed to form a National Party of Action and he called
on all his followers to infiltrate all the existing parties
for his cause:
Help the trend toward mutual aid societies. Form them
wherever you can. If others create them, place our
workers in them, so that the National Idea is inserted,
so that they are not reduced to a mere fact of material
interest. They will be created in the south at any time
and once founded, they will seek contact with yours (of
the center and north) , so that later a strong league of
the people can be formed.
8
These Mutual Aid Societies did get together for numerous con-
ferences but never voted to adopt the national plan of action
that Mazzini wished to follow. Nonetheless, his program was
a milestone because it created a new movement in Italy that
showed that a worker had become aware of the more complex
issues, "other than those having to do with assistance to the
sick and infirm.""
Richard Hostetter, The Italian Socialist Movement
Origins (1860-1882) (Princeton, 1958), p. 27.
9




Perhaps one reason the Party of Action program failed
was because there was such a strong competing system, the
clientelismo or clientele system. This system grew up with
the Mutual Aid Societies but was more of an economic forma-
tion designed to procure favors and jobs. The clientelismo
system produced strong relations which themselves became
political parties. This system continues today in Italy
because of its relative achievements. The clientelismo will
be discussed in depth later since it has become a source of
PCI support.
Mazzini's ideas on socialism were to become more coherent
as the unification process moved to completion. His basic
premise was that virtue was the divine goal, not, as Marx
would say, utility and self-interest. His ideas were more
national than individual and herein is his main gift to the
Italian socialist movement. He also became well known inter-
nationally because of his part in the unification movement
and the blossoming socialist movement. He was even becoming
as well known as the authors of the Communist Manifesto . Like
the authors of the Communist Manifesto , Mazzini identified the
plight of the proletarian as the central issue in the social-
ist movement. He was for the rights of the proletariat in
the sense of equality:
Abolition of the proletariat, emanicipation of the workers
from the tyranny of capital concentrated in a small number
of individuals; division of the product, or the value that
issues from it, according to work accomplished. .. (However)
,






Mazzini's historical analysis of the workingman 's struggle
concluded that social remedies must follow political change
because politics alone would not suffice. Here again he dif-
fered from Marx in that he preached a peaceful transition to
social reformation:
In Italy... the social question does not carry with it
threats of unjust subversions or anarchy. In those
regions there boils no profound hatred between class and
class ,... (there is) no necessity for the introduction of
rash systems or solutions .1
In the intervening years until his death in 1872 he pursued
the social goals of the workingman as well as a total repub-
lican unification of the country. The preoccupation with
these two strong ideas was the main reason for his loss of
leadership in the socialist movement.
On 28 September 1864 the First International was formed
in London. The International met at this time in preparation
for the first International Workingmen's Association (IWA)
Congress in Brussels in 1865. The meetings were concerned
with setting the standards for the revolutionary movements
in all of Europe. Mazzini sent two of his strongest sup-
porters, Wolf and Fontana, to present his program to the
council. Initially, Mazzini's program was adopted but on
the arrival of Marx the program was changed. Marx radically
changed the platform more along the "Marxian" line, abolish-
12
ing the more humanitarian aspects of Mazzini's.
11
Ibid, p. 44.
Giinter Nollau, International Communism and Worl Revolu -
tion (New York, 1961), p. 323. The London Council's program
was accepted by the council in 1866 and later by the full IWA
Congress in 1871. See Appendix A for the full text.
18

This marked the end of Mazzini's predominance in the inter-
national socialist movement.
Marx was also convinced that he needed to totally destroy
Mazzini, even in Italy. He contacted Michael Bakunin, who
was in Italy, and persuaded him to undertake the task of
personally destroying Mazzini's brand of socialism. Bakunin
succeeded in destroying Mazzini but at the same time, in his
desire for international stature, damaged Marxian socialism
almost as much.
Bakunin, the legendary Russian anarchist, arrived in
Italy in early 1864, bent on bringing revolution to the people
He was convinced that Italy was the weakest link in the chain
of reactionary Europe, the country with the most promising
prospects of revolution. Bakunin agreed to many of the Ital-
ian aspirations for political and social reform but only in
an attempt to persuade the Italians to accept the anarchist
formula of catastrophic social revolution, international or-
ganization of the workingman and total rejection of authority.
By 1866, Bakunin was experiencing limited success nation-
ally, although he was receiving a more encouraging response
from the rural peasantry of the south. He had succeeded in
mobilizing the workers toward more revolutionary actions and
away from Mazzini. The disaffected reformers who left Mazzini
did so because he refused to abandon his patriotic goals for
purely social ones. With each success Bakunin increased his
goals. He began to formulate plans to wrest the leadership
of the international movement from Marx.
19

Bakunin's initial bids for leadership in the interna-
tional movement were in the formation of rival organizations
which he hoped would merge with the IWA and by sheer numbers
gain control. His first attempt in 1868, the League for
Peace and Liberty, failed. He then founded the International
Alliance of Social Democracy which, because of widespread
international pressure, was absorbed into the IWA in 1869.
This was unfortunate for both Mazzini and Marx because it
legitimized Bakunin's brand of socialism on the peninsula and
delayed the debut of Marxism into Italy until the 1880 's.
Two general factors led to Mazzini's decline in Italy.
The first was the international appeal of the IWA which was
beginning to make itself felt in Italy. However, had Mazzini
followed up his earlier attempts to nationalize the workers
groups he would have had the organizational solidarity to
resist the IWA. If he had made early attempts through these
organizations to block the International movement, he might
have succeeded. The second factor was a problem related
to unification. Mazzinian socialism had slowed to a walk by
the time of the Franco-Prussian War, which put a capstone on
14the process of Italian unity. Both Bakunin and Mazzini
Hostetter gives a more complete explanation of how
this could have occurred. On page 124 he tells how Mazzini
did not take full advantage of his resources.
Hostetter quotes, on page 136 of his book, a letter
from Bakunin to Gambuzzi on 4 July 1870 in which Bakunin says,
"Is there still a section in Naples? In what condition is it?
Might it have fallen into the hands of Intriguers ?... But , in
the name of Heaven, don't sleep."
20

noticed this occurrence, but Mazzini was more severely
affected. Mazzini was so concerned with the process of
Italian unity that when the process ceased he lost much of
his enthusiasm. He had implanted unification so deeply in
his brand of socialism that the movement was not able to
switch to a social and political cause of socialism until
unity was complete. This intransigence in the Italian pro-
letariat was to be forced out into the open by the events in
France. The Paris Commune was to be the spark that re-ignited
socialism in Italy.
Events in Paris between 18 March and 25 May 1871 completely
altered to Mazzini ! s disadvantage the leadership structure of
the Italian Socialist movement. From the Paris Commune on,
Mazzini never recovered his stature or the leadership of the
movement. Mazzini alienated many of his supporters by con-
demning the materialistic Frenchmen and their inherent denial
of his thesis that social change should occur by gradual peace-
ful means. He felt that the major fault was the inherent anti-
nationality of the Commune:
Politically, that system leads to the indefinite dismem-
berment of authority, to the exclusive recognition of
sovereignty in the smallest local collective entity; and
therefore to the absolute negation of Nation and to the
absurd proposition that the Commune, more than the Nation,
has the secret, the inspiration of the national life and
right ... (Such a league of) independent and sovereign Com-
munes would destroy everything that makes the national
idea sacred. 15
By contrast, the Italian radicals hailed the loss of the




long awaited class struggle in the world. The International
Socialists were the benefactors of the defeat of the Commune.
Bakunin, because he was more well known in Italy, reaped the
majority of benefits of this new movement in Italy.
Italy was split into four factions of the Commune.
Mazzini's followers were strongly anti-Commune. The IWA was
strongly pro-Commune but lacked the visibility in Italy to
make substantial gains. Garibaldi, the hero of the "One
Thousand," was ironically pro-Commune. He was so, mainly
out of a disillusionment with Mazzini and Mazzini's lack of
action. He was also convinced that all men should unite under
one banner to help humanity. Perhaps he could have used his
national stature to become a serious threat in Italy but his
lack of a clear-cut plan doomed any venture to failure.
Bakunin's principles of anarchy and action fit perfectly with
the ideals of the Italian radicals and his organization was
prepared to take advantage of any opportunity.
By the Congress of Rome on 1 November 1871, Bakunin had
successfully replaced Mazzini as the leader of Italian social-
ism. Although his social principles were endorsed by the
Congress, Mazzini failed to organize Italy into an anti-
international front. His failure to separate unification
from the social movement prevented him from entering the new
phase of international socialism. Bakunin's action programs
were more to the liking of the Congress. They were convinced
that Bakunin could lead them to their goals.
22

The intervening period since the Commune had also been
successful for Bakunin in his fight against the IWA.
Bakunin's polemics with the IWA were so fruitful that when
the split between his faction and the IWA occurred in mid-
November, he was in firm control of Italian Socialism.
Bakunin's ideas flourished quickly in Italy, especially in
the more industrialized areas of Romagna, and with Mazzini's
death on 10 March 1872 Bakunin was in absolute control of
the Italian Socialist movement. On 4 August 1872 at Rimini
the Italian Socialists held their first organized National
Congress (the other Congresses having been held by the Mutual
Aid Societies). The Congress declared for Bakunin, thereby
marking the beginning of the end for the Second International
in Italy and, as events will show, in Europe as well.
On 15 September the ant i- authoritarians , led by Bakunin,
met in St. Imier, Switzerland and proclaimed their split from
the IWA (on 2 September Bakunin had been expelled from the
IWA). It should be noted that many of the Italian Socialists
were not actually cognizant of the differences between Bakunin
and the International. When Bakunin emerged as their leader,
it was not because of his ideas but because of his stature,
his organization and the penetration of his movement.
The next phase of Italian Socialism embodied the violence
which Bakunin so avidly supported. Bakunin tried to carry
out his plan to replace the existing structure of government
in Italy. He did not fully realize the potential of his new
enemy, the state, and by 1876 Bakuninism was on the decline.
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Beginning in 1872, Bakunin planned a series of armed insur-
rections which failed, and by 1874 most of his followers
were brought to trial. Due to the ineptness of the Italian
prosecutors, the anarchists were acquitted and freed to re-
organize and pursue the same course. However, adverse public
reaction had set in and in March 1877, when his followers
attempted to liberate several towns in the San Lupo area, the
whole repressive machinery of state was brought to bear. The
government outlawed the organization, dissolved the sections,
arrested the leaders and used other pressures. Although
Bakunin escaped, anarchism had failed in Italy and with it
the link to international socialism.
As one socialist wrote: "The International. . .no longer
exists, either as a Marxist association or as a Bakunist sect.
There are revolutionary and anarchist socialists in every part
of the world, but there is no longer any contact, public or
17
secret, between them."
Perhaps the attempt at violence helped to precipitate the
rapid decline of international socialism in Italy, but it
would have ultimately failed because the anarchists lacked
the organizational base required for the slow education of
the Italians. Into this void was growing a new socialist
group aimed at "legal" revolution.
In 1879 some small uprisings and outbreaks of violence
occurred but they were on such a small scale as to not affect
the over-all situation.
17 Hostetter, p. 409.
24

The "new left" was a product of earlier moderates who
were determined to achieve their ends through gradual means.
The new reform method was designed to conquer through the
electoral process. The new attitude was not so much dictated
by a serene assessment of the relative merits of a new theory
as by circumstances in Italy at the time.
In 1882 the real origin of present day socialism began
with a change in the electoral laws which quadrupled the
electorate, allowing the socialists to send members to the
Chamber of Deputies for the first time. Additionally, a new
industrial proletariat began to emerge in the north creating
a schism with the old southern oriented Italian socialism and
a new awareness of labor problems.
Two poles of socialism began to emerge during the 1880's,
centered around the "new left" and its legal revolution. The
first of these groups, Minimal is ti or "minimalists," stressed
short term democratic reform and emphasized the usage of the
electoral process for change. The Minimalist
i
were willing
to enter the political arena in a parliamentary state and
collaborate with non- socialist parties. This could be ac-
complished only by renouncing integral collectivism and
advocating economic and social reforms acceptable to non-
socialists. In effect, they accepted pluralism and all that
democracy offered. The second of these groups, Massimalisti
or "maximalists," was concerned with long term goals of
revolutionary change. They were convinced that, once the
economic base was changed, political transition would be
25

abrupt and immediate. They refused to play the parliamentary
game and were opposed to collaboration with non-socialists,
but they counted on the electoral process to put them in
power. This position was based on the erroneous assumptions
that all wage earners were sympathetic to socialism and wage
earners were a majority in Italy.
These groups were all part of the Marxian socialist move-
ment that met in Genoa in August of 1892 to form the Partito
dei Lavoratori Italiani (Italian Workers Party). In 1895 the
name was changed to the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian
Socialist Party, PSI) the name it retains today. This new
party for the first time presented the government with an
opposition made up of the worker-peasant group. Although
its leaders were drawn from the intellectuals of the indus-
trialized northern cities of Milan, Turin and Genoa, the most
substantial support came from the agricultural and industrial
workers
.
The original objectives of the party as stated in 1892
combined the goals of the major factions of the party; an
immediate struggle to improve conditions of the workers;
followed by a longer range struggle to win control of the
working class. These goals were pursued until late 1895 when
the party began a new phase of socialism.
The early years of socialism were marked by many changes
which would bear on the later historical development of the
party. Mazzini had identified the spirit of nationalism that
all Italians felt. He had identified the need, as Bakunin
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did later, for infiltration of workers organizations for the
purpose of persuading them to accept his ideals. He did not
realize, as Bakunin did, the need for a strong organization
to control the movement. Mazzini also formulated the theory
of a peaceful transition to social reform.
Bakunin failed organizationally because of his lack of
extensiveness in organization and the fact that he tried to
use the organization before it was mature. Perhaps the most
important lesson to be gained from Bakunin was the failure
of anarchist methods. This lesson would be repeated in the
violence leading up to World War I.
Some other lessons learned during this time were the
success of the cl ientelismo system and a reaffirmation by
the "new left" of the use of the electoral means to power.
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IV. FRAGMENTATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY, 1895-1920
The period between the formation of the PSI and the split
which gave birth to the PCI was extremely turbulent. The
opposing factions within the party became even more frag-
mented as the growing demands of the working classes were
amplified by the chaos brought on by WW I
.
In the initial four years between 1896 and 1900 the
country was beset by a series of strikes and uprisings. Al-
though these were minor in scale they served to heighten the
differences between the moderate faction, which opposed revo-
lutionary activity, and the more radical section of the party
Filippo Turati's reformists were in control of the party dur-
ing this time and they were able to subdue the more violent
aspirations of the radicals because of his success in achiev-
ing some of the aims of the socialists by cooperation with
Giolitti's liberal government. In fact, Turati was so suc-
cessful with his governmental dealings that he was invited
into the government on numerous occasions between 1904 and
1914 but the anti-government and anti- bourgeosie feeling of
the party ran so high that he was forced to decline. To some
extent this tendency to participate in the government was
influenced by the growth of vested interests in both the
existing institutional framework (both government and muni-
cipal) and the pressure exerted by the unions to separate




In the period between 1908 and 1912 the moderates and
reformists found that their control was being eroded by the
more radical factions. Additionally, the party was split
four ways between the minimalisti , massimalisti , revoluzionari
(revolutionaries who counted on force to seize power and
replace capitalism with collectivism, and the riformis ti
(reformists) who were a more liberal section of the minimalisti
and therefore quite eager to collaborate with the government.
The polarization of these factions was increased by the lack
of achievement of major changes and by the practice of grad-
ualism and compromise utilized by the moderates.
The normalization of relations with the International re-
flected these divisions. Whereas the moderates were content
to deal with the controlling hierarchy of the International,
the radical factions formed a subgroup within the Interna-
tional. At the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau
on 30 July 1914 conferences were scheduled at Zimmerwald for
September 1915 and Kienthal for April 1916 at which only
certain groups attended. These groups were later to form
the third, or Communist International (Comintern)
.
At the thirteenth Socialist Party Congress at Reggio
Emilia in July 1912 the mass imalisti faction gained a leading
role in the party. It was at this Congress that Benito Musso-
lini, the leader of a leftwing revolutionary faction, was
thrown into the spotlight. Although he was a leading figure
in the party for the next two years, he was expelled on
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24 November 1914 for supporting Italy's entry into the war,
1
8
a manifest breach of party discipline.
The change in party orientation was a reflection of the
growing labor unrest which preceded World War I, but the war
and the economic chaos that followed the war crystallized the
conflicts in the party. The PSI was the only leftist party
in Western Europe opposed to the war. The reasons given by
the party for this neutrality were fostered by the radicals'
ideology. They felt that if the party was one of class alone
then there was no need to defend the government from its im-
minent destruction. This also coincided with the theories of
Lenin soon to be applied in Russia. It was also one of the
basic premises of a new Marxist group being formed around
Amedeo Bordiga of Naples and a young intellectual following
which headed the Turin industrial workers. The Turin intel-
lectuals contained such soon to be party notables as Gramsci,
Togliatti, Terracini and Tasca.
There were a number of strikes and spontaneous uprisings
in the industrialized North, capped by a five-day insurrec-
tion in Turin during August of 1917. The failure of this
uprising vaulted Antonio Gramsci into the forefront of the
Turin movement. Gramsci was determined to build the Turin
section into a strong, well disciplined political party along
the general lines of the Russian party. He felt that if he
1
8
Mussolini was made editor of Avanti , the socialist
newspaper, four months after the Congress. In this capacity




could build the core of the party up to a position of relative
strength, it could act whenever the opportunity arose. He
was even more convinced of this after Lenin's successful
revolution in Russia and said this about the timetable for
socialism, "...it is possible to realize Socialism at any
moment ... .They (the Leninists) are revolutionaries, not evo-
lutionaries. And revolutionary thought does not see time as
19
a factor of progress."
The majority of the Socialist Party overwhelmingly sup-
ported the Russian revolution and planned to follow the Soviet
example, but felt that they should wait until the war was
over. This was a serious error because the recovery of the
Italian army coupled with the post-war economic destruction
changed the distribution of power in Italy. The PSI still
may have been able to carry out a successful coup but the
lack of a strong plan prevented any action.
The founding of the Third International (Comintern) at
Moscow, 2-6 March 1919, was a major boost for Bordiga and
the Turin group. Although the PSI immediately declared their
support for the International, they did not take the necessary
action to rid themselves of the riformisti to insure their
ideological solidarity with the Comintern. The Turin faction,
led by Gramsci, was so impressed by the Comintern and disap-
pointed by their own party's lack of purity that they began
their own more revolutionary order within the party.












Antonio Gramsci as a young man
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The idea of this new group, Ordine Nuovo (the New Order),
was to socialize the workers and prepare them for the revo-
lution. With this in mind, Gramsci created Factory Councils,
along the lines of the Russian Soviets, to educate the workers
He felt that Marxism was a --
...philosophy of praxis, a belief that the goal of pro-
letarian liberation could be achieved through voluntary
political activity of the proletariat itself, or rather
by means of a continually progressive dialectic between
the proletariat and the class conscious vanguard. 20
Additionally, Gramsci decided to gain control of the unions
where he could then exert more pressure on the state. Gramsci
felt that --
The Italian state must be decapitated in Milan, not Rome,
because the real capitalist governing apparatus is not in
Rome but Milan .... Rome has no function in Italian social
life; it represents nothing and will submit to the hard
laws of the worker's state against parasites. 21
The trade unions became quite active; however, the
legalities within which they worked forced Ordine Nuovo to
2 2yield to the Italian system and operate within it. This
in turn forced the party to rationalize this legal activity.
Gramsci described the unions as a tool of the revolutionary
movement and that legality was justifiable if it aided the




Neil Mclnnes, The Western Marxists (New York, 1972),
p. 10.
22 Cammett gives a more detailed description of the
interaction of Ordine Nuovo and the trade unions starting
on page 65 of his book. The complete description goes into




Insofar as the unions recognized the temporary nature
of the compromise and tried to increase the power of
the working class and prepare it for a more positive
role in society, they would be a revolutionary instru-
ment in the class struggle. Even if industrial legality
were enforced with such ends in mind, it would be just-
ified by the need for industrial discipline . 23
The executive council of Ordine Nuovo incorporated this pol-
icy in their national program by calling for participation in
national elections so as to prevent isolation of the people
and further their social education. This philosophy was later
enhanced by the major failure of the one bid by the Ordine
Nuovo at Turin in April 1920 to bring immediate revolution
to the workers and create an Italian "Petrograd."
While Ordine Nuovo was growing in strength, events else-
where in Italy were focusing attention on the PSI Congress
in October 5-8 and the national elections in November. The
situation in which the political struggle developed was
growing increasingly acute and complex. The riformis t
i
still
retained their influence in the Party hierarchy but the effects
of the Comintern were being manifest in the growth of the
Bordiga and Ordine Nuovo groups. In addition, the Fascists
were already making themselves known by resorting to violence
and sabotage.
When the PSI met in October it overwhelmingly resolved to
support the Comintern and to build the revolutionary organiza-
tion required by the Comintern. Even though this initial step
was taken, pressure by the riformis ti forced the PSI to de-
clare that the revolution would have to wait because the time
23 Cammett, p. 85.
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was not ripe and that the party would continue parliamentary
action for awhile. Bordiga violently opposed this concession
to the reformist group and campaigned for their expulsion.
It is ironic that Lenin was critical of both factions: the
PSI for not expelling the reformers; and Bordiga for opposing
24parliamentary action.
In November the PSI made decisive gains in the Italian
parliament. They won 1,756,344 votes and 156 out of 508
25positions in parliament (or almost 31%). The success of
the elections seemed to show that the newly "Russian" styled
party was popular with the people, but the fact that the re-
formists were tolerated within the party was destined to pro-
2 6long the internal friction.
This continued ambivalence in the Party was reflected in
the events of 1920. The riformist
i
were convinced that capi-
talism would fall of its own weight, while the radical left
was more preoccupied with revolutionary action. The immobil-
ization of the leadership over these issues destroyed its
capacity to take advantage of the economic problems occurring
24 James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist Inter -
national (Stanford, 1964)
,
p~. 163 . Hulse gives a fairly
concise description of Lenin's whole feelings on the situ-
ation in Italy during this period.
25 Franz Borkenau, World Communism: A History of the
Communist International (Ann Arbor, 1962)
, p . 169
.
According to Borkenau, on page 169, although there
were serious difficulties between the radical sects and the
moderates, "the majority of the Italians rejected absolutely
the idea of purging the party of reformists and traitors."




in Italy and was perhaps one reason for the Party's failure
to support the ill-fated Turin uprising in April. The masses
involved in the Turin uprising, lacking the direction and
effective organization of the whole PSI, ultimately could not
adequately carry out their plans. At the most opportune mo-
ment in the early 1900's the inaction of the leadership pre-
vented a successful revolution.
Gramsci had learned a lesson from his failure at Turin
that he would apply vigorously to his Party: It must be
"...a homogenous, cohesive Party, with its own doctrine and
2 7tactics and a rigid and implacable discipline..."
As if on cue, the Comintern held its Second Congress at
Moscow from 17 July to 7 August where it issued its famous 21
conditions for Comintern membership. The seventh, sixteenth,
seventeenth and twenty-first were particularly applicable to
the PSI. (See Appendix B for complete list.)
7. Parties which wish to join the Communist International
are obliged to recognize the necessity for a complete
and absolute break with reformism and with the policy
of the "centre," and to advocate this break as widely
as possible among their members. Without that no
consistent Communist policy is possible.
The Communist International demands unconditionally
and categorically that this break be effected as
quickly as possible . The Communist International is
unable to agree that notorious opportunists, such as
Turati, Modigliani . . . etc
.
, shall have the right to
appear as members of the Communist International
that could only lead to the Communist International
becoming in many respects similar to the Second
International, which has gone to pieces.
27 Cammett, p. 104
36

16. All the decisions of the Congress of the Communist
International, as well as the decisions of its
Executive Committee, are binding in all parties
belonging to the Communist International. The
Communist International, working in conditions of
acute civil war, must be far more centralized in
its structure than was the Second International.
Consideration must be of course given by the Com-
munist International and its Executive Committee
in all their activities to the varying conditions
in which the individual parties have to fight and
work, and they must make decisions of general
validity only when such decisions are possible.
17. In this connection, all parties which wish to join
the Communist International must change their names.
Every party which wishes to join the Communist
International must be called: Communist party of
such and such a country (section of the Communist
International) . This question of name is not merely
a formal matter, but essentially a political question
of great importance. The Communist International has
declared war on the entire bourgeois world and on all
yellow social -democrat ic parties. The difference
between the Communist parties and the old official
"social-democratic" or "socialist" parties, which
have betrayed the banner of the working class, must
be brought home to every ordinary worker.
21. Those members of the party who reject in principle
the conditions and these put forward by the Communist
International are to be expelled from the Party. 28
Furthermore, Lenin indicated on two separate occasions his
agreement with the program advocated by Ordine Nuovo . On the
latter occasion he very bluntly told the Congress that, "We
must simply tell the Italian comrades that the trend of the
Communist International corresponds to the trend of Ordine
Nuovo
,
and not to that of the present majority of Socialist
29leaders and their parliamentary group."
28
29




The majority of the PSI leadership enthusiastically
embraced communism but felt that Moscow was being unrea-
sonable and could be persuaded to change its mind. The
majority, led by Serrati's moderates, felt that Moscow did
not understand the Italian situation and that the long dis-
tance direction could ruin the Party. This group attempted
to change Moscow's mind but ultimately agreed to convene a
special Congress in January of 1921 to consider the conditions.
The vacillations of the Serrati group threw the Ordine
Nuovo and Bordiga groups together at last. In November of
1920 they set up a central office headed by Bordiga to coor-
dinate strategy for the upcoming Congress. The stage was
being set for the confrontation at the January Congress and
both sides were preparing their arguments.
The background on which the foundation on 21 January 1921
of the PCI seemed in many respects to have been built by dis-
unity and disorganization rather than a concerted desire on
the part of the new "Marxists" to change history. Within
this background many lessons had been learned that would in-
fluence the new party as it split from the PSI and consolidated
its position. The moderates had shown that socialism could
make significant gains at the polls. This was re- emphas ized
by Gramsci's theoretical writings on association with the
electoral process and the failure of the Turin uprising. The
Turin uprising also underscored the need for a strong, well
disciplined party that could work within the system but still
be ready to attempt the revolution if the opportunity arose.
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Finally, the Fascist agitation was becoming more than a
nuisance to the rest of the socialists.




V. FORMATION OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
The evolution of the Italian socialism which was begun
in the 1800' s was about to give birth to another child. The
new party would be Marxist in ideology but so thoroughly
Italian as to seem at times almost non- communist
.
The lines of battle were sharply drawn when the 17th
Congress of the PSI began its deliberations on 15 January
1921 at Livorno. The Bordiga- Ordine Nuovo faction was in-
tent on the purification of the party along the lines of
the 21 Conditions, which meant: an acceptance of the revo-
lutionary strategy; the struggle against reformism; and the
creation of party identity through elite solidarity and cen-
tralized organization. The moderate PSI leadership supported
most of the Soviet directives but refused to expel the re-
formists. The final vote was as follows: out of 172,487
voting, 58,783 votes went to the Bordiga faction, 98,028
votes went to the moderates, and 14,695 votes were cast for
30
the reformists. The victorious moderates immediately con-
tacted Moscow to try to renegotiate their membership in the
Comintern, but they were turned down by Lenin.
30 Cammett, p. 151
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Bordiga and his followers seceded from the PSI and formed
31
the Italian section of the Comintern. Bordiga summed it up
thusly
:
The majority of the Congress, with its vote, has placed
itself outside the Third International. The delegates
who voted for the Communist motion are to leave the hall.
They will meet at eleven o'clock at the Teatro San Marco
to write the constitution of the Communist Party, Italian
Section of the Third International . 32
The meaning of the split is not necessarily so obvious a
problem as that of doctrine alone. The Congress was initially
called in response to problems that would determine how far
and in what ways the PSI would split but deeper doctrinal
problems and historical forces were set into motion by the
split. One of the most immediate problems encountered was
the loss of over 100,000 members by the PSI, as well as a
great deal of unity and cohesion. The initial confusion on
both sides of the split was a factor which contributed to
the rapid rise of Fascism in the country and brought about
an abrupt end to the growth of both parties for over 20 years.
Another result of the schism was that Qrdine Nuovo ceased
to exist as a group after January and it took almost five
years for the leaders to attain the leadership of the PCI.
Had the Qrdine Nuovo group been able to move Bordiga aside
See Drachkovitch , Milorad M. and Branko Lazitch, etc,
The Comintern: Historical Highlights (New York, 1966), p.
359-360 , for more background on Bordiga. Also see, on p. 272
299, Paul Lewis* letter to the Comintern on the PCI. It
reveals actual events of the period as well as doubts of the





at the start, the party may have built their organization
swiftly enough to pose a threat to the Fascists.
The new Italian Communist Party was formed along the
lines of the Comintern's 21 Conditions and the Organic Acts
of Constitution reflected the goals of international com-
munism as put forth by Lenin. These Acts proclaimed the
imminent downfall of capitalism, the necessity of armed
conflict between the workers and the bourgeois state, the
hegemonic role of the proletarian party, the goal of destruc-
tion of the bourgeois state, and the immediate establishment
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Although this showed
complete acceptance of the Comintern strategy, it disguised
the great variation in ideology and style between Bordiga
and Gramsci.
This solidarity with Moscow proved to be short-lived.
The lack of mass support in Europe from 1919 to 1921, coupled
with the growing internal difficulties encountered by Moscow,
prompted the Third Comintern Congress which met in June 1921
to alter its tactics in favor of a "temporary conciliation
of capitalism" and a resumption of collaboration with the
socialist parties in the form of a "united front." Terracini,
representing the PCI at the Congress, initially opposed the
policy but finally yielded to the Moscow leadership.
Bordiga refused to accept the new policy of the Comintern
and at the Second PCI Congress in Rome in March 1922 won over-
whelming support by the Party. The Bordiga position, which
opposed collaboration with the socialists and upheld the
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practice of power seizure through revolutionary action, was
upheld by the Congress by a vote of 31,000 to only 4,000 for
the opposition, which was led by Angelo Tasca. At this time
both Gramsci and Togliatti were among those supporting Bor-
diga. With the matter presumably settled, the PCI began the
task of building a central core of militant and professional
cadres. Togliatti was appointed to the Central Committee
and the organization was streamlined to prevent the institu-
tional paralysis that had beset the old PSI.
The Comintern, realizing that it had obtained a communist
party which it neither anticipated nor fully accepted, began
preparing for Bordiga's removal. In June of 1922 Gramsci
went to Russia to attend the first meeting of the Comintern
Plenum. During his eighteen months in Moscow he developed a
close relationship with the Comintern leader, Gregori Zinoviev,
and apparently in return for a promise by Zinoviev of support
in a bid to become leader of the PCI, was persuaded to oppose
Bordiga's "Rome thesis." Gramsci was also able to devote
some time to the preparation of his own programs. Pajetta
also says that at this time Gramsci returned to the real
meaning of Leninism and the true revolutionary perspective
.
Bordiga now faced the difficult choice between repudiating
the program which he had fought for in the Socialist Party and
defiance of the Comintern. He realized that Moscow was now
Gian Carlo Pajetta, "Italian Communist Party: Fifty
Years," New Times
,
No. 3 (20 January 1971), p. 12. The pur^
pose of Pajetta's article was to connect the history and
origins of the PCI with the situation in 1971.
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tightening the international organization, intending to
transform it into a monolithic Soviet instrument. With
concurrence of the majority of the PCI, Bordiga decided to
oppose the Comintern openly.
Events within the PSI in 1922 were working to the dis-
advantage of Bordiga. In August the PSI finally bowed to
the Comintern's wishes by expelling Turati and voting to
adhere to the 21 Conditions. By the time of the Fourth
Comintern Congress of November-December 1922, Bordiga was
opposed by the same group which he had forced out of the
Comintern two years earlier.
At the Fourth Congress the Russians and Italians clashed
openly over the "united front" tactic. Zinoviev and the
Comintern leadership let it be known that if Bordiga and his
followers did not accept the Comintern's direction to col-
laborate with the PSI that they would not remain for long as
leaders of the PCI. Bordiga still refused, but the Congress
overruled him and then appointed Gramsci as the mediator in
the unification process. Gramsci was not wholeheartedly in
favor of the union but took the job knowing it was doomed to
failure by the reluctance of- both sides to merge.
Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy and his subsequent
crackdown on political parties simplified the Comintern's
problem with Bordiga. Bordiga and the PCI leaders were
arrested in February 1925 by the Fascist police. At the same
time, almost 2,000 other communists were arrested and almost
two-thirds of the party membership deserted the ranks.
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The Comintern quickly designated Gramsci, then in Vienna, as
acting head of the PCI, who in turn instructed Togliatti,
who was in hiding in Italy, to temporarily perform these
functions until his return.
Bordiga was released in September 1923 along with most
of the other arrested communist leaders, but Gramsci and his
followers had no intention of relinquishing control of the
Party. The subsequent power struggle allowed the direction
of the Party to become diverted from the real menace, which
was fascism.
In May of 1924 a National Party Conference was held in
secret at Como . The only positive accomplishment of this
Conference was the establishment of clandestine underground
activities. In addition, the clash between Bordiga and
Gramsci came to a head, with the Bordiga faction once again
winning the support of the Congress. This action prompted
the Comintern at its Fifth Congress, from June 7 to July 8,
to appoint a new PCI Central Committee which excluded Bordiga
and his followers.
Opposed by the Comintern and deserted by a growing number
of his followers, Bordiga was finally defeated at the Third
PCI Congress at Lyon in January 1926. The Gramsci-Tasca forces
overwhelmingly defeated Bordiga (Bordiga only received 9.2%
of the vote). Bordiga' s influence in the Party had ended,
although he was not formally expelled until 1950.
Gramsci' s victory was won not only in the name of
international communism but also represented a victory of
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"Italian" communism. The "Lyon Thesis" delivered at the
Congress reflected the national as well as class character
of the Party. Gramsci called for a unified and centralized
party on both the ideological and organizational level and
an abolition of factions within the party. He declared that
the party should remain primarily in the hands of the prole-
tariat but that, "the working class cannot do without the
intellectuals, nor can it ignore the problem of gathering
around itself all those elements driven in one way or another
34
to revolt against capitalism." He stressed the need for
the party to lead by becoming part of all sections of the
working class and not by merely proclaiming its leadership
of the people. In Thesis 30, Gramsci reintroduced the idea
of Factory Councils so as to infiltrate the worker's movements
and reeducate the masses. By mobilizing the masses over
tempory demands, Gramsci felt he could win the masses over:
(The Party) leads and unifies the working class by parti-
cipating in all struggles of a limited character, and by
formulating and promoting a program of immediate interest
for the working class. Partial, limited demands are con-
sidered a necessary opportunity for achieving the progres-
sive mobilization and unification of all the forces of the
laboring class. *°
Gramsci echoed the "united front" tactic of the Comintern
but theorized that it was to be used for the ultimate destruc-
tion of the state and those allies with which they had united.







The real reason behind the "united front" was the exposure
and elimination of the reactionary forces, not the fraternity
of compatible interests.
In his analysis of fascism, Gramsci made an error which
meant his ultimate imprisonment and the near fatal destruc-
tion of the party. His preoccupation with capitalism was
such that he viewed fascism as only another form of capital-
ism, and as such destined to create the forces of its own
self-destruction. He was not able to judge the real nature
of the movement and, as Landauer says:
What a tragedy that the Italian Marxists had read the
Communist Manifesto more carefully than the Class Struggle
in France and The Eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte !
From the nature of the role of Bonapartism as described by
Marx in the two latter writings, they could have drawn
illuminating analogies to the dangerous potentialities of
fascism, and could have learned that the socialist workers
might have to cooperate with the liberal bourgeosie to
stave off such a danger. 37
It took the PCI twenty-two years of fascist rule to be able
to apply the lessons learned in the late 1920's.
In November 1926, Mussolini issued a series of exceptional
decrees which clamped down completely on the PCI. The PCI
was relieved of all its seats in parliament while Gramsci,
Bordiga, Terracini and others were arrested. Togliatti and
Tasca were luckily in Moscow attending the Seventh Plenum of
the Comintern and thereby escaped arrest. Togliatti was ap-
pointed the interim leader of the PCI and directed its
37 Carl Landauer, Hilde Stein Landauer and Elizabeth
Krindl Valkenier, European Socialism, A History of Ideas
and Movements
,
Vol. I (Berkeley, 1959), p. 887.
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activities, first from Zurich and then from Paris, as the
PCI went completely underground.
The organization which had been set up at the May 1924
Congress was called into play as the entire PCI began clan-
destine activities. During the winter of 1926-1927 the
organization achieved considerable success and operations
were rapidly built up in the major population centers. A
secret domestic center was formed which remained in operation
until 1932 when it was dissolved by the leadership as too
dangerous to the party hierarchy.
The years between 1927 and 1929 represent a critical
juncture in the history of PCI. During this time the forces
of Mussolini were mobilized in a swift counter-offensive
against the underground, and the PCI was decimated by the
fascist cadres. Finally, in June Gramsci was sentenced to
20 years, 4 months and 5 days in prison. This internment
stopped him physically but not intellectually.
Although the PCI lost an able leader in Gramsci, it bene-
fited in the long run from his writings in prison. Between
1929 and his death in 1937 he filled 32 notebooks, which
contained 3,000 pages of minute handwriting. His writings,
although marxist in theory, follow a more transitional approach
to communism in Italy. He defended democratic objectives as
the strategy most appropriate to the Italian conditions. He
did reemphasize the need for a "pure" party, a theme which
was carried out by Togliatti in his expulsion of Angelo Tasca
in 1929, "the three"- Pietro Tresso, Alfonso Leonetti and
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Paolo Ravazzoli in 1930, as well as numerous others between
1930 and 1932.
Gramsci took into account the unique historical conditions
of Italy and drew these experiences together by the thread
of marxist ideology. He realized that his error in failing
to foresee the revolutionary power of fascism prevented him
from accommodating with the right and center in a parliamentary
way to overcome fascism. This lesson in political processes
would be repeated by Gramsci in all of his writings on cooper-
ation and collaboration. As Togliatti later wrote of him,
"Gramsci was a political theorist, but he was above all a
7
practical politician."
The decimation of the party had some positive effects.
The remaining communists were forged into small but highly
reliable groups in which a high premium was placed on organ-
izational talents and unquestioning obedience to authority.
These forces were able to exist despite the pressures exerted
by fascism over the next ten years.
The first ten years of the PCI had been turbulent and
sometimes disastrous, but many historical lessons were learned
which shaped the ideology of the party. The need for cohesion
and discipline was reinforced. A policy of total obedience
was instituted which called for the elimination of any fac-
tions so as to preserve the strength and purity of the party.




party policy. The slogan of a constitutional assembly used
as, "the basis for an agreement with the anti-fascist parties,"
39





VI. FASCISM AND WORLD WAR II
The Fascist victory affected the PCI deeply. For more
than two decades the party would lead a highly precarious
and frustrating existence, squeezed between the increasingly
effective repressions of the Fascist police, who made it
virtually impossible to launch any sustained organized po-
litical activity, and the stringent demands of the Comintern.
These factors helped to produce a new and articulate program
of the forces and directions of the Italian revolution.
Two figures shaped the party during this time, Antonio
Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti. Gramsci was the party theo-
retician who combined the deterministic features of Marx with
the culture and historical processes of Italy and translated
them into an ideology and practice for the party to follow.
Togliatti, who was Gramsci's successor, was the pragmatist
who knew how to apply the practical aspects of Gramsci's
ideology to the peculiar nature of Italian circumstances.
Togliatti also shared a common background with Gramsci as
well as a sense of the distinctiveness of the Italian revo-
lutionary tradition. This blending of the two personalities
during the period of Fascism solidified the party into the
entity one sees today. With the death of Gramsci in 1937
the whole party leadership was shifted to Togliatti.
Between 1930 and 1933 the PCI center in France had little






mounting pressure of the Fascist state. The organization
continued to be whittled down by the repressive methods of
Mussolini. In 1934 the PCI, realizing that it was losing
in Italy, switched to external activities abroad.
One of the first manifestations of the new policy was the
formation of the "Unity of Action Pact" in 1934 with Nenni's
Socialists. This was a logical extension of Gramsci's theo-
ries of cooperation and of Togliatti's application of these
principles. Also in 1934 the PCI switched its activities to
foreign ventures aimed at propagandizing the Italian emigres.
In 1935 the Comintern approved the PCI's idea of a united
front and based its new worldwide strategy on the Italian
model. The purpose of this new strategy was to unite mass
support against fascism with a later mind to assimilating the
full front into the communist party. The Soviets, because of
fear of the rise of Hitler in Germany, even went so far as to
induce the PCI to seek collaboration with the Fascists. The
proposal was rejected by Mussolini, but the lengths to which
the Soviets would go to insure their survival seemed endless.
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War provided the PCI
the opportunity to display its organizational and leadership
talents. Togliatti, then a member of the Executive Committee
of the Comintern, was appointed as the Comintern's represent-
ative in the War. Luigi Longo was one of the most effective
leaders of the non-Spanish forces. Numerous other leaders of
the International Brigades distinguished themselves during the






on the Italian people when the resistance was finally formed
in Italy.
The impact of the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact on
23 August 1939 and the subsequent change in Comintern policy
on Italy was cushioned by the fact that the PCI was so iso-
lated from the Italian people. The results of the Comintern
policy, which had such a bewildering effect on other European
communist parties, did not reach the Italian people and hence
the PCI was still held in relatively high esteem. The new
policy did force the termination of the Unity of Action Pact
with the Socialists and a definite cooling of relations
between the two parties.
When France entered the war, many of the PCI leaders re-
siding in France were arrested, and the remainder were forced
to flee and move their headquarters to Moscow. Togliatti
arrived there in April 1940 where he set up the structure for
directing the Italian resistance.
When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941,
the Sixth Strategy of the Comintern, calling for a United
War Front, was put into operation. By October 1941 the PSI
and PCI had reunited in a new "Union of the Italian People."
Through this union the PCI was able to subordinate the will
of the PSI until the middle of the 1950 's. It is one of
the factors which would prevent the Italian Socialists from
becoming a strong post-war party, able to stand by itself.
Once given the green light by Moscow to resume under-
ground activities in Italy, Togliatti immediately reopened
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the domestic center in Italy and began active agitation. In
Milan and Turin the PCI renewed propaganda activities which
were designed to give a political character to the labor
movement. The skeleton underground system, benefitting from
the obvious international notoriety of the PCI, was built up
rapidly into an impressive resistance organization. By the
end of 1941 the PCI was able to carry out effective clandes-
tine operations in Italy.
The mission of the PCI during the resistance was two-fold
to defeat the Fascist regime and to penetrate the strongholds
of Italian society. Because the PCI had the only well disci-
plined organization in Italy it was able to become the leader
in the resistance effort as well as carry out its own far
reaching political objectives. By March of 1943 they had
succeeded in instigating strikes in Turin and Milan and by
April definite cadres were reestablished in the north. On
10 June 1943 the Comintern was dissolved in a tactic designed
to placate Russia's allies, and the strategy of National
Fronts was promulgated. This policy was quickly accepted in
Italy where communists, socialists, liberals and Catholics
began to form "Committees of National Liberation" (CLN) to
fight the Nazis. These organizations were generally run by
the PCI leadership and were later used to participate within
the legal framework in areas under allied control, and to
carry out guerrilla warfare in areas under German control.
The backing the PCI received from all classes involved
in the CLN allowed them to establish a foothold in some key
56

areas of Italian society; the national and local government
administration; labor unions; cooperatives; and other numer-
ous organizations and institutions. Many Socialist supporters
who were disillusioned by interparty struggles and the party's
utter collapse before the Fascist onslaught were more than
eager to join these new organizations.
Through their powerful organization the PCI was also able
to become co-leader of the national labor organization, and
later obtain full control. The bureaucratic organizations
of labor erected by the Fascists were taken over, lock, stock
and barrel by the PCI.
When Mussolini fell on 25 July 1943, the PCI was in charge
of most of the resistance activities in Italy and was the
strongest political force in northern and central Italy. With
the conclusion of the armistice between Italy and the Allies
on 8 September, Togliatti began preparation for his return to
Italy. The party's program from that time forward was designed
to conclude the war effort, effect national reconstruction,
develop a policy of collaboration and conciliation with other
parties and classes in the name of national solidarity, and
to hold in check the revolutionary potential of the workers
while preventing the formation of other parties which could
exploit this potential.
After 18 years of exile, Togliatti returned to Italy in
April 1944. Togliatti knew the plans of the USSR and the
theory of dividing Europe into spheres. He realized what
bloodshed had occurred in Italy and had no illusions about a
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revolution taking place in a country emerging from 20 years
of Fascism and occupied by Allied troops. He planned to
bring Italy down the road to socialism by a gradual process
of democratization of the state and collaboration, based
upon the guidelines set down by Gramsci. He wanted above
all to build a large party capable of winning an electoral
victory, or as he describes it: "We are the party of the
working class; but the working class has never been foreign
to the interests of the nation. We will no longer be a small,
restricted association of propagandists for the general inter-
40
ests of Communism." He was quick to assure the middle class
that he would protect their interests also:
We do not intend to ask for the bureaucratization of any
part of the National economy... or to fight capitalism in
general ... Even if we were alone in power today, we'd
appeal to private initiative to help in the reconstruc-
tion, because we know that Italy isn't yet mature enough
for certain tasks. 41
Togliatti took the underground leadership of the PCI to
task for not collaborating more fully with the anti-fascist
forces and for their sectarian tactics. He immediately of-
fered to support the Royal government and later aligned the
party with the Badoglio cabinet. This willingness to join
the ruling coalition was extended to each successive govern-
ment until the PCI was forced out in 1947. Togliatti made
everyone fully aware that he favored a constituent assembly




41 Claire Sterling, "The Crucial Hour for Italian
Democracy," Reporter (2 June 1955), p. 11.
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Palmiro Togliatti and Luigi Longo in 1945
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(as Gramsci had in his early writings) . Unfortunately for
the PCI, Western Allied pressure prevented them from achieving
any key posts in the post-war governments or achieving decis-
ive control of the parliament.
The clean slate that the PCI had carried into the war and
its impressive resistance activities during the war helped to
build it up to the second largest party in Italy by the war's
end. Within a short time the party boasted over 1-1/2 million
members; however, the important aspect of this growth was
represented by the fact that it drew its support from a wide
spectrum of the Italian people. It held a fascination for
the majority of the intelligensia and these people supplied
the brains and organizational ability which had become the
party's chief asset. This organizational ability was applied
to the local PCI-run administrations to produce a competent
and honest machine. In a nation characterized by gross cor-
ruption and inefficiency, honest administration proved
attractive to many non-communists.
Togliatti went one step further by removing many of the
radical elements from positions of leadership in the PCI and
turning over arms caches to the Allies. The PCI bent over
backwards to keep from alienating the Allies. Also, being
acutely aware of the Catholic hostility to his party, Tog-
liatti insisted on the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts of 1929
in the new constitution.
The inclusion of the PCI in the Constitutional Committee
was a crowning achievement for the PCI because it legitimized
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their position and when the first government was formed in
June of 1945, the PCI became part of it. By the end of 1945
the PCI had over 1.7 million members and continued to grow
for the next five years.
The PCI participated in the Italian government until May
of 1947 when Alcide de Gasperi excluded the PCI from the Gov-
ernment, but not before the PCI had proven that it could make
a respectable attempt at working within the processes of the
42
state. To do this, the PCI stifled any manifestation of
long term revolutionary objectives and called for a continu-
ation of the "United Front" formed during the resistance. A
tactic which bore more than passing resemblance to that being
used so successfully in Eastern Europe.
In the non-political arena, Togliatti attempted to
institute programs that Gramsci had written about in 1919:
The socialist state already exists potentially in the
institutions of the social life of the exploited working
class. To tie these institutions together ... to centralize
them powerfully .. .means creating from then on a true and
real workers democracy. 43
He mobilized the CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labor)
in an attempt to institute a dual controlled economy and
thereby infiltrate the higher institutions of government.
The idea was to institute management councils containing both
employer and employee, which would become the pivot of in-
dustry. By combining the forces of labor and capital, the
42 See Appendix C for PCI participation in government.
43
Tarrow, p. 103.
This system works well in West Germany now, but it did
not suit the traditional Italian employer.
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PCI hoped to gain a foothold in management process. Despite
the pressure of the PCI and the massive labor organization
of the CGIL, the Italian economy was reconstructed along
conventional lines and the objectives of the PCI failed.
This defeat of the economic plan, although it reflected on
the ability of the PCI to carry out its total program, none-
theless failed to detract from the growth of the PCI. The
failure was understood by most workers as more of a reluc-
tance on the part of management to accept a reasonable policy
than a failure of the PCI leadership.
Unfortunately, the fact that a successful accommodation
could not be reached with the employers caused the workers
to demand more militant action. Togliatti was impelled to
issue a series of warnings to the people to maintain the
party line and desist from any radical overtures. All of
his maneuverings seemed to have been for naught because in
May of 1947 the PCI was excluded from the government.
Had Togliatti been less aware of the Allied pressure
against his inclusion in the Italian government he would
have considered his parliamentary program a failure. But
given the success achieved in gaining control of municipal
administration, the labor organizations and the bureaucratic
organizations, he could be proud of the effectiveness of his
program.
Fascism and World War II had considerable impact on the
PCI. The party learned that cooperation with all available
groups was essential to achieve its ends, but also learned
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that intra-party purity and discipline had to be maintained
at the highest level to take advantage of the cooperation.
It also learned that to cooperate it had to make appeals to
all classes of the Italian people and control the radical
fringe elements to keep from alienating the majority it
sought. It is also apparent during this time that the ide-
ology delineated by Gramsci in the late 1930's was carried
45
out with very little change over a period of 20 years.
The Italian Communist Party had become a unique entity by
the end of WWII
.
This continuity in Party ideology is discussed in most
PCI literature. Although the Italian Communists admit to
making tactical changes, they try to emphasize wherever




VII. TOGLIATTI GUIDES THE POST-WAR PARTY
The exclusion of the PCI from the Italian government, al-
though detrimental to Togliatti's immediate plans, caused no
alteration in the PCI's long term strategy. During Togliatti's
period of leadership the party would still attempt to attain
power through parliamentary means by pursuing a three-pronged
strategy aimed at: (1) developing and maintaining the party
base within the industrial proletariat while extending its
influence throughout all aspects of Italian life, to include
the middle class, the subproletariat and the southern peasant,
(2) pursuing any favorable alliance or coalition, and (3)
accommodating links with the USSR and the international move-
ment which would not impact adversely on the party.
The strategy proved difficult to carry out in 1947 and
1948 in light of certain events which exacerbated growing
anti-communist sentiments in Italy. The first problem arose
within the party's own supporters, the militant labor force.
This group staged a series of strikes throughout the country
in protest over the PCI's exclusion from the government.
Togliatti moved swiftly to halt the strikers and get them
back to work. Although the strikers were calmed down by the
communists, the Italian populace was acutely aware of the
communist presence and firmly believed the strikes were com-
munist instigated. Premier De Gasperi capitalized on the
strike issue to reinforce the anti-communist sentiment which
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he had earlier whipped up and used to exclude the PCI from
the government.
In addition to the Christian Democrats' anti-communist
campaign, the Catholic church was also conducting its own
ant i- communist campaign. Since the vast majority of Italy
was Catholic, the Church held sway over a large bloc of votes
which could be pivotal at any point. Gramsci had been aware
of this fact; in his writings he made it a Party imperative
to win Church support. Togliatti had been following this
policy quite closely, as evidenced by his strong support of
the attachment of the Lateran Pacts to the Constitution.
The bad publicity from Eastern Europe over treatment of Cath-
olics overshadowed any PCI overtures and caused the Church to
press harder against the communists.
By the fall of 1947 the international scene was to provide
a further roadblock in the PCI's strategic path. The Zhdanov
speech in September to the Cominform urging the communists to
take the hard line once again and wreck the West's economic
recovery ran counter to Togliatti's "respectable politician"
approach. If Togliatti followed "orders" by resisting recon-
struction and disrupting the Marshall Plan, he would certainly
alienate business and the middle class, while economic failure
would destroy the workers. On the other hand, if he alienated
the USSR he would lose his financial backing and repudiate the
center of communism. Togliatti did what the PCI could do so
well, he took the middle road by playing to the Soviets ver-




attention on domestic priorities. This tactic allowed the
PCI to continue to pursue both strategies and became one of
the cornerstones of its over-all policy.
If all of these events weren't bad enough, the Unity of
Action Pact with the PSI was coming under fire from groups
within the PSI. In January 1947, a group led by Guiseppe
Saragat broke with the PSI (this group would form the core
of what later became the Social Democratic Party) . Through-
out the year other factions left the PSI to join the Saragat
group, thereby cutting back on an already weakened party.
In spite of the fact that the PCI's membership drive
seemed to be blunted somewhat, Togliatti persisted in fol-
47lowing the Party strategy. Convinced that the party could
form a socialist state by parliamentary means, Togliatti con-
tinued to advocate the use of democratic methods to attain
4 8power. Perhaps he may have also found it difficult at that
time to change the structure of the organization which had
been devised under the auspices of Gramsci's theories for a
parliamentary accession to power. Additionally, most Italian
people found it hard to believe that a communist could conform
46 None of the machinations that the party went through to
please the Soviets were pressed with any determination because
of fear of alienating an already skittish Italian middle class.
47
Membership figures were still increasing but not at
the previous rapid pace. For a comparison, see Appendix E
for figures
.
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to a democracy, especially in light of the "Czech Coup" in
February of 1948.
In April of 1948, the nationwide elections provided a
test of both the Christian Democrats' anti-communist campaign
and the strategy of the PCI. The Christian Democrats were
obviously the big winners and polled an impressive 48% of the
vote; however, the Communists were able to maintain their
strength by polling, along with the PSI, 31% of the vote, and
49
even increased their seats in the Chamber of Deputies by 27.
The PCI's mass party strategy was somewhat vindicated by
these elections, but the PCI was forced to scale down its
ambition from trying to get into the government immediately
to a more modest target of building a powerful opposition.
There was an additional threat to the PCI's moderate
strategy in July of 1948. On 14 July, as Togliatti was leav-
ing the Chamber of Deputies, he was wounded by a 25-year-old
Sicilian student named Antonio Pullante. The reaction of the
radical elements in the PCI to the attempted assassination
was immediate. The largest labor union, the CGIL ( Confera -
zione generale italiana del lavoro ) , called a general strike
and violence broke out in Turin, Genoa, Milan and Tuscany.
For a while it looked as if the revolution was imminent;
however, the PCI leadership acted quickly to halt the radi-
cals and by the 16th things had returned to normal. The
radicals were obviously disappointed by the failure of the
49 Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose. The International
Almanac of Electoral History . (New York, 1974), p. 72.
See also Appendix F for voting figures.
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PCI leadership to provide inspiration and direction to the
willing revolutionary forces. Although the PCI had antag-
onized many of its industrial proletariat supporters, it had
kept from alienating other sectors of Italian society and
prevented the government from using the strikes as a pretext
to crush or even outlaw the Communists.
Togliatti was clearly fortunate in having many subordinates
who could carry on while he was hospitalized. Had discipline
in the Party hierarchy been less stringent, the crisis may
have gotten out of hand, and as it was, serious breaches of
discipline did occur. Several groups within the leadership
polarized around which way the Party should have gone during
the strikes. When Togliatti recovered he swiftly moved to
demonstrate that Party strategy and discipline would be fol-
lowed implicitly and democratic centralism was still a main-
stay of Party policy. On 18 July he instituted a series of
purges in which the more radical members of the Party were
replaced. It became evident to even the most radical ele-
ments that the PCI was determined not to upset the balance
in the country until the Party had a large enough majority
to allow it to control the organs of government fully.
It is interesting to note the presence of a strong
violent revolutionary apparatus even without the support
and guidance of the PCI leadership.
Wohl, Robert A. "Palmiro Togliatti- -Master of Maneuver,"
Leaders of the Communist World
,






During this same timeframe the PCI was still going through
the motions of seemingly following the Zhdanov directive, al-
beit half-heartedly. In June the Communists made a bid to
help the Italian government administer the European Recovery
Plan, which was voted down in the Chamber of Deputies and the
PCI quickly let the issue die. Other unsuccessful and weak
attempts were made in this same vein throughout the year while
the PCI continued under-the-table cooperation with the govern-
ment. In fact, despite the open display of ideological hos-
tility to the government, from 1948 to 1953 more than one-half
of the laws passed in parliament did so in committees with the
5?
support of the PCI. ** The PCI was obviously pursuing domestic
policies at the expense of relations with the CPSU.
The CPSU was not so naive as to be oblivious to what the
PCI was doing; however, problems in Eastern Europe took most
of its time. The CPSU pressured and admonished the PCI to
get back in line but the obvious positive results of the PCI
strategy made the Soviet policy seem rather futile.
The PCI sensed the reluctance of the Soviets to clamp
down severely on it and pushed forward with its plans to
extend the Party's electoral and membership base. During
1949 and early 1950 ihe drive to sign up members reached its
peak when the price of a card was reduced to ten lire, or
53
one-half the price of the Party newspaper. The results
52 Devlin, Kevin. The PCI's Long March Through the Insti -
tutions . Radio Free Europe Background Report #103 (10 May 1976)
p. 5.






were somewhat spectacular as Party membership rose to
542,532,625. Although this drive was perhaps successful in
pure numbers, certain groups were still not being penetrated
successfully. In particular, the Catholic church dealt the
PCI a disastrous blow in 1949. In July, Pope Pius XII excom-
municated all Marxists. As can be seen from the membership
figures, this move was not immediately disastrous, but the
long term impact on Catholic Italy would have profound impli-
cations for the PCI. Without the Catholics the PCI could
never control the country.
In other domestic developments, the PCI -controlled CGIL
reintroduced the idea of dual management of industry but
resistance was still so great that the proposal was withdrawn
to prevent alienating business. The CGIL was emasculated
somewhat by the PCI leadership and had to be content to per-
form mainly traditional trade union functions. The PCI took
up much of the slack from the CGIL and between 1950 and 1953
mediated labor disputes between labor and the government,
typically trying to portray the government in a bad light.
The only pro-Soviet plan of any substance during the
1950-1953 period was an offer by the PCI to support any
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Con-
gress. World Communist Movement: Selective Chronology
,
1918-1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 389.
Kogan, Norman. "Italian Communism, The Working Class,
and Organized Catholicism: An Italian Interpretation."
Western Political Quarterly
,
XI, No. 3 (September 1958),
p. 554. Also see Vree, Davis. "Coalition Politics on the
Left in France and Italy," The Review of Politics , XXXVII,





government which would try to neutralize aspects of the cold
war. Not realizing that this offer was designed to aid the
Soviets, many Italians applauded the PCI for their non-
revolutionary and democratic stance.
In March 1953, Stalin died and with his death a series
of events began which would allow the PCI finally to pursue
openly its long repressed domestic strategies and equally
repressed autonomous international role. The death of Stalin
came at an opportune time for the PCI because of the approach-
ing Italian elections. While the USSR was "leaderless" , the
PCI quickly boasted of its moderate and responsible position,
one which was independent of outside influence. The PCI polled
6,121,922 votes and increased their percentage of the vote to
22.61. There was a slight increase in seats in the Chamber
57
of Deputies to 143, or 24.2%. The PCI-PSI coalition together
polled a total of 3 5% of the vote. The Communists showed sig-
nificant gains among the southern peasants and the middle
class, although because of their previous labor tactics there
58
was a decline among the industrial workers of the north.
Togliatti sensed that the PCI had finally emerged from a
purely protective period into one in which it could expand
and take the initiative in increasing its penetration of
Italian society. He remarked on 15 September 1953 that:
56 Galli, Giorgio. "The Road Toward a Dilemma, 1945-1956,"
Problems of Communism (May/June 1956), p. 45.
57 See Appendix F for comparison of figures.
58 Galli. "The Road," p. 46.
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The victory of June 7 has brought to maturity the
first elements, and I believe also the principal elements,
of a new situation, in which the democratic labor forces
see before them the possibility of passing from resistance
to advance . 59
Furthermore, the results had shown in slightly less than a
decade the PCI had grown from a party based in the industrial
north to a "great mass party" spread throughout a wide strata
of the Italian society. The decline of prestige among the
proletariat was a small price to pay for pursuing a success-
ful strategy which had extended its social base and electoral
strength. The Party had also been able to maintain quite
close and friendly relations with the USSR despite its differ-
ences of opinion with respect to Italian strategy.
Togliatti continued the Party's penetration into Italian
society in the period from 1953 to 1956. No new programs
were initiated, but as Togliatti indicated, the Party took
the initiative in spreading the Party base throughout the
country. At this point it would be easy to assume that the
PCI may have been tempted to go further in its compromises
with parliamentarian methods and make changes in the Party
organization also. This was not the case, as the Party main-
tained its reliance on the typical Marxist-Leninist forms of
discipline and authority it had instituted in 1921. A good
example of this occurred on 18 January 1955 when Togliatti
demoted a high Party official, Pietro Secchia, and "exiled"
59 Galli in Griffith, p. 308
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him to Lombardy as the regional secretary because of differ-
ences of opinion concerning strategy.
Events within the association of international communist
parties seemed to have been unstable between 1953 and 1956,
but it was clear that the Soviets were giving tacit approval
to PCI policy. The Soviets were becoming more agreeable to
a new degree of autonomy in the international communist move-
ment. At the Bandung Conference of April 1955, Kruschev form-
ulated the idea of a Commonwealth of Socialist Nations rather
than the previous rigid "family." Other liberal policy
decisions by the CPSU signaled the PCI that it was not over-
stepping its authority.
The real watershed for PCI strategy occurred in 1956 when
the "secret speech" once and for all resolved the conflict
between domestic strategy and the international communist
movement. It was ironic that the Soviets were the ones who
cut the bonds and released the PCI to pursue its own brand
of socialism. This period alone could provide ample mater-
ial for research because of its importance to the PCI, and
yet the results can be summarized fairly concisely for the
purposes of this paper.
Legislative Reference Service, p. 908.





See Donald L.M. Blackmer's book, Unity in Diversity
for just such a detailed extensive analysis of the events and
ramifications of des talinization
.

One of the first lessons that the PCI had learned from
the Bordiga days was that it was imperative to attend all
CPSU Congresses to show solidarity with the Soviets. Con-
sequently, Togliatti was present in Moscow and able to take
advantage of the opportunities which arose at the CPSU XX
Congress. The CPSU XX Congress met in February 1956 to dis-
cuss some of the new policies of the Soviet Union and the
world communist movement. Basically three issues were raised
by Khruschev. First, peaceful coexistence between east and
west was possible as the ideological barriers separating the
two camps began to fade. Secondly, Khruschev endorsed varied
and democratic roads to socialism and a new system of socialist
states by stating that:
Forms of transition to socialism vary and implementation
of these forms need not be associated with civil war under
all circumstances. (Further) the question arises of
whether it is possible to go over to socialism by using
parliamentary means. No such course was open to the Rus-
sian Bolesheviks , who were the first to affect this tran-
sition. Lenin showed us another road, that of the
establishment of a republic of Soviets, the only correct
road in those historical conditions...
The winning of a stable parliamentary majority backed
by a mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and
of all the working people could create for the working
class in a number of capitalist and former colonial
countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental
social changes. 64
The final issue dealt with Stalin's cult of personality.
Khruschev admitted that Stalin had made errors which were not
Codevilla, Angelo. "The Opening for Communism in Italy,"
Politeia
, II., No. 1 (Winter 1964-1965), p. 29-30.
64 Boggs , Carl Elwood, Jr., The Transformation of Italian
Communism. (Berkeley, 1970), p. 80.
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appropriate for the USSR, and stripped Stalin of the godlike
reverence with which he was held.
The' ramifications of the "secret speech" were far reach-
ing. The speech acknowledged pluralism among the communist
parties of the world by doing away with the automatic sub-
ordination of every communist party to the Soviets. This
acknowledgement of pluralism in turn open the way to the pur-
suit of independent national strategies. Of some significance
was the subsequent loss of the aura of infallibility which
the USSR had perpetuated for so long. With agreement that
national~needs of each country would be different from those
of the Soviets, it was clear that open doctrinal conflicts
would eventually evolve (the PRC, for example, would eventually
break totally with the Soviets). Free discussions of ideo-
logical problems, openness to the West and a recognition of
alliances and coalitions would all have a profound effect on
world communism.
For the PCI, Khruschev's admissions seemed to totally
ratify the policy that had been followed by the Italian Com-
munists since Gramsci first formulated it in prison. This
was the same policy line which had been carefully reiterated
66by Togliatti in 1944. However, Togliatti was not content
to leave anything to chance so when he spoke to the Congress
he made sure that it was clear what the PCI's sentiments were.
65 Codevilla, p. 29-30.
66 Boggs, p. 80 and see also Galli, "The Road," p. 48
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With attention to his domestic audience in Italy, he demanded
that the Soviet comrades give a detailed answer to the question
of how the course of socialist development in the USSR could
have allowed a person like Stalin to become so warped. Then,
for good measure, he added that he was now sure that no one
believed that the PCI got instructions from the CPSU on how
to conduct business. In spite of these seemingly hostile
remarks, he did hint at confidential meetings with CPSU rep-
f\ 7
resentatives . It seems clear that although ties with the
USSR went beyond the personal bonds forged by Lenin and Stalin,
Togliatti T s denunciation of Stalin helped to widen any theo-
retical gap between the PCI and the USSR. Togliatti did not
press for any further concessions, perhaps because of the
stunning impact of the "secret speech" or perhaps because he
was satisfied with the majority of the items brought out in
the speech.
On his return to Italy, Togliatti addressed a meeting of
the PCI Central Committee on 15 March where he launched the
slogan of the "Italian road to socialism." During his summary
of events at the CPSU Congress he stated that:
The search for an Italian road to socialism has been our
constant preoccupation. I believe that I am able to
affirm that it has already been the preoccupation of
Antonio Gramsci, who in all his political actions, par-
ticularly in the later period of his life, aimed to
translate into Italian terms the teachings of the Russian
Revolution . 68
67 Nollau, p. 264.
68 Galli in Griffith, p. 310.
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The rest of his speech dealt with three basic themes which
he had gleaned from the CPSU Congress and clearly felt would
further the' aims of the PCI: first, he reiterated Khruschev's
peaceful coexistence theme; second, the need to change the
pattern of relationships between the USSR and other communist
parties; and finally, the growing economic strength and
69democratization of the USSR.
The first theme suited the domestic purpose of the PCI
because Soviet and international communist militancy could
be played down. If the USSR could be viewed as a peaceful
power, then the neutralist line advocated since World War I
by the PCI would be more believable to the Italian people.
The second issue was the system of socialist states. The
new autonomy within the socialist system proved the triumph
of socialism against its enemies, since the USSR no longer
had to be the bastion of the faith. It also meant that, "the
states that are marching along the road to socialism are free
70
states, independent, sovereign, fully autonomous." Further-
more, as stated by Togliatti in his description of the
"Italian road," it was clear that, although the Soviet exper-
ience in socialism was an inspiration to all, it had to be
recognized that there were also other experiences that the
71
PCI could learn from. These facts confirmed that the PCI








could and should continue to modify its strategy and tactics
to suit its own unique domestic situation.
The last theme, dealing with the vast achievements of the
Soviets, showed the validity of the Soviet system. Togliatti
was sure that these great feats should have been an inspira-
tion to all and spoke of how, once the Italians embraced
communism, they too could expect great things. In light of
the growth of post-war Italy, this optimistic view of a future
socialist economy may have been a rather shaky hypothesis.
These three themes were accepted readily by the PCI mem-
bership but the destalinizat ion of the CPSU caused a minor
crisis in the Party. The Central Committee was polarized
around Stalinists and "progressives." The polarization oc-
curred within the context of an intellectual debate which
even spilled over externally and gained notoriety in the
Italian press. The debate centered around not only the re-
pudiation of Stalin's methods, as compared to the more moder-
ate approach of Togliatti and the PCI, but also the effect of
destalinization on the international communist movement. It
is interesting to note that this obj ect iveness within the
party never threatened seriously the "we" mentality of the
PCI, and as Blackmer noted, "at no point did party discipline
become so weak that distinct factions with clear alternative





In response to the internal discussion over the CPSU XX
Congress, the editors of the periodical Nuovo Argument!
invited Togliatti and other intellectuals to write articles
for their May-June issues on the subject. In the first of
these articles Togliatti criticized the cult of personality
which had built up around Stalin. In a later article on
17 June Togliatti expounded on the fact that the PCI would
now follow the "Italian road to socialism" and what the
XXth Congress meant to world communism:
The Soviet model should no longer be obligatory. .. The
complex of the system is becoming polycentric, and in
the communist movement itself one can no longer speak
of a single guide... The criticisms of Stalin give rise
to a general problem, common to the whole movement. 74
On 24 June 1956 in an address to a Plenary session of the PCI
Central Committee, he explained the meaning of the polycentric
system:
The solution which probably most nearly corresponds
to the new situation may be to grant the individual
Communist parties complete autonomy and to set up
bilateral connections between them, so that complete
mutual understanding and mutual trust can be achieved,
conditions which are essential for the unifying not
only of the Communist movement but also of the whole
of the progressive working class movement.
...It is clear that in the new situation, while we
are working towards the creation of new contacts with
other sections of the international Communist movement,
we must energetically reaffirm and fight for the spirit
of proletarian internat ionalism. . . 75
73 For much of the text, see Daniels, Robert V., ed.,
A Documentary History of Communism (New York, 1960), p. 231-235
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Although this may have seemed to have been a declaration of
independence from the USSR, closer examination will reveal
that Togliatti only went as far in his autonomy from the
USSR as he felt was required to aid his domestic strategy
and in effect echoed Khruschev's "system of socialist states."
The destalinization process allowed the PCI to openly and
actively pursue long sought goals. The discussion in the PCI
which ensued from July to December of 1956 led to a gradual
change in the tactics to be used in the pursuit of these
goals, but the basic strategy of alliances and electoral
presence remained unchanged. The PCI obviously had to re-
structure its ties with the USSR, but this restructuring had
been slowly taking place since 1944 when Togliatti arrived
back in Italy and described his "new party." The only dis-
ruptive effect of the XXth Congress was the rise of a Bordiga-
like group within the PCI which published a series of not too
complimentary articles in June and which caused its expulsion
7 f\
from the Party.
After the Polish uprisings in July, Togliatti once again
published an article clarifying the "Italian road":
It would be... unwise to draw... the conclusion that it is
beyond any doubt that in Italy we will be able to reach
socialism by means of a series of parliamentary decisions.
The error therefore lies in saying that the terms "Italian
road" and "parliamentary road" are equivalent. Will we
succeed, and how, in using Parliament to foster the ad-
vance to socialism? In any given situation the problem
must be faced and resolved in the light of concrete data
...But why is it also wrong and senseless to establish an
identity between the "Italian road" and the "democratic
road"? Because everv road that leads to socialism is
7 f\
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Togliatti was still juggling words to arrive at a satisfactory
explanation as to how the Party was to progress. Clearly, he
was still concerned with maintaining his tactical flexibility
as each new international and national development occurred.
The rapid way in which the situation in Poland was cleared
up allowed the PCI to escape without major adjustments, but
the events in Hungary in October of 1956 were not so easily
overlooked.
The armed intervention and decisive crushing of the revolt
in Hungary caused such a furor in Italy that the PCI was
forced to make some hard decisions concerning their associa-
tion with the international communist movement and the USSR.
Perhaps because of their continued attachment to the Soviets,
the PCI's response was too supportive of the Soviets for the
Italian people.
Instead of open outrage, the PCI concerned itself with
the ideological validity of the Soviet action. Togliatti
originally agreed with the spirit of the Hungarian people
in wanting to pursue their own form of socialism; however,
under the pressure of the Soviets, the PCI finally defended
the "painful necessity" of Soviet intervention because "coun-
terrevolutionaries" had taken over the reform movement and
the Soviets were compelled to restore unity to the




socialist camp. The continued uproar in Italy over the
intervention and the negative response to the PCI's analysis
of the situation made it obvious to the PCI that a close
association with the USSR could prove harmful to the PCI.
By 1957, when over 200,000 party members had torn up their
cards, Togliatti decided that such losses were not necessary
and that all that was required was a tactic which would main-
tain close relations with the international movement while
allowing the PCI to accept or reject anything the Soviets did
and still remain good communists. Following the "Italian
road" in a polycentric system was clearly the way to solve
the problem.
The post-war period up to 1956 saw the PCI caught in a
conflict of domestic and international priorities. The PCI
had been unable to pursue a successful domestic strategy under
Stalin's relentless directive pressure. With the release
granted by Khruschev's "secret speech" at the CPSU XX Congress,
the Party was finally free to follow the "Italian road to
socialism." During this period of settling into the "Italian
road" the PCI would need to make fine corrections to its pro-
gram in order to find an equilibrium within the strategic
confines of Party goals. These adjustments would lead to
domestic and international criticism and yet the PCI would
ultimately be proven correct in its policies. The new
78
Hellman, Stephen M. Organization and Ideology in Four
Italian Communist Federations. (Cambridge, 1975), p. 50, 180.
82

polycentric system of socialist states had offered the PCI




VIII. THE PCI FOLLOWS THE "ITALIAN ROAD"
The period from 1956 to 1964, although turbulent in terms
of international communist relations, was a period of domestic
settling for the PCI. The process of de-stalinization caused
frequent discussions over which way to go and what tactics
to employ, but basically the Party began to solidify behind
Togliatti's "Italian road." The decline of Soviet authority
in the international movement as well as the Sino-Soviet
split encouraged the Party to rely more and more on its own
ideological and political resources. As its electoral strength
grew, the PCI realized that its access to power was not de-
pendent on its association with the USSR. As a result of
the decision not to rely on the Soviets, the PCI moved more
decisively forward with its system of alliances and penetra-
tion into Italian life.
The impact of the XXth CPSU Congress and the events in
Hungary caused a drastic drop in Party membership of 217,197
79by September of 1957. Togliatti moved swiftly to expand
the base of the PCI once again. He urged all cadre members
to actively recruit new members. He even made some changes
in the Party hierarchy to insure that he could maintain a
smooth running organization and weed out some of the dissen-
tion. Enrico Berlinguer was made responsible for the over-all
79
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Party organization after having performed so admirably with
the communist youth organizations.
On the international scene, the PCI was still cautious
in its dealings with other parties. In November 1957, the
PCI delegates attended the 40th anniversary celebration of
the USSR revolution where apparently the Soviets attempted
to restore some of their old worldwide leadership. The
"Moscow Declaration" which followed the meeting stated common
principles of international unity as well as reconfirmed the
8leading role of the USSR. It was clear to the PCI at that
time that the Chinese and the Soviets were having fundamental
problems and despite its cautious attitude, the Party tried
to help solve the problems.
The involvement in the Sino-Soviet split by the PCI is
quite complicated. The PCI attempted to mediate the dispute
between the two parties without making either hostile. Later
developments would make it necessary for the PCI to side with
the Soviets in the dispute, but at this point there was a
real concern in the PCI that autonomy did not mean that the
socialist parties should not be united, at least in basic
theory. This need to maintain unity was given as the reason
for signing the "Moscow Declaration." In any case, the Ital-
ians gained additional prestige in the international movement
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with the international movement allowed them to take advan-
tage of the situation to pursue an independent domestic policy-
free from conflicts with USSR.
Things were not going as well for the PCI domestically.
The PSI, which had been drifting away from the PCI since 1956,
continued to move farther away. At the PSI Congress in 1957
the Party Secretary, Nenni, pushed through a resolution stat-
ing that democracy was as important as attaining a socialist
81
society. By 1959 the Unity of Action Pact was formally
abrogated and the PSI moved swiftly to ingratiate itself with
the ruling Christian Democratic Party. By 1960 some DC-PSI
local administrations were formed and in 1963 the PSI was
participating fully in the government. The PCI's strategy
was obviously affected by this defection, but the inclusion
of a leftist party in the government was a blessing in dis-
guise. The Communists reasoned that if one leftist party
could gain a respectable place in government, why couldn't
the PCI? The answer to that question was found in the goals
of the parties; one wished to reform and one wished to trans-
form. The people of Italy were not ready for a radical
transformation but perhaps as they became used to the PSI
they might change.
The "economic miracle" in Italy in the late 1950's and
early 1960's also forced the PCI to change their tactics.
Some explanation for this growth had to be made and the PCI
8
1
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had to find something better to offer the workers. With a
751 majority in the largest union, the CGIL, the PCI was able
to exploit much of the economic growth to their own advantage
by saying the PCI's direction of labor had facilitated the
growth. While no longer stridently predicting the imminent
collapse of the capitalist system, the PCI was quick to point
out that this was only because the PCI had been helping the
capitalists to stave off collapse. The PCI even admitted
that perhaps the EEC was not as bad as the Party had initially
described it.
In January and February of 1960 the PCI held its Ninth
Congress. The first item on the agenda was a "new" long term
strategy designed to increase the PCI's inroads into the
middle class. By the Congress almost 250,000 members had
been lost since 1956 and the PCI needed to recoup its losses
if the over-all strategy of a mass democratic party was to
be effective. Togliatti called for all democratic elements
of society, peasants, workers, intellectuals, small industri-
8 3
alists and white collar workers to unite together. This
"new majority" of all Catholic and anti-fascist forces would
Q A
then be able to build a new Italian socialist system.





84 Hellman, p. 117. This "new majority" was described
by Gramsci in his theoretical writings and crops up as new
theory now and again. Berlinguer's "historic compromise"
is based on this "new majority."

After speaking at length of democracy for the people of
Italy, the PCI displayed a little of its own internal "de-
mocracy" at the Congress by replacing some of its leadership
so as to make room for people who were more supportive of
the "Italian road." Along with the earlier resignations of
leading party members Giolitti, Reale and Onofrio, this move
solidified the Party's stand on what the future strategy of
the PCI would be. 85
The autonomous role of the PCI got an added boost in
November and December at the Moscow Conference of 81 communist
countries when Khruschev made an effort to recognize the dif-
ferences between socialist countries, a theme he had touched
on only slightly at the XXI CPSU Congress in 1959. 86 Khruschev
stressed the need for all parties to be independent and equal
and to "shape their policies according to specific conditions
8 7in their respective countries." He even went so far as to
refuse to have the CPSU designated as the leader of the com-
o o
munist world. The PCI wholeheartedly supported the Soviet
89position and once again its forward position was vindicated.
8 5
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Deputy General Secretary Luigi Longo still reflect the smug
satisfaction of the PCI.
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The period from late 1960 until the XXII CPSU Congress
in October of 1961 was one of increasing turbulence in the
international communist movement. The Sino-Soviet dispute
was becoming more intense. The PCI finally sided with the
Soviets because of the greater power of the Soviets to main-
90tain unity in the international communist movement.
By the CPSU Congress in October, Khruschev was still will-
ing to recognize the differences between socialist countries.
He was also willing to continue the process of destalinization
begun at the XXth Congress, but the extreme positions of
Albania and China forced his hand. The events of the XXII
Congress and the expulsion of Albania are well known, but one
may wish to read Dallin's book, Diversity in International
Communism
,
which contains many original documents of the
91Congress. The utter disarray that the communist system was
in after the Congress would bring about mixed emotions in the
PCI.
This second wave of destalinization caused extended debate
in the PCI over the unity of the socialist movement and the
events within the Soviet Union. One of the features which was
emerging as a unique feature of the Party was the ability to
view other socialist parties objectively and make fine adjust-
ments to PCI strategy if something better were found. Although
perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the debates of
90 See Galli and Griffith for some of the reasoning behind
why this was done and other particulars.
91 See Dallin, Diversity in International Communism .
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October and November 1961, it was clear that even though
supportive of the Soviets for unity reasons, the PCI was
critical of Soviet policy. The PCI openly criticized Soviet
domestic life as not fitting the pattern that Italian growth
should take. These debates clearly went beyond the destalin-
ization process of Khruschev because they dealt with the need
for continual revision of policy and structure to keep up
with reality. Because of Togliatti's strong leadership, the
debates were steered in a centrist direction so as to avoid
many of the radical viewpoints in the Party. The Party was
able to once again maintain discipline and order and come up
with a policy formulated to please as many members as possible
The final communique" at the end of the debates reflected this
92
compromise.
Togliatti's initial address to the Central Committee,
which reemphasized the autonomy and independence of the Ital-
ian Communists, set the framework for the final communique":
The decisions of the XX Congress, and particularly
the texts relating to the possibility of avoiding a
new world conflict, or to the various ways of reaching
socialism, etc., had great importance to us, not because
they caused us to revise the policy we had followed for
twenty years but because, by confirming the correctness
of that policy, they enabled us to go more deeply into
it, give a better justification for it, develop it with
greater courage in today's circumstances, and forge a
better link, in all our work between practice and




p. 182. See also Dallin's book for
the actual documents and Sylvia Sprigge's article, "De-Stal-
inization in the Italian Communist Party," World Today , XVIII
(January 1962), p. 23-29, for an excellent analysis of this
period.
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Certainly we cannot deny that this way of acting of
ours has given our party a particular, original stamp
in the very extensive camp of the international Commun-
ist movement of today. But this does not at all disturb
us--quite the contrary. We have found nothing in Marx,
Lenin, or Gramsci that contradicts or condemns the
manner in which we are moving. We have always been
persistent advocates, for quite a long time now, of the
belief that the struggles of the working class must have
a stamp of their own, corresponding to the conditions
and traditions of the country, and a corresponding
course of political action. 94
He made it clear that the Party was determined within the
framework set out by the Soviets to become a completely
autonomous party.
The final communique published by the PCI Secretariat
on 28 November 1961 more accurately depicted the diversity
of views in the Central Committee but still showed the
strength of Togliatti's leadership. The issues debated and
the diversity of opinions are contained in Dallin's book but
can be summarized as follows: first, the PCI applauded the
Soviet advancement; second, it once again spelled out the
thesis that peaceful coexistence was the road for the PCI
to follow; third, it confirmed the policy of des talinization
and the policies of the XXII CPSU Congress, but made some
rather harsh accusations about earlier errors of the Soviets;
fourth, it acknowledged the idea of a multi-party, plural-
istic system as being acceptable; fifth, it affirmed soli-
darity with the international movement; sixth, it stated that





international socialism; and lastly, it confirmed the Leninist
95principle of democratic centralism.
In the final analysis, the conclusions of the communique
were more a compilation of several policies and strategies
which had emerged in earlier PCI debates. No major change
in the "Italian road" had occurred and the debate could better
be compared to one which would arise in the CPSU Politburo
than a schism or break in Party cohesiveness and discipline.
The independent course which the Party now supported was no
different than that advocated by Togliatti in 1944 or Gramsci
in 1930.
While international events involving the Chinese and
Soviets held much of the Party's attention, domestic policies
were still important, and two noteworthy events occurred in
1963. The brightest spot seemed to be the growing rapproche-
ment with the Catholic Church. In April 1963, Pope John XXIII
issued his famous Pacem in Terris which essentially opened a
new dialogue with the Marxists and undermined the discrimin-
96
ation against the PCI. The inclusion of the PSI in the
government also legitimized the position of the left and an
"opening to the left" was underway in Italy.
Internationally, the PCI continued to side with the USSR
in the Sino-Soviet dispute because of concern about the dis-
ruptive effect the quarrel was having on the international
95
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communist movement. On the other hand, the PCI did not wish
to have the CPSU regain its supremacy in the world movement
for fear that the Italian Communists might lose some of their
autonomy. Therefore, the PCI resisted Soviet attempts to
excommunicate the Chinese through a worldwide communist party
conference, but instead asked for a set of bilateral confer-
97
ences to help work out problems amicably. Togliatti found
another subtle way to bring his objections to the Soviet's
attention. He published a series of letters between himself
and Gramsci in 1926 concerning the factional struggle in the
98CPSU at that time. The gist of the letters was that fac-
tional disputes would have an adverse effect on international
unity, which would have a detrimental outcome for the Soviet
leadership. The Soviets' response to this subterfuge was
rather neutral although they did register that they had seen
the articles
.
During the course of the dispute there was an obvious
division of labor between the PCI and the CPSU. The PCI was
able to voice ideas which the CPSU was toying with but prior
to Soviet official pronouncement and therefore proposed ideas
99that seemingly ran counter to the Soviets. " This division
of labor was to be extended throughout the 1960 's and allowed
greater flexibility in the Soviet strategy as well as Italian
foreign policy.
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Soon after his debates with the CPSU over international
unity, Togliatti left for a scheduled trip to the USSR.
While staying in Yalta, Togliatti became ill and died. The
memorandum he wrote to himself for Khruschev on the eve of
his death was to be one of the more important Party docu-
ments. While the "Yalta Memorandum" was not meant for public
consumption, it was quickly published as Togliatti's "test-
ament." There was nothing particularly new or remarkable
in the "testament" but the circumstances surrounding the
authorship put a historical stamp on it.
Togliatti's memorandum expressed many of the tendencies
which the Party had exhibited all along but the fact that it
was his final document led to much interpretation. His "test-
ament" dealt with several broad topics. He first declared
that the PCI would attend a preparatory meeting in Moscow for
an international communist meeting, but he criticized the
Soviet handling of the Chinese situation and the slowness of
destalinization in Eastern Europe. He wrote at length about
the autonomy of the communist parties and reinforced different
ways to socialism. He suggested that perhaps a looser form
of exchange could take place between communist parties rather
than a new international organization. He also crystallized
the idea of transforming the state from within when he wrote
about the possibility:
A good description of his testament is published in




....of the working class capturing the positions of
power within a state that has not changed its bour-
geois nature, and therefore the possibility of fighting
for its progressive transformation from inside. 101
The effects of the "testament" on the Soviets were nega-
tive to say the least. The "testament" created a platform
for criticism of just about every Soviet policy. It also
undermined the Soviet international position considerably.
The stand taken by Togliatti was clearly not intended to
support the Chinese view and yet the Chinese quickly capital-
ized on the points of international unity raised by Togliatti.
What Togliatti would not have done to the Soviets while he
was alive, his "testament" did after his death.
The impact of the "testament" on internal PCI politics
was to reinforce the policies already in being and provide
a concrete guide for the future. The PCI had travelled a
rocky road during Togliatti's stewardship, but by the time
of his death a cohesive Party had decided on a common plan
for the future. Togliatti had applied Gramsci's theories of
iMarx and Lenin to the unique Italian situation and formulated
the "Italian road to socialism." More than anything else,
the Italian road was a pragmatic approach to the future which
took into account the situation in Italy and applied the
appropriate strategy or tactic. The Party now was given a
much more concrete contemporary guide to the future. What
Marx, Lenin and Gramsci had done for Party ideology, Togliatti
had done for the strategy and tactics of the Party.
Est et Quest, No. 327, p. 6.
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IX. 1965 TO 1976; CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN COMMUNISM
Togliatti's loss to the Party was a great blow, but a
final tribute to the man was the smoothness by which the
Party machinery continued to run and the ease of the succes-
sion process. The Party functioned in his absence as he had
planned. The strategy of the "Italian road" was maintained
and the tactical spirit of adapting the Party to practical
reality was applied at every opportunity. While affirming
the image of autonomy, the PCI sustained the idea of inter-
national communist solidarity and continued its amicable
102
associations with the USSR.
Togliatti died on 21 August 1964 and on 26 August Luigi
Longo was elected unanimously as the new General Secretary by
the PCI's Central Committee and Central Control Commission.
Longo was the obvious choice and proved to be a good one.
Seven years Togliatti's junior, Longo was the next senior
party official and Deputy General Secretary. His excellent
record in the Comintern and in the Italian underground added
to his credentials of excellent party work in the post-war
years. Longo ' s release of Togliatti's "testament" despite
Soviet displeasure was a clear indication that he intended
103
to follow the policies outlined by Togliatti.
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Longo's organizational skill and centrist tactics were suf-
ficient to keep the Party on the "Italian road" and increase
the growth of Party strength.
Despite angering the Soviets over the release of the
"Testament" the PCI did its best to maintain good relations
with the Soviets between 1964 and 1968. The PCI position
could best be described as that of the loyal opposition.
They still resisted the reclaiming of supremacy of the world
movement by the Soviets but they echoed the Soviet line on
104China, Albania and most other problems.
The Party's membership continued to decline from its high
mark of 2,552,625 members in 1950. This was a deceptive
problem because the actual base of sympathizers as reflected
in electoral increases was still growing. By 1965 the youth
movement had one-half million members, more than 150,000 over
1955. Also, the communist extension of its organization into
all aspects of the Italian social structure was becoming more
extensive. A case in point was the CGEI, where, although PCI
total numbers were reduced, the influence in the organization
remained strong and was extended to include new sympathizers.
(This penetration of Italian life will be discussed in a later
chapter.) The PCI hierarchy seemed to be satisfied with the
Party's progress and their plan was working even though it
was taking a long time. The PCI philosophy was that when one






In January 1966 the PCI met for its Eleventh Congress.
The central topic of discussion was the growth of the Party
strength. Pietro Ingrao and a small group urged more liberal
action on this issue but their ideas were overruled.
Longo ' s policy put forward to the Congress was a reiteration
of Togliatti's plan for a "single party of the working class"
based on a "new majority" formed "through joint action between
left-wing lay and Catholic forces." Longo saw the "new
party" as a combination of all socialist forces:
It is directed toward all of the left-wing forces; its
purpose is to create new forms of cooperation and unity
among them: on one hand, to help create a new unity of
popular and democratic forces, and a new parliamentary
majority, and on the other, to create a single party of ,
n
_
the working class embracing all really socialist forces.
This "new" plan satisfied all sides of the debate over the
Party's future strategy because it provided the most real-
istic approach to the Italian situation.
In addition to the "new plan" the normal range of other
topics were brought up at the conference: the increasing
worldwide crisis of capitalism; new contradictions in the
Italian political and social life; the Party's propositions
for the development of the new society; and the failure of
the present center-left government in Italy to solve the
Hellman, p. 210.
106 Caldwell, p. 522. See also "Italy," The Yearbook on
International Communist Affairs (hereafter referred to as
YICA) , 1966, ed. Milorad M. Drachkovitch (Stanford, 1967),
p. 610.




country's problems. In the final document of the Congress,
the PCI expressed the continuity of the Party ideology as well
as the dedication to the transformation of Italian society:
With full confidence in the will of the Italian people
to advance along the path shown by Gramsci and Togliatti,
the Communists will vigorously carry forward their fight
for a new policy, for the transformation of Italian
society, for socialism. 109
There were some continued internal mumblings, perhaps
brought on by the lack of a charismatic leader such as
Togliatti; however, the Party hierarchy ably handled the
problems. The solution took the form of numerous expulsions
of Party members in the fall of 1966, beginning with that of
a Senator, Luca di Luca. In September, Silvio Paolicchi,
a federation secretary, and two regional secretaries, Giovanni
Ceccarelli and Settimo Pallechi, were also expelled from the
Party. "Discussion" was allowed within the Party's proper
channels if it was sufficiently discrete and "friendly" but
dissention and factionalism were dealt with by traditional
Marxist- Leninist discipline and democratic centralism.
Luigi Longo represented the PCI at the CPSU XXIII Congress
His speech was very low key on international topics. He re-
frained from openly attacking the Chinese position, as was
the case at the last CPSU Congress, but Longo did reiterate
108
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his solidarity with the Soviets. The PCI press more than
made up for Longo's omission of mention of the Chinese by
directly attacking the Chinese for not attending the Congress
and for the "extremely grave errors" in recent Chinese pol-
112icy. Longo was apparently still trying to maintain some
friendly relations with the Chinese and repair the breach in
international communist unity. However, it was obvious from
articles in Italy that the PCI was becoming more pro-Soviet,
as the Chinese drifted farther away from the Soviets and
displayed open hostility to any rapprochement with the inter-
national movement.
In 1967 the Party continued to follow a moderate approach
to domestic affairs. The strategy of combining with all
Catholic and socialist forces was pursued diligently. Nothing
particularly noteworthy occurred, which suited the PCI's strat-
egy of a low profile penetration and it was therefore free to
expound on international occurrences.
Several major policy statements were made by the Italian
Communist leadership on the international situation during
the year. Enrico Berlinguer delivered a speech to the joint
plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Com-
mission in which he supported the idea of convoking a world
conference of communist parties. This agreement with the










communist movement. Berlinguer's position was ratified
by Longo and the PCI leadership; however, in late October
and early November Longo published a series of articles
dealing with the world communist conference and other issues.
In these articles he hedged on the Party's earlier endorse-
ment of a world communist conference by calling for intensive
114
study of world problems prior to the conference. Longo
also repeated Togliatti's policy concerning unity in the
world communist movement in the form of a loose association
of socialist states. The term "unity in diversity" was to
guide this association. This vacillation in the Party showed
that the PCI was still following a centrist policy in its
views toward autonomy and proletarian internationalism.
The events of the "Prague Spring" and the subsequent in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia proved to be somewhat of a problem
to the "fence sitting" strategy of the PCI. The Party was
forced by domestic pressure to make some sort of a commitment.
After showing caution initially, the PCI approved the new tack
being taken by the Czech communists in the spring of 1968.
In May Longo visited Czechoslovakia and expressed his Party's
satisfaction with the way in which Czechoslovakian socialism
was progressing.
Longo was in Moscow in August when the invasion occurred.
The uproar was so great in Italy that, in his absence, the
113
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Directorate issued a statement expressing "serious disagree-
ment" with the "wholly unjustified" military invasion.
Upon Longo's return the PCI leaders met in several emergency
sessions to confirm their initial reaction. Even during this
display of Party indignation at the Czechoslovakian invasion
there was not unanimous agreement. There were many old party
officials who were not convinced that there was any differ-
ence between Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
therefore there was no reason to take offense with the Soviet
A 4. 1 • 116undertaking
.
The debate in the PCI made it clear that three issues
were involved in the Czechoslovakian invasion: the reaffir-
mation of worldwide Soviet hegemony within the socialist
"system"; the autonomy of socialist parties; and the freedom
to be allowed within any given country. The "Brezhnev Doc-
trine" made it clear where the Soviets stood, but it was more
117difficult to ascertain the PCI's position. The main thrust
of the PCI was that the properly constituted organs of the
Czechoslovakian state were capable of handling the situation
in Czechoslovakia and should have been allowed to do so inde-
pendently. In an article in Rinascita , Berlinguer questioned






For an extensive and informative look at the impact
of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" see Mitchell, F. Judson, "The
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103

whether or not all political avenues had been exhausted by
118
the Soviets before the invasion began. As can be seen by
his article in Rinascita , his objections to the whole situa-
tion were on more of a philosophical rather than purely
practical level.
In that article, Berlinguer tackled the problem of Soviet
hegemony and autonomy of the socialist parties in such a way
as to side with the Soviets while at the same time taking a
backhanded slap at the latter:
If we point out and underline this undeniable situ-
ation (of different roads to socialism) , this does not
mean that we wish to detract from the fact that the
Soviet Union represents the first, the most grandiose
and multiform experience in the building of socialism
nor that we deny that this experience has been, remains,
and will always be a rich source of precious information
for all. It means, however, that we recognize, even in
the building of socialism, the legitimacy and indeed the
absolute historical and political necessity of the most
varied and original roads. And it means that we must
consider in a new way the problem of how we can and must
ensure a system of relations among the socialist states
founded on common solidarity in struggle and reciprocal
collaboration, despite this diversity.
On this point, we have always expressed the opinion
that one of the essential conditions to guarantee this
objective is absolute and rigorous respect of the prin-
ciples of sovereignty, equal rights, and non-interference
in relations among socialist states. H"
He gave the impression in several places in the article that
there was a definite need for action in Czechoslovakia, but
because of the philosophical level of the article he never









Berlinguer's article also reflected the PCI's preoccupa-
tion with the extent of internal freedom a country was to
have. Since Italian public opinion had focused on the freedom
issue as the real reason for Soviet intervention, the Party
had to make it a part of its discussion also. While not
naming specifics at that time, the PCI did stress the fact
that internal conditions were the sole domain of each inde-
120pendent party. The freedom issue will be analyzed more
in depth in a later chapter.
As discussed above, the Italian people reacted favorably
to the democratization of a communist regime and, like the
rest of the world, was shocked by the invasion and suppression
of freedom. But just as quickly as the rest of the world, the
Italian people let this issue of Czechoslovakia die, and al-
though the PCI followed suit, periodically articles confirming
the Party's initial stand on Czechoslovakia surfaced. The
issues in these articles have always been the same: agreement
with the new course the Czechoslovakians had been pursuing;
the Czech Communists were capable of handling the situation;
and the military intervention only aggravated the problem.
As far as over-all impact to the PCI went, besides casting
doubt once again on whether a communist country could ever be
free and autonomous, the PCI's membership in 1969 dipped to












the membership figures were on the rise, so the effects of
the intervention seemed to have been only momentary.
In February of 1969 at Bologna, the PCI held its Twelfth
Congress during which nothing new was added to the Party
platform of the last Congress. Peaceful coexistence, soli-
darity with the Soviets, "validity of the strategy of reforms
and alliances," the new majority, and a need to tighten up
122
the organization were the major themes at the Congress.
Although Czechoslovakia was mentioned briefly, the speeches
about Vietnam evoked the greatest applause and most interest.
A dissident group which had begun to form in 1968 became
more visible at the Congress. This "leftist" group was al-
lowed to address the Congress but warned about their criti-
cisms. The group continued to express criticisms of the USSR
and PCI throughout the Spring and by June had published its
own periodical, II Manifesto . The persistence of the group,
despite a number of opportunities to return to the "Italian
road," prompted the PCI to expel the group temporarily. This
temporary expulsion was made permanent by local federations
in November and a wave of purges followed in November and
123
December which cleared the Party of other dissident elements.
The PCI attended the International Meeting of Communist
and Workers' Parties at Moscow on 5-11 June 1969.
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Berlinguer led a large contingent which firmly discussed
both Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Once again
Italian declarations were more directed at increasing dis-
cussion to solve problems rather than placing blame on any
individual party. The PCI was successful in preventing any
condemnation of China in the final document, but because some
controversial issues in parts of the document may have offended
non-communist Italians, the PCI only signed the last section
of the document.
The so-called "Hot Autumn" of 1969 brought PCI attention
back to the domestic arena. Worker dissatisfaction that had
been building since 1967 when the Italian "economic miracle"
began to fade erupted in Autumn in a series of massive grass-
125
roots strikes. The PCI was momentarily disoriented by the
spontaneity of the strikes and the Party's inability to con-
trol the tempo. It was imperative for the Communists to bring
the strikes rapidly under control because a large sector of
the middle class was swiftly becoming alienated by the events
of the "Hot Autumn." Gradually, the striking died down and
became controllable. Once the strikes had subsided, the PCI
quickly proclaimed a victory for the Party at having been
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The challenge to the Party provided by the labor unrest
provided fuel for the II Manifesto group, which played upon
the indecision of the PCI. Lingering "leftists" within the
Party also called for a more specific policy from the PCI.
Since the PCI was slowly trying to improve its image as a
moderate party, it found a need to disassociate itself from
these factions, so further purges and resignations occurred
in 1970 and 1971.
The emphasis on alliances and coalitions to extend the
moderate image of the PCI brought new members to the PCI ranks
in the form of women, because of the PCI's support of the
divorce referendum in 1970, and many businessmen, by the
Party's support of the institutional status quo. The Party
also found opportunities to criticize the Czechoslovakian
intervention and the Soviets' "repression" of freedoms, which
further increased its respectability at home (but only after
the Italian press had raised the issues, and then the Party
only went as far as domestic consumption required)
.
In 1971 the PCI participated in the CPSU XXIV Congress,
where Luigi Longo delivered the Italians' address to the
Congress. After expressing the usual platitudes, Longo sum-
marized the PCI's international views:
Our international solidarity does not mean and, needless
to say, cannot mean the complete coincidence of our
positions with the positions of each socialist country
or, on a broader plane, with the positions of each Com-
munist or Worker's Party, positions that it has taken
and is taking on its own responsibility. Our solidarity
means profound solidarity with a country like yours,
with the other socialist countries, with all of that
world that has already altered the destiny of mankind
108

12 7by the very fact of its existence and by its gains.
This same theme was repeated later in the year in a series
of articles published on the occasion of Nikita Khruschev's
128death. Once again the PCI seemed to be proclaiming the
need for autonomy and yet still solidly in the Soviet camp.
The polemics against the USSR never caused a serious break
with the Soviets, and the PCI was always quick to praise
the Soviets at every opportunity.
The PCI's thirteenth Congress, held in March of 1972,
was focused on domestic affairs again. Berlinguer, the
newly- elected General Secretary, in his opening remarks to
the Congress proposed a "new" program of cooperation in the
country: "In a country like Italy a new perspective can
only come about through collaboration between the three great
129popular currents: Communist, Socialist, and Catholic."
He added that this new force would require the defeat of the
ruling Christian Democrats so they would have to open their
forces to contact with the Communists. Berlinguer was6
clearly trying to impress the Italian electorate with the
"1 "7 *7
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openness and willingness of the PCI to cooperate with all
aspects of Italian society (the Congress just happened to
coincide with the elections in Italy). His willingness to
cooperate obviously did not extend to the Christian Democrats
and, in actuality, Berlinguer's "new" proposals were just old
policies dating back to Gramsci, Togliatti and Longo, but
which were worded in a slightly different way.
Berlinguer's accession to power posed no difficulties
since he had been a protege" of Togliatti and Deputy General
Secretary under Longo. The 72-year-old Longo was given the
honorific post of Party President where he was to remain a
persuasive but not initiative force in PCI policy making.
The election of Berlinguer to the General Secretary's post
meant that, despite occasional internal disputes, the PCI
policies which had been initiated by Gramsci were to be con-
tinued unchanged by the new leadership of the PCI
.
Early in March, members of the PCI met with CPSU officials
to discuss the international movement and foreign policy
issues. The joint communique issued at the end of the meeting
proclaimed agreement on issues long considered to be points
of contention between the two parties
:
The delegations of the CPSU and the PCI proceed from the
premise that in the development of the revolutionary
struggle in all countries there are common principles
which manifest themselves in different ways according to
the specific conditions in each country. Each country
independently develops its own way toward the democratic
and socialist transformation of society and the building
of socialism according to the conditions and traditions
of its own country. The two parties reaffirm determin-
ation... to contribute to consolidation of the unity of
international communist and workers' movement and to its
110

Enrico Berlinguer and Luigi Longo at a PCI rally
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solidarity and cooperation, while respecting the autonomy
and equality of rights of each party on the basis of
non-interference in internal affairs. 131
The communique also emphasized the "damage done by any form
of anti-Sovietism" but affirmed the policy of overcoming the
13 2Cold War legacy of opposing military blocs in Europe.
Things seemed to be going well between the two parties but
discussions over the different printed versions in Soviet and
Italian newspapers led to problems. The omission of certain
points of autonomy in the Soviet version caused Berlinguer to
comment on that subject and on other topics of Soviet foreign
policy, most notably "freedoms" and Czechoslovakia. After
reaffirming the PCI's original stand on Czechoslovakia, Ber-
linguer mentioned the lack of freedom in Eastern Europe.
These remarks were broadened to include the repression of
dissidents in the Soviet Union. The conclusion drawn by the
articles was that Italian Communist and Soviet ideas of
democracy were not the same.
The right wing coup d'etat in Chile crushed what the
Italians thought was to be the model for future communist
accession to power. The Chilean experience confirmed the
PCI's policy of the need to form broad alliances to gain
power but indicated a necessity for a much greater majority
to hold power. B.erlinguer qualified his earlier proposals
131










for collaboration of the "democratic forces" of Italy by
saying that a simple majority would not be sufficient in the
future to achieve the socialist society but that a "historic
compromise" among the great majority of Italian people was
134
required. The PCI leaders emphasized that this was a long
term project and would not be accomplished overnight. The
"historic compromise" gave a new twist to the old alliance
strategy and became the central point of future PCI policy
(because of its importance, it will be discussed in a later
chapter)
.
International affairs in 1974 and 1975 tended to prove
that the PCI was correct in taking a more long term approach
in its domestic policies. Specifically, the events in Portu-
gal reinforced the events in Chile and prompted Berlinguer to
go further in his concessions to the other parties in Italy
so as to facilitate the "historic compromise." Berlinguer
emphasized the PCI's willingness to remain in the EEC and
even stated that the PCI would no longer press for Italy's
withdrawal from NATO. This change in posture on NATO was
explained by Berlinguer as being designed to reduce friction
between the left and right in Italy.
The domestic and international strategy of the PCI was
obviously working well, as evidenced by the large gains in
the regional elections in 1975 (the PCI gained almost 6%
134
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compared to a DC loss of 2%) . The PCI gained control of
three more regions as well as almost all of the major cities
137
in Italy. Had these elections taken place on a national
level, the ruling coalition led by the DC would surely have
been forced to make concessions to the Communists in 1975.
At the PCI's fourteenth Congress in March of 1975, the
Party dealt with the usual international and national problems
but focused the majority of the discussions on the "historic
13 8
compromise." Berlinguer stressed the need for a "trans-
formation" of the DC before the "historic compromise" could
take place and that the coalition would then take place only
within the framework laid out by the "democratic and socialist"
forces
.
The PCI, in turn, was doing a little transforming itself.
The Politburo was entirely eliminated and the Secretariat was
increased from 7 to 9 members. This streamlining was perhaps
due to the leadership's desire to increase control and disci-
pline within the Party as the regional organizations spread
out and decentralized.
The Party's policies in the rest of 1975 and 1976 remained
almost unchanged except for some tactical changes which will
136 Codevilla, Angelo. YICA, 1976 , ed. Richard F. Staar
(Stanford, 1976), p. 180-182.
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be noted in later chapters. This cohesiveness and stability
of the PCI continued to garner good results, as shown by the
elections of June 1976 when the PCI polled 34.4% of the vote
compared with 38.7% for the DC. 139 The DC was for a time
even running behind the PCI in the polls and seemed in danger
of losing.
The PCI emerged from the elections as the real victor
since it had a dramatic increase in votes and yet did not have
to take the reins of government while the country was in such
a shaky position economically. Because of the DCs inability
to form a government alone after the elections, they were
forced to rely on abstentions of no-confidence votes from the
PCI and therefore allow some limited participation in govern-
ment by the PCI. This penetration was in the form of the
PCI's acquisition of chairmanships of permanent commissions
of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies for the first time in
140the history of the post-war republic. In addition, Pietro
Ingrao was named as Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. The
PCI gained the chairmanship of the following commissions: in
the Chamber of Deputies: Constitutional Affairs, Finance and
Treasury, Public Works and Transport; in the Senate: Budget,
Agriculture, Councils for Authorization to Proceed and for
the Elections. If one understands that a majority of the
bills passed by the Italian government are passed by these
1 3Q
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commissions, then it is easy to realize the tremendous gains
141
made by the PCI in the June elections. By claiming seven
of the twenty- four chairmanships, the PCI is now able to
exert more influence in the government. Although the repre-
sentation in the commissions is proportional to the electoral
vote, the chairmanship allows the PCI to "guide" the decisions
of the commissions in the PCI's favor (as in the U.S. Congress)
By 1976 the PCI had advanced well along the "Italian road"
to power. While not denying the internationalism of the Party,
changes in the international relations of the PCI had taken
place. A superficial examination of history alone may even
indicate a deradicalization of the party to the extent that
they might be just another democratic party. A closer inspec-
tion of the Party should reveal whether or not the tactical
and strategic changes made throughout the Party's history led
to ideological changes also.
For an explanation of the workings of the legislative
process, see the Instituto Italiano Di Cultura's Facts About
Italy
,
No. 5, "The Legislative Process in Italy" and No. 6
,
"The Parliament," (Italy, May 1970). Also see Adams, John C.






X. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
The origins of Italian communist ideology are two-fold:
the historical cultural context of the Italian national
experience; and the writings of Marx and Lenin. While it is
not the intent of this paper to accomplish a descriptive
analysis of Italian communist ideology or a comparative anal-
ysis with the Soviet system, certain aspects of both types
of analyses will emerge during the description of the char-
acter of the PCI.
It is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge of
Marxism-Leninism; however, some parallels will be drawn with
Marxist-Leninist theory to refresh the reader's memory for
comparison with the unique Italian experience.
To speak effectively of the ideology one must have a firm
idea of what ideology is. For the PCI, it is a symbolic guide
to action, a source of solidarity and communication which
provides for concrete role definition, as Gramsci wrote:
Ideologies, thus are "true" philosophy because they are
philosophical "vulgarizations" that carry masses to con-
crete action, to the transformation of reality. That is,~
ideologies are the mass aspect of each philosophical
conception which in the "philosopher," looks abstractly
universal, beyond space and time.... 142
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Within this broad context Gramsci further subdivided ideology.
Besides the pure philosophy, there are doctrinal elements,
the general direction of political action, and the action
program itself.
In modern Italian revolutionary ideology, the doctrinal
assumptions about the nature of reality have led to several
changes in actions programs but not philosophy. This is
clearly evidenced in the historical context and will be re-
emphasized more later.
Assumptions about the realities of Italian politics have
generated one of the unique aspects of the PCI, which is the
ability to quickly alter its program to meet the changing state
of societal affairs. These pragmatic solutions to everyday
problems are integrated into the Party's systematic program,
but only after first checking for justification in communist
philosophy. Other communist parties do this same thing but
none have specifically allowed for such contingencies in their
ideology and most are then dogmatic about changes. The PCI
has made a point of flexibility in meeting the needs of its
long term goals
.
The PCI has been called revisionist, T^ut , since communism
has taken so many forms, revisionism is to Marxian movements
what heresy is to religious ones, i.e., what occurs inside
one movement is dogma, while externally it is viewed as heresy.
With respect to revisionism, the PCI contends that it ulti-
mately bases its theory and practice on the ideas of Marx,
the elucidation of Marx by Lenin, and a uniquely national
118

philosophical interpretation of Gramsci. When the PCI is
finally backed into a corner over ideological disputes, it
stubbornly persists in its adherence to the traditions of
Marxism- Leninism.
The national element of the Italian communist movement
has developed out of the confusing myth that there is some
sort of mystical affinity between communism and the "people."
This confusion and misunderstanding, which is based on erron-
eous assumptions about the goals of the Communists is extra-
ordinarily durable. The sources of these assumptions are
several. The first is the semantic disorientation which the
Party fosters through the systematic perverse use of the
language, e.g., by calling "hegemonic" that which is "dicta-
torship," "democratic" that which is "autocratic," and "free"
that which is upheld by coercion. By falsifying reality
through obscuration of the language, the PCI has made inroads
to the actual sense of political reality.
As was clearly visible in the historical context, the
Communists have also made an effort to identify the Party with
Italian tradition, such as the Risorgimento and the Resitance.
This strategy has encompassed a broader penetration and coali-
tion strategy which will be discussed at length, but briefly
this identification with competing movements has allowed the
Party to recruit fellow travelers by blurring the issues and
alignments to prevent drawing lines of ultimate conflict.
The final confusion arises over the fact that the true
purpose of the PCI is normally concealed behind the facade
119

of democratic ideals. This is in turn enhanced by the
formidable communications stopper which arises out of the
projection of Western democratic expectations, needs, values
and cognitive habits. Since the majority of Western exper-
iences have been shaped by dealings with other democratic
parties, there is a tendency to mistake short term strategies
and tactics for long term goals.
In the following chapters certain characteristics of PCI
theory and practice will be analyzed to clear away the con-
fusion surrounding the purpose of the Party. The PCI will be
looked at to find out whether it is a revolutionary party or
whether time and changes have de-radicalized the Party. To
preclude a misunderstanding caused by the interpretation of
Communist goals by the Western mind, much of the Party's own
words will be used to describe the PCI.
120

XI. PCI GOALS AND STRATEGY
It is being asked whether we communists are taking the
road to become a social democrat party. Our party has
remained, remains and will remain a communist Party.
To be and remain such, means first of all that in what-
ever circumstance (even when one must demonstrate
realism and flexibility) one must not lose sight, not
even for a single moment, of the seeds for which we
are fighting: The emancipation of workers and of all
society, of the construction of a society superior in
everything and for every thing to the bourgeois
society. 143Enrico Berlinguer, 21 September 1976
Italian Communism is unique in that while most of the
socialists in Europe were trying to apply Marxism to their
countries Antonio Gramsci was interpreting Marx in an Italian
way. Gramsci 's formative years during World War I impressed
upon him the vibrant moral, material and cultural history of
the Italian people so that when he began to apply Marx to
Italy he did so to all aspects of Italian life: political,
cultural, social, and economical. Gramsci had no intention
of revising Marx but rather thought of himself as following
144
Lenin along the course of further purifying Marx. Gramsci
was mainly concerned with a less deterministic and dogmatic
approach to Marxism, or as Togliatti described it, "with
Gramsci, Marxism is liberated from the parasitic deformations
of positivist Marxism and vulgar materialism, and regains its
143
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full value as a conception of the world and an integral
145
vision of history." It is sufficient to note in any case
that the Italian movement, although Marxist-Leninist in ori-
gin, has been enriched by Gramsci and a once purely interna-
tional class movement is now one that develops along national
146lines
.
The PCI, despite whatever accusations have been leveled
at it, has, because of Gramsci, had the tremendous advantage
of a largely original theoretical analysis in which the
majority of the Party firmly believed since the early days
of its formation. This originality was indeed an advantage
considering the disastrous domestic and international upheaval
as well as the ideological conflict in the international com-
munist system from 1921 to the present. Gramsci's Quaderni
del Carcere (prison notebooks) are most certainly more reson-
sible for PCI ideology than any other source, perhaps even
overshadowing Marx. To insure purity in ideology, the Party,
which controls all of Gramsci's writings, only releases bits
and pieces when required to substantiate or initiate policy.
In fact, several years ago the USSR urged the PCI not to
publish all of Gramsci's works because they contained suspect
material. Many of his earlier writings which may have been
145 Greene, Thomas H. "The Communist Parties of Italy
and France," World Politics , XXI, No. 1 (October 1968), p. 27.






embarrassing were delayed in publication until after the
CPSU XX Congress.
147
What is Gramscian ideology? It is derived from Marx
and Lenin, it proceeds from the premise that capitalism will
disappear, it is concerned with the transformation of society
and then continues where Marx and Lenin became fuzzy. Gram-
sci was more concrete about the transition to power, the role
of the intellectual, the use of will in politics, and taught
that quality and profundity of ideas were essential in poli-
148
tical success. Togliatti called Gramsci the "political
realist" because Gramsci 's theories were designed to become
a guide to over-all goal resolution while allowing almost
149
anything in practice to achieve the goals. This realistic
response to the Italian situation was described in his meta-
phorical writings on war in which he allowed for diverse
tactics to be used by a revolutionary party in an advanced
country. As was shown in the historical context, Togliatti
took these flexible theories and turned them into practice in
Italy, being always careful to bind each new strategy or
tactic together with a bit of Gramscian ideology. The philo-
sophical aspect of the PCI can thus be summed up as national,
147 Mclnnes, Neil. The Western Marxists (New York, 1972),
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flexible, based on its own thinkers, more concrete in its
guidance and yet not dogmatic.
Once the Party had an ideology it needed to set goals
for the future and plan strategies. As shown in the his-
torical analysis, the PCI has always followed a rather con-
tinuous strategy, but what about goals? Have these goals
been consistent and are they really revolutionary or just
progressive ?
Since communism calls for a revolutionary change in
society, from capitalism to a classless society, then it
follows that the PCI must be a revolutionary party if it is
to be really communist. The problem lies in defining what
is revolutionary. Revolution has been defined as "a complete
or radical change of any kind," for example, "overthrow of a
government, form of government, or social system, with another
taking its place." Nothing is said about violence, but
instead, radical change is the key word and change is, "to
be partially or wholly transformed, in nature, form or char-
152
acter." In summary, revolution is a radical transformation
of the nature of society, not necessarily involving violence.
Even Lenin said that violence was not a necess-ary prerequisite
for revolution.
Looking for statements calling for radical change in the
Italian communist pronouncements is difficult, since the PCI
McKechnie, Jean L. Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dictionary (New York, 1975), p. 1553.
152
Ibid, p. 1938 and p. 302.
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is surely not going to find much cooperation in government
if it broadcasts the fact that it wishes to do away with the
government. Then again, there is a problem defining whether
a change is radical enough to be called revolutionary or, as
the Syntopicon describes the problem, "that change is, is
evident, but what change is, is neither evident nor easy to
153define." Perhaps the best way to solve this problem is
to use the words of the PCI itself. If the PCI calls for a
transformation and not just progressive changes, then it can
be assumed it fits the definition of revolutionary change.
Early in the formulation of PCI theory by Gramsci it was
clear that although the aim of transformation must be pre-
served, the means would have to conform to Italian experience,
and it would be non-violent. If the Party was to enter the
government and transform society from within, a violent rev-
olution would be disruptive because the state system itself
154
was to be used in the transformation. * This transformation
shaped up as a lengthy process, involving a prolonged conflict
between values and ideals in the gradual transformation of
Italian society, rather than the sudden Boleshevik changes
perpetrated at the political: level. Gramsci felt that
in order to destroy capitalism it was first necessary to
153 Hutchins, Robert M. , et al. Great Books of the Western
World, Vol. II (Chicago, 1952), p. 193.
154 Tarrow, Peasant Communism
,





undermine the legitimacy, the moral and cultural dominance
of the ruling bourgeosie and the groups aligned with it prior
to the assumption of power by the working class. In his
writings he likened this process to a battle where there was
a "war of position" (the undermining process) and a "war of
movement" (when the government is totally transformed).
The "war of position" was the long campaign of passive
resistance in which the state would be infiltrated and un-
dermined from within the superstructure of bourgeois society.
In this war the revolutionary party is required to deal with
democracy on its own terms:
The massive structure of modern democracies, their state
organizations and complexes of civic organizations, con-
stitute for political art the "trenches" and permanent
fortifications of the front in the war of position. ^-^7
On the other hand, the "war of movement" is the frontal war
which takes place at every opportunity but without endangering
the "war of position." The "war of movement" will probably be
limited to small skirmishes until it is obvious that no oppo-
158
sition can overcome the final thrust in the "war of movement.
The PCI leadership has constantly maintained that they
have been fighting the "war of position" to gain control of
the cultural, social and economic base of society and that
while in this war the revolution is essentially non-violent -
The transition from capitalism to socialism. .. does not










interplay of battles and revolutionary conquests that
will develop to different degrees ... "159
This downplaying of the radical aspect of the Party began
early in the Party history with the ouster of the Bordiga
faction and has continued throughout the long history of
the Party.
It is important to understand that this "war of position"
does not portend the ultimate goal of the Party. Only after
absolute power has been concentrated in the hands of the PCI
will the radical transformation occur. The "war of movement"
is a new phase which has not been entered yet and therefore
the effects are often disassociated form the communist move-
ment .
Following Gramsci's theories, the PCI set the stage for
the battle for socialism in Italy under its own terms:
Communists are laying down certain inevocable con-
ditions: a coherent program of reforms and a new method
of government which will free the state from the para-
sitic incrustations of those engaged in political
corruption. Only under these circumstances can the
rapprochement between Communists, Socialists, and a
DC which has been changed in terms of its trends and
methods provide a positive solution to the country's
serious crisis. 160
The Party also declared that in spite of what occurs within
the context of the "war of position" the Italfan people will
have to realize that the PCI is determined to cure the ills
of the country by communism and not by progressive reform.
Gian Carlo Pajetta summed up the way to this new socialism:









...it would be simplistic and even grotesque to imagine
a new unity of the workers' and socialist movement as
acceptance of the status quo by the Communist. The
elimination of the old splits - even though seen as
autonomous characteristics that have developed in this
period - the new internationalism, make sense only if
they serve to emerge from the crisis of capitalism in
a new way, to transform the society that produced it,
to open a new page of history. 161
Pajetta further declared that for the Italian Communists,
"our model cannot, therefore, be that of social democracy
which, even where it has governed for a long time has not
brought about an effective socialist transformation."
Essentially, the final goal of the Party will be different
than that displayed by the pragmatic maneuvering in the "war
of position" to build "the new socialist society which...
involves a transformation of the entire structure of so-
• + ,,163ciety . . . "
Despite these definite long term goals of the Communists,
there is perhaps still a question in some minds as to whether
or not the PCI is really not just a social democratic party.
It is difficult for some to realize that when the Communists
start sounding like social democrats in their "war of posi-
tion" they are not trying to say their goals have changed
but only that they will achieve them by persuasion.
161 Rinascita (Rome, 28 November 1975), p. L2
.
162 FBIS , No. 239 (11 December 1975), p. L2.
165 Berlinguer's speech to PCI CC , on 13 May 1976. FBIS
No. 105, Supp. 36 (25 May 1976), p. 20. Macciocchi emphasized
this in her book on p. 139 when she said, "our party was born
and grew not just to build a democratic society, but to
destroy capitalism and construct a socialist society."
Macciocchi, Maria A. Letters from Inside the^Italian Com -
munist Party to Louis Althusser (New York, 1975).
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Gramsci always advocated a more peaceful and flexible approach
164
than Marx or Lenin. More recently, when asked if the PCI's
policies of peaceful transition to socialism meant they were
social democrats, Berlinguer replied:
No, because social democratic societies do not progress
toward overcoming capitalism. Nor are they successful
in freeing themselves from the characteristic element
of modern capitalism, namely the presence of large
monopoly concentrations. Whereas socialism also means
the affirmation of new human values, in social demo-
cratic society, despite the progress made in terms of
material prosperity, all the negative effects of capi-
talism, such as alienation, continue to exist... 165
Clearly the Party hierarchy believes in the transforma-
tion of society, but what about the lower echelons? In Maria
Antonietta Macciocchi's book describing her victory while
running for the Chamber of Deputies in Naples under the PCI
ticket during 1968 she states that:
The thing which is really at the heart of this victory
is, as I have written so many times, the triumph of the
ideals of profound opposition to the old class society;
the aspiration to overturn this society (and not simply
to correct it or see it improved); it is, in general,
what we call a drive for socialism. 166
Of course, it would take many people like Macciocchi to make
the changes required and in her opinion, "the PCI has an
overwhelming quantity of true revolutionary militants in its
1 f\ 7
ranks, above all in the working class." In Robert Putman's










studies of the PCI members in the Chamber of Deputies in
1968, the Communists scored well above all others in radical
tendencies (Table I and Table II).
The PCI is definitely more radical than any of the other
parties but does this mean that violence will be used by the
PCI to effect the desired change? The best answer to this
question comes from Steven Hellman's 1970 study in which the
Party's feelings toward violence are analyzed (see Table III)
This, of course, does not mean that 38% of the Party will use
violence to take power, but as Hellman noted:
Several respondents took pains, in their openended
answers, to stress that while the PCI foresaw a peaceful
transition to socialism, a recourse to violence was not
ipso facto excluded. All those who did make this point
emphasized that a peaceful road was possible and desir-
able, but, should reactionary forces attempt to prevent
the left from taking power forcibly, such a maneuver
would be met in kind. This has always been the PCI's
position, and, particularly given the experience of so
many older functionaries in the Resistance, I included--
more out of curiosity than anything else--an assertion
in the written appendix (of the PCI statutes) which
raises the question of severe and often cruel measures
being necessary during revolutionary upheavals. The
wording of the assertion is: "In order to realize great
changes which benefit humanity, it is often necessary
to act in a completely unbiased and even cruel way." xo °
Within the context of all of these radical reforms, it is
clear that a transformation of the political structure will
have to take place, but the full impact of the transformation
is left intentionally fuzzy. Since the PCI has decided to
assume power only with a virtual electoral monopoly within
the parliamentary constraints, it is safe to suppose that the
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Non- Communis t Left is composed of deputies from the PSI,
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reforms proposed 30 4 17
3. Accepted, but
amel iorative
reforms proposed 65 93 61
4. Accepted,
no important
reforms proposed 4 22
100 100 100
(N = 20) (N = 27) (N = 36)
* Non-Communist Left is composed of deputies from the PSI,
the PSIUP, and the left-wing of the DC.
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Political Science Review , LXV (1971), 651-681, and The
Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflicts, and Democracy
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state itself will become the instrument of the monolithic
party wherein the total use of power will bring about the
restructuring of the society's social and economic system.
Gramsci made this point in 1919 when he wrote that:
The socialist state already exists potentially in
the institutions of the social life of the exploited
working class. To tie these institutions together
to centralize them powerfully .. .means creating from
then on a true and real workers democracy . 172
The PCI reemphasized Gramsci' s thoughts in its 1976 Party
platform when it spelled out the need to direct power from
the central government and, "to enable Parliament to accom-
plish this function, we need a profound transformation in
17**
its form of existence and operation." Most of the policy
statements of the PCI have purposefully been left vague on
the subject of transformation of the form of government to
prevent the government from using such statements as a pre-
text to outlaw the Communists. It is clear from Gramsci's
theories and the occasional statement that pops up that the
Party will use the State in the "war of position" and modify
it for the Party's purposes in the "war of movement."
More obvious statements of transformation have been made
about the economic and social transformation of Italy. Per-
haps this has been because the PCI finds more support for
change in these areas. The central goal of the revolution is
transformation of the economic structure. Gramsci originally
wrote about the unique requirements for the transformation of
17- Tarrow, Peasant Communism
,
p. 103.
173 FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 56 (23 May 1976), p. 47
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Italian economy. He explained that in highly developed and
automated capitalist societies there was a capacity for re-
tention of a neo-capitalistic system within the new socialist
174
order. This new-capitalist system would incorporate a new
175
order of production and distribution. The state would be
the ultimate arbiter and controlling agency for the means of
production. This would mean that the Italian economy would
be run along the lines of "state capitalism," where the state
uses central planning to control the economy and free markets
to stimulate the economy. Some communist countries have re-
cently introduced a measure of market socialism to increase
efficiency, but for the Italian economy this would be a step
backward rather than forward.
This state-directed economy is still what is being pro-
posed by the present leadership, "for us, therefore, it is a
question of public control, of utilization of the major means
of production in the interests of the nation, of progressive
worker participation in management, of the introduction of
17 7
the elements of socialism." ' Berlinguer emphasized the need
for central planning in his 13 May 1976 speech to the PCI
Central Committee:
174 r rGreene, p. 5
17 5 Pozzolini, A. Antonio Gramsci: an Introduction to His
Thought (London, 1968), p. 5.
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17 7 Interview with PCI Secretariat member Piero Pieralli.
FBIS
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Democratically prepared and implemented (economic)
planning will be the basic instrument for this policy:
not in order mechanically and in an authoritarian
fashion to put ourselves above the laws of the market,
not to expand the public economic area which will
instead be restored and reorganized, but in order to
use the laws of the market in the correct fashion so
as to bring about massive shifts of funds and political
commitments toward agriculture and toward scientific
research, to guide the necessary process of industrial
conversion, to establish new priorities in investments
and consumptions, to provide jobs for boys and girls,
and to broaden the area of social consumption. 1'8
The PCI Central Committee refined Berlinguer's ideas and
explained them in more detail in their policy statement for
1976:
All fundamental choices of our planning policy- - includ-
ing those pertaining to sector programs for industrial
conversion- -must be submitted to Parliament. On the
whole, our proposals tend to establish a close relation-
ship between Parliament and the government in the man-
agement of economic policy, giving Parliment greater
policy making and supervisory powers and enabling it
to exercise these powers efficiently. The regions will
be given an essential role in the formation of planning
policy directions to which they must be called upon to
contribute both through direct participation in the
various phases of drafting the programs and the direc-
tions on the national level. 179
These proposals, seem to parallel the Soviet Gosplans which
leave little freedom for the industries to choose the direction
of the economy. Although the phrase "democratic planning" has
been used frequently by the PCI, once the state commands that
production will proceed in a certain manner, democracy will
no longer be part of the system.
178 FBIS
,
No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 46.
179 Ibid, p. 46.
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To introduce a state- commanded economy, it would be
necessary to control the majority of industry, which could
be easily accomplished since Italy already has a high degree
of centralism, with close relationships between banks and
industry. Great bank trusts virtually control large portions
of Italian industry, which are in turn dependent on govern-
180
ment orders to maintain their viability. Togliatti had
advocated the nationalizing of most of the major monopolies
while allowing some industry to remain in private hands.
Togliatti deduced that with the state directing the economic
plan and controlling major industries there is no need for
the state to own everything. Part of this realization was
reinforced by the fact that Mussolini controlled the economy
181quite well without nationalizing everything. Furthermore,
if the state controls production quotas, employment policies
and investments, while still allowing private ownership, then
the people who are the nominal owners of these private busin-
esses feel they have a stake in their business. The PCI
official platform of 13 May 1976 assured the private sector
that it will be able to survive, but within the framework of
high level controls.
180
For a further analysis of this phenomenon, see
Proccacci, Guiliano. History of the Italian People (New York,
1970) .
181 Some good parallels between Mussolini and proposed
PCI economics were drawn by Angelo Codevilla in an interview
entitled Italy After the Elections on 8 June 1976 by Valerie




We communists hold the opinion, as we have said many
times before, that we must not look to a further exten-
sion of the public sector of the economy but rather to
a rearrangement and a renewed commitment of this sector
--which today is big enough- - toward the attainment of
the main economic and social development objectives
spelled out through democratic planning. We must at
the same time seek to offer- - through planning--a frame
of reference for the choices of the private enterprises
and we must point up their development along priority
lines . 182
The agricultural sector will probably undergo the largest
transformation of the economy. Presently, there are many
large, inefficient estates in Italy which control the majority
of the land but produce little. The PCI wants to replace
large land holdings with non-paying tenancy or peasant owner-
183
ship. People would be offered inducements to return to
the farms and start a new life. The same state direction
will apply to the farms that applies to industry. The pro-
184posal is akin to that presently being used in Poland.
In summary, it can be said that the PCI desires a trans-
formation of the economy into a state command economy which
can operate in a free market. The state is to be the final
planning and directing agency and the central point of in-
vestment so as to control its plans. This economy will not
require nationalization of all industry. Berlinguer stated
this policy plainly on 3 June 1976:
182 FBIS
,
No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 40.
183 Jones, Mervyn. "Italy: II Momento e Grave,"
New Statesman
,
(18 June 1976), p. 801.
184 FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 56 (28 May 1976), p. 40.
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We believe that private enterprises in all sectors (in
industry, agriculture, trade, cottage industry and so
forth) can operate usefully- - together with a public
sector of the economy- -not only in the building of
socialism but also in an advanced socialist society.
The distinguishing point is that in a socialist econ-
omy the economy is programmed in a way which tries to
direct the whole economy toward general interests and
establishes reference points, advantages and certain-
ties from which both public and private enterprises
can draw inspiration. 185
Besides the goal of ultimately overthrowing the dominant
ideology and economy interests, the Party also advocates the
Utopian goal of a classless world society. This classless
society would mean a levelling of life for the Italians and
not necessarily an increase in prosperity. The PCI spelled
out its goal in its 1976 policy statement when it called for:
A situation of greater justice and prosperity for the
entire population, understood here not just as the search
for and the possibility of having everyone acquire super-
fluous goods, not understood here as the mechanical and
dissipating expansion of individual consumption but rather
as the satisfaction of essential needs (food, shelter,
health, education) for all, as the free development of
the individual personality and the life of the individual
and as the promotion of higher-level needs tending toward




The Italians need only look at the USSR to see how such a
non-comsumer oriented society would function.
Putting all of this information together, what emerges
is a non-violent revolutionary party which is determined to
change the basic structures of society and politics in Italy,
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in that they tend to portray the Party as another social-
democratic party. It can be assumed that only when the "war
of movement" has begun will the radical transformations of
society start to take place. Also, in achieving socialism
in Italy the PCI will be following a more national road which
was originally described by Gramsci and thereafter repeated
18 7
by every leader of the PCI. As Berlinguer recently put it
in his policy statement for 1976:
"Our aim is essentially the following one: To affirm
and to put into effect a new idea of socialism that would
be different both from the experiments underway in Eastern
Europe and the kind of social democracy being practiced
in other areas of Europe.
"The socialist society we want to crease implies a
transformat ionof the entire structure of society .. '.'188
The term "national road" is not necessarily synonymous with
the Soviet definition of national communism since the "national
road" still recognizes the need for international communist
unity and common action. Perhaps the most difficult thing
for many people inside and outside of the Party to accept is
the fact that the PCI is determined to come to power peace-
fully. Many people say this denies the Party linkage with
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but, considering that armed struggle
is impossible in Italy and that Marxist-Leninist theory never
See Sergio Segre's quote in the Historical Context,
also see Blackmer, Communism in Italy and France
,
p. 374;
Hellman, Organization and Ideology" p^ 306- 308 ; and Sasson,
Donald, "The Italian Communist Party's European Strategy,"
The Political Quarterly
,
XLVII, No. 3 (July-September 1976)
p. 53-275.
188 FBIS, Annex 95 (14 May 1976), p. 2.
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obliged anyone to be stupid, the PCI's national strategy is
essentially correct Marxism- Leninism because whenever possible
the PCI has stimulated desired changes in the environment.
Due to its national orientation, the PCI has had a ten-
dency to adopt flexible strategies to deal with the changing
nature of national politics. These strategies are formulated
within the context of Party goals and ideology but adapted to
the peculiar requirements of Italian society. Sidney Tarrow's
book, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy
, deals in depth with
189
this policy of flexibility. Tarrow describes how the PCI
has maintained a dual policy in Italy for dealing with prob-
lems of northern or southern Italy. Obviously, this type of
flexibility allows for more penetration and success in a
190diverse society such as in Italy.
In the "war of position," while it is not yet in control
of the country, the PCI has had to develop a policy which
would allow it to gain power within the social, economic and
political realities. This parliamentary acquisition of power
has four basic dimensions: development and maintenance of
the Party itself; the penetration of the social and economic
base; pursuit of the political and social alliances to allow
it to increase its electoral base; and maintenance of close
links with the USSR and the international communist movement
as a whole.
189 Tarrow, Peasant Communism .
190
For more discussion of flexibility and penetration,
see Blackmer, Unity
,






The parliamentary strategy first of all required that the
Party develop and maintain a large cadre capable of being
active in Italian life, mobilizing the people when required,
disseminating information to party and non-party members and
running the vast party organization. Furthermore, the exper-
ience with Fascism in Italy taught that a purely class party
would be disastrous and therefore the PCI had to transcend
class and regional differences to form a large, broad-based
party. Gramsci formulated the idea of a mass party, combin-
ing all the exploited forces of Italy. This mass aspect was
based on Lenin's teachings at the time of the formation of
the PCI in which he stated that:
The law of military success which consists of having
an overwhelming preponderance of forces at the decisive
moment in the decisive place, is also the law of poli-
tical success particularly in that fierce, intense war
of classes which is called revolution . 191
and also:
But in order to achieve victory you must have the sym-
pathy of the masses. An absolute majority is not always
essential, but in order to achieve victory, in order to
retain power, it is not only necessary to have the major-
ity of the working class--I use the term "working class"
here in the West European sense, meaning the industrial
proletariat- -but also the majority of the exploited and
the toiling rural population. 192
Gramsci was even willing to extend his mass party to the
bourgeosie. 193
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When Togliatti landed in Italy in 1944 he followed
Gramsci's plan for a mass party and further amplified the
idea when he spoke of the "Party's task to gather round it-
self all the productive forces in the country" and defined
the "nation" which the PCI must strive to represent as not
only the working class per se, but "the peasantry, the masses
of intellectuals, the masses of all those who work with their
brain as well as those who work with their arms- -professional
194
men, technicians, clerks...." Togliatti also wanted a
large party to act as a buffer against right-wing reactionary
forces. Berlinguer, like his predecessor, continued the
strategy of a mass party. He emphasized the broad base of
the Party while never forgetting the reasons for the Party's
being. At a speech in Bologna in 1974 Berlinguer stated that
the PCI was:
....A mass party which is at the same time vitally bound
to the working class; a national and people's party which
is at the same time loyal to its internationalist tradi-
tion; and a democratic and at the same time revolutionary
party. . . .195
Clearly, such a large party would be difficult to control
but Gramsci provided for that contingency also. He felt that
historical continuity, a solid base, good organization and
196
strong discipline would keep the Party together. The or-
ganization and composition of the Party will be looked at in
194
Ibid, p. 36-37. For further analysis of the mass party










in a later chapter in the context of the present makeup, and
the historical continuity has already been demonstrated in
this and earlier chapters, but, the discipline which the PCI
displays is a very interesting feature of the Party which
needs closer analysis. It is the one facet of Party life
that never changes, never slackens and separates the PCI from
the loose groupings of political theories which make up the
other Italian parties. With strong discipline the PCI is
able to provide a united front to the electorate, thereby
constantly improving their electoral basis, year after year.
Giovanni Sartori writes in European Political Parties: The
Case of Polarized Pluralism that the PCI is the only party
in Italy "whose discipline and hierarchical structure over-
197
come internal dissent."
The PCI has several problems besides just controlling a
mass party when it comes to discipline. Because the PCI is
a radical group which is ideologically oriented, it harbors
many fringe elements which occasionally deviate in one direc-
tion or the other. To maintain the tight ideological unity
of the Party, these groups are periodically purged. The
recent Chilean problems with fringe groups further emphasized
this problem for the PCI. Additionally, the practical prob-
lems of politics in a parliamentary setting make it imperative
for the PCI to maintain strong discipline to keep their elected
19 7
La Palombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner, eds. Political
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officials under control. And finally, once this mass party
gains control of the government, strong discipline will be
required to "lead" the country along the "Italian road to
socialism.
"
It was Lenin who first brought up the need for strong
discipline in a party. In 1920 he spoke of the need for
"iron discipline" and although dissenting opinions would be
allowed in the Party, no independent factions would be allowed
198
to form. Gramsci was even more concerned about discipline
than Lenin. Gramsci 's insistence on the necessity of disci-
pline, especially in the course of political action, is one
of the most effective things he wrote and is still preached
199
constantly by the PCI cadres. In his theoretical writings
on discipline he explained that the Party was to be guided
by the principles of democratic centralism and, therefore,
"discipline in this sense does not annul individual person-
ality..., but merely limits the will and irresponsible impul-
siveness." By limiting the will, he meant that no factions
2 01
would be allowed to organize. According to Gramsci,
discipline was in keeping with democracy because it maintained
the over-all unity of the Party:
If the authority is a specialized technical function, and
not an "arbitrary" force or an external imposition, disci-
pline is a necessary element of democratic order and freedom.
198 Lenin, Vladimir I. Selected Works, Vol. X (London, 1943),
p. 204.
199 Mclnnes, Western Marxists
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A specialized technical function exists when the authority
is exercised within one socially (or nationally) homogen-
eous group; when it is exercised by one group over another
group, discipline will be autonomous and free for the
first, but not for the second. ^ 2
In the Western meaning of the word, democracy was not being
displayed in the principle of democratic centralism but for
Gramsci and the PCI this fit their definition perfectly.
The limits placed on factions and dissention were a further
limiting element in the portrayal of a "democratic" party.
When the PCI was formed in 1921 the theories of discipline
were put into effect and have been strengthened throughout the
Party history. The cornerstone of discipline, democratic
centralism, has been written into the Party rules:
Once a decision is reached, all members of the party are
bound to the line decided by the majority; decisions of
higher levels of the party organization are obligatory
for lower levels; activities leading to organized fac-
tions or oppositions within the party are prohibited. 2^
This, of course, did not deny the possibility of legal debate
but there was definitely a limit as to the extent that debate
would be allowed. Togliatti emphasized this point by stating
that even though he was advocating a "new party" that the PCI
would not become a debating club made up of opposing factions,
"but a revolutionary party, created for action and combat,"
a u * • «. a • i • 204and governed by strict discipline.
Even though the Party statutes declare that the Party
maintain strict discipline, it is still another matter to
202 Cammett, p. 195.
0j) Hellman, Organization and Ideology
,
p. 86.
204 Ibid, p. 86.
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carry them out. The PCI has done a noteworthy job of carry-
ing out the statutes and has a lengthy record of purges and
periodic shuffles to maintain discipline. Beyond the expul-
sions mentioned in the historical context, such as after the
attempted assassination of Togliatti, Luca di Luca, II
Manifesto and others, there were other major purges such as
from 1955 to 1960 when Togliatti's cleaning of the Party went
20 5
all the way down to the lower levels of Party structure
and when Antonio Graziadei, the economic theorist of the
Party, was expelled when he attempted to prove the lack of
? n (\
foundation for the Marxist-Leninist theory of surplus value.
Macciocchi saw the principle used quite often during her cam-
207paign in Naples. During an interview in 1975 Berlinguer
summarized the PCI's feelings on extremist groups. In speak-
ing about the II Manifesto group he emphasized that the PCI
takes a harsh attitude toward positions which it believes to
be mistaken.
As long as the "manifesto" group remained within the
sphere of the discussion of ideas, there were no measures,
when it entered the sphere of an organized creation of
splits, a conflict with the rules which govern the life
of the party really began. There is absolute agreement
on the part of the entire party on the principle of not •
allowing currents ... 208
A better understanding of how strong the theory of demo-
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study of this phenomenon in Party functionaries. The question
asked was: Given the chance to hold referendums on major
party policies, would you accept the idea or not? Table IV
n * «.!, 209reflects the responses:
TABLE IV
PCI Functionaries' Reaction to a "Referendum of the Base "
Percentage
Reaction of Respondents
1. Unqualified acceptance 191
2. "O.K. in certain cases" 19
3. Very qualified acceptance,
rejecting any "yes-no" formula 23
4. Rejected idea 39
TOTAL 10 0%
Even when offered the chance to participate in any type of
referendum, 3 9% flatly refused, citing the fact that this
was not in keeping with the Party's feelings on discipline.
With respect to the rest of Italy, Longo's statements on
democratic centralism explain the full -range of application
to be used externally as well as internally:
Democratic centralism is the main instrument for
expressing the communists' desire to run events and not
to be run by them. This also applies to the party's
unitary actions and to the development of all its forces
in order to achieve its chosen goals and to combat





manifestations of weakness expressed in the internal
contradictions which are inherent in a system of cur-
rents and in factionalism. 210
By what Longo says, the system of democratic centralism is
not to be excluded from external application in pursuit of
party goals. This is an important principle to remember
when forecasting future Party actions.
Democratic centralism and rigid discipline reinforce
many aspects of PCI character. By sustaining a disciplined,
centralized party, the PCI is able to maintain ideological
unity, and effectiveness denied other parties because of
allowing the communist to act in a monolithic way. In a
recent interview Berlinguer explained it thusly, "...demo-
cratic centralism is the system which guarantees maximum
211
efficiency and maximum democracy..."
Since the PCI would be both revolutionary and "democratic"
the second dimension of PCI strategy would take on aspects of
212Duverger's devotee party and Selznik's combat party. As
Gramsci saw it, the Party was to have two basic emphases.
The first would be the vanguard of the workers
:
It is the cutting edge of the movement that seeks to look
ahead of the proletariats' short term interests and con-
centrate on real interests. To do this it translates
philosophy into action. 213
210 FBIS
,
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For a more detailed analysis of this combination of
theories, see: Tarrow, Sidney G. "Political Dualism and
Italian Communism," The .American Political Science Review
,
LXI, No. 1 (March 1967), p. 39-40.





The second and major emphasis of the Party would be on the
cultural and social penetration of the masses to increase
/ 214
the support of the Party in the masses. The acquisition
of leverage from this penetration would allow further pene-
tration and so on until the PCI would be massive enough to
acquire governmental power. This idea of "presence" is the
linchpin of the PCI's strategy and was first acknowledged by
Gramsci when he called for the PCI to establish itself in the
215
"trenches and fortifications of bourgeois society."
The requirement for securing the allegiance of Italian
society through other than political means results from the
non-political nature of the Italians. Enzo Forcella, a
nationally known reporter, once remarked about the political
nature of Italy in an article on the reporting of politics
that:
A political journalist in our country can count on about
1,500 readers: the ministers and the undersecretaries
(all), the parliamentarians (part), the party leaders,
trade-union leaders, high prelates, and a few industri-
alists who want to appear informed. The rest do not
count, even if the paper sells 300,000 copies. 216
This is reflected in Table V which shows which methods of
influencing government the Italians feel are most effective:
214 Boggs, p. 169.
215 Tarrow, Sidney G. "Adaption and Change," Communism
in Italy and France , eds . Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney
G. Tarrow (Princeton, 1975), p. 585.












217Preferred Methods of Influencing Government, by Region
(in Percentages)
Methods of Influence North South Italy




Working in a party
Protest demonstration
None; don't know; other
Gramsci recognized that in order to gain control of the
Italian state and create his socialist society that there
was a need to exercise hegemony over all spheres of society:
Every revolution has been preceded by an intense labor
of criticism, of cultural penetration, of permeation
of ideas through groups of men initially refractory and
engrossed with solving day by day, hour by hour, their
own political and economic problem. 218
This situation would exist until the "war of position" had
been won and the masses were ready to break down the last
219
vestiges of resistance in the "war of movement." In fact,
Gramsci made it imperative that the Party "exercise leadership







219 D A7Boggs, p. 67.
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220(i.e., hegemonic) before winning governmental control."
He recognized that it would take a long term effort to be
able to build up the socio-political influence to convince
all classes that the workers* struggle was their struggle
too. To do this, the Party's presence would need to cut
across class and geographic barriers. It would also require
the formation of direct alliances with existing groups in
order to be able to mobilize the population.
A closer look at this strategy in action reveals the
depth to which it has been applied. The PCI has penetrated
local and regional governments, trade unions, cooperatives,
press, cultural institutions, schools, universities, cinema,
television, sports and most all professional groups. The PCI
is the largest political employer below the level of national
government, controlling virtually all major cities and most
municipalities. Because of its regional control, the PCI
has constantly lobbied for more decentralization in Italian
government and at the same time trained legions of Party
members to be administrators.
One example of Party presence is the penetration of the
largest labor union, CGIL, which was initially very large
but as the presence spread to other organizations the actual
number of Party members in the hierarchy decreased.
2^0 Hoare, Quinton and Geoffry Nowell Smith. Selections
from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London, 1971)
p. 207. See also Pozzolini, p. 88.
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(See Table VI.) The PCI's loss of position did not mean a
loss of dominance because most CGIL activity still takes
221place along PCI lines.
TABLE VI
222Party Affiliation of the CGIL Executive Committee
1960 1965 1969
(%) (%) (%)
PCI 53 55 32
PSI 47 27 24
Other -- 4 32
PSIUP -- 14 12
One benefit from this is that by not being too closely iden-
tified with one group the PCI is able to extend its influence
to a greater area of Italian society without alienating any
one group.
The presence of the PCI is clearly spelled out for the
lower echelons in the Party statutes which apply to section
responsibilities:
The section should tend to have a permanent headquarters
which should be the meeting and activity center for the
Communists and a hub of political, cultural, educational,
recreational, and assistential life for all the workers
of the locality.
221 Tarrow, "Adaption and Change," p. 542.




It should promote, direct, and coordinate the
activity of the Communists in every aspect of mass
political action in the centers of productive, cultural,
and associative life which exists in the territory under
its jurisdiction. 223
This penetration on the lower levels has established the PCI
in the majority of the common man's social and economic life.
In order to increase Party flexibility, no directives have
been issued as to specifics governing the course of lower
level penetration because each area has its own problems.
This tailoring to needs has allowed the Party to use existing
structures to aid its penetration.
One unique system of handling problems, clientelismo , has
grown up around the lack of ability of the Italian government
to handle most problems and it has favored the growth of the
224Communists' presence. " As discussed earlier in the histor-
ical context, this system grew up in the 19th century out of
economic needs and has become a way of life in Italy. In a
study done by Joseph La Palombara on voting behavior he found
That the voters were motivated by strictly local and
personal economic issues, that ideology and national
issues played little part in determining voting behavior,
and that many shifts were simply the result of clientel-
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Since the PCI controls most of the local governments, it
also controls all the local jobs such as town doctor, cemetary
attendant, street cleaner and town guards and therefore is the
7 7 f\
largest user and beneficiary of the system of patronage.
Additionally, because it controls the CGIL it can extend its
economic patronage. Over-all, the PCI has made effective
use of an economic peculiarity in Italy for political gains.
The PCI's presence in Italian society would still not be
effective if the Party were unable to mobilize the populace
it had penetrated. Fortunately for the Communists, the wide-
spread patronage and broad social penetration has made it
possible for the PCI to call into play a large portion of
227Italian society when required. In addition, the large,
well disciplined cadre discussed earlier has allowed the PCI
to apply this support in a coherent manner, not only politi-
cally but economically and professionally as well. Ascher
and Tarrow in their study, "The Stability of Communist Elec-
torates: Evidence from a Longitudinal Analysis of French and
Italian Aggregate Data," confirmed that the PCI's capacity
for mass mobilization does not fluctuate greatly and has
a * j-i ^u 228increased steadily over the years.
226jvforman Kogan expands more on the municipal patronage
in "The Impact of the New Italian Regional Governments on the
Structure of power within Parties," Comparative Politics , VII,
No. 3 (April 1975), p. 383-406.
'Blackmer, Donald L.M. "Italian Communism: Strategy for
the 1970's," Problems of Communism , XXI, No. 3 (May-June 1972),
p. 48.
2 2 8 See the evidence presented by William Ascher and Sidney
G. Tarrow in "The Stability of Communist Electorates: Evidence
from a Longitudinal Analysis of French and Italian Aggregate
Data," American Journal of Political Science , XIX (3 August
197 5)
, p. 475-500. 155

The social dimension of PCI strategy has greatly facil-
itated the implementation of the political strategy. Since
power acquisition is of primary strategic importance to the
PCI, it is natural for their political strategy of parlia-
mentary politics to be based on short term compromise and
alliances, both of which are aided by the social strategy
of presence. Coalition and alliance strategy does not mean
ideological compromise, but rather a flexibility in attuning
the Party to reality so as to capitalize on the PCI's "pro-
gressive aspects. Basically this has meant finding an issue
on which collaboration was possible and then making the Party
available for cooperation. By doing this, the PCI has not
only advanced the cause of the Communists but also insulated
the Party from counterrevolutionaries.
Lenin enunciated the need for compromise when dealing with
the enemy:
A vanguard performs its task as vanguard only when it is
able really to lead the whole mass forward. Without an
alliance with non- communists in the most varied spheres
of activity there can be no question of any successful
communist constructive work. 229
He also admonished his followers to take care to remain true
to the ideology during the compromise:
The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to
renounce compromises once and for all but to be able
throughout all compromises, when they are unavoidable,
to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its
revolutionary purpose, to its task of preparing the way






for revolution and of educating the masses for victory
in the revolution. ^30
Lenin felt that if the party could remain loyal to the
ideology while making "all the necessary compromises" then
231the coming to power could actually be accelerated.
Gramsci added to Lenin's theory of compromise and alliance
by extending it to all socialist forces:
There is no country where the proletariat is in a posi-
tion to conquer power and retain it by itself: it must
therefore always seek allies. It must look for a policy
which will allow it to assume the leadership of those
other classes which have anti-capitalist interests and
guide them in the struggle for the overthrow of bourgeois
society . ^32
Although he felt the need for alliances, at every chance he
emphasized that the movement was still to be originated in
the proletariat.
The theory of alliances with other classes has been
stressed by each General Secretary of the PCI. The PCI has
identified these alliances with as many legitimate movements
and called them by as many names as necessary in order to
convince the Italian people of the PCI's sincerity. Such
names as "democratic and left wing," "all democratic and
socialist" or "all democratic and anti-fascist" forces are
but a few of the names used by the PCI to describe their pro-
posed coalitions.





Ibid, Vol. X, p. 38.
23 2 Fiori, Guiseppe. Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolu -
tionary (New York, 1971), p. 203.
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In addition to opening alliances to virtually all classes,
the PCI also adopted the Leninist principle of "partial ac-
tions" whereby the Party could gain ground by bits and pieces
2 33
even if it did not directly benefit the workers. Gramsci
said that this was required because of the nature of Italian
society
:
Because of the unique problems in Italy, the PCI would
have to assume power by stages. This period of transi-
tion would take the place of direct conquest of power
and therefore the PCI should adopt the slogan of
"constituent assembly" and use it as "the basis for an
agreement with the anti-fascist" parties. 234
The theory of "partial actions" has allowed the PCI a strategic
and tactical flexibility which has been called everything from
revisionist to opportunist but the fact is that the PCI has
followed a preconceived strategy which specifically calls for
compromise, alliance and strategy to achieve its goals. Two
good examples of the PCI's attempt to form major alliances
are the Party's attempt at coalition with the Catholic Church
and the "historic compromise."
Gramsci was keenly aware of the fact that over 90% of the
Italian population professed to follow the Catholic religion.
He urged that the PCI never engage in a frontal confrontation
with the Church but instead do everything possible to win
235
over the Church's support. Clearly the communists' goals
233 Tarrow, Peasant Communism
,
p. 103.
234 Cammett, p. 184-185.
235






and methods conflicted with those of the Church and therefore
the PCI would find it difficult to influence the Church. The
only chance which the PCI had to offer the Church anything
was when the Party helped include the Lateran Pacts in the
Italian constitution. Even in this case the Party erred in
that Togliatti underplayed his hand and his acceptance of the
Lateran Pacts did not display a sincere desire at understanding
the Church but rather an inclination to use the Church to the
Communists' own ends. In Togliatti' s speech he stated the
reason for inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the constitution
was purely tactical:
Since the... Church will continue to be the very center
of our country- -and hence any conflict with it would
disturb the consciences of many citizens- -we (communists)
must arrange carefully our relation with the Catholic
Church. 236
As this historical context shows, the Church was normally
quite hostile to the Communists. In spite of periods of thaw,
the Church would quickly revert back to an anti-communist
stand when it looked as if the PCI might win too many votes
at the polls (e.g., 1948 and 1976 elections). In the face
of constant rejection the PCI still persists in trying to
form links with the Catholics or at least breaking the strong
attachment between the DC and the Church. To this date they
have had limited success under the table but have failed to
win any overt approval from the Church.
The most obvious attempt at coalition has been centered
around the Communists' endeavors to form a political coalition
236
"Italy," Time, XLIX, No. 14 (7 April 1947), p. 32.
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strong enough to gain power. The PCI's desire to gain a
majority of votes involves perhaps the most complicated
coalition or series of coalitions, and yet the Party has
always tried to explain the over-all strategy in very simple
terms. In the early days of the PCI's growth this strategy
was based on Lenin's writings concerning the need for a
237
majority of masses to achieve the revolution. The history
of the Party is replete with attempts at Fronts, or coali-
tions of all "democratic" forces.
The most recent manifestation of political coalition
strategy is Berlinguer's "historic compromise." This ampli-
fication of earlier attempts- to form a coalition of all Cath-
olic "democratic," socialist and anti-fascist forces came in
response to the coup d' etat in Chile. What happened in Chile
was that Allende's leftists took power with a very small base
of popular support, and because the Chilean Communist Party
lacked a strong party and a secret police force they were
unable to maintain control of their own people and the rate
of socialist transformation. Once Allende was in power, the
workers in the Chilean Communist Party demanded and got the
expropriation of thousands of farms and businesses, causing
economic chaos. The economic collapse only spurred the
activists to further expropriation. Allende finally had to
instigate repressive measures against his opposition to pre-
vent them from becoming too vocal. Unfortunately for






Allende, the opposition controlled the military and he was
«, 238
overthrown.
Since the PCI had been advocating an advent to power
similar to that which occurred in Chile, they were extremely
shaken by the coup d'etat, but once again the unique flexi-
bility of the Party strategy devised a new solution. Ber-
linguer in his articles in Rinascita on "Italy after the
Chilean Events" laid out the "revised" future strategy of
the PCI. He called for:
An historic compromise between the forces that rally and
represent the great majority of the Italian people. (It)
would be completely illusory to think that, even if the
parties... of the Left managed to gain 51 percent of the
votes and of the parliamentary representation. .. this
fact would guarantee the survival ... of a government rep-
resenting that 51 percent. This is why we speak not of
a "leftist alternative," but rather of a "democratic
alternative,"- -that is, the political perspective of a
collaboration and an understanding of the popular forces
of a communist and socialist inspiration with the
popular forces of a Catholic inspiration, and also with
formations that would have some other democratic orien-
tation. ^39
His plan of action outlined in the strategy was as follows:
1. A progressive transformation of the political, economic
and social assets of Italy to lay down the conditions
for a future "democratic way to socialism."
2. Socialism in Italy through constant government assist-
ance to the masses.
3. Socialism achieved by injecting the working class into
the mainstream of the decision-making process, without
serious damage to the middle class.
4. Socialism through a coherent alliance with heterogen-
eous political forces whose common denominator is the
perfection of the democratic state.
23 8 Codevilla, Angelo. "Italy after the Elections," p. 2.
239 Radio Free Europe Research Report No. 118, p. 7.
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5. The "historic compromise" by a "democratic" transfor-
mation means the rejection of any collaboration with
conservative, capitalist and neo-fascist elements at
all levels of the political and government pyramid. 240
The two most important points brought out in this program were
the need for more than a simple majority and the requirement
for a transformation of the non-communist forces prior to the
"historic compromise" taking place.
Berlinguer was determined to work within the constraining
conditions of the time and to use every tactic to avoid a
vertical breakup of the Italian people into two hostile fronts.
He emphasized the need for maintaining alliances between the
workers and middle class by stating that, "even at times when
the political battle becomes more inflamed and harsh, we must
still pursue a policy of unity and one of seeking for the
broadest convergences and alliances, never abandoning the
241
struggle." The last phrase indicates, as mentioned earlier,
that even during a coalition the Party was not to lose sight
of the ultimate goal.
Berlinguer ' s fears stemmed from the fact that he felt that
he may not be able to control his own party once the PCI was
in power because, "if the working class parties think they can
go it alone, they would abandon acting positively to influence
242
the other forces of democratic orientation." This would
240 Nazzaro, Pellegrino. "Italy in Trouble," Current
History
,
CVIII, No. 403 (March 1975), p. 103.
241 FBIS , No. 184 (20 December 1974), p. M-2.
242
FBIS, No. 62 (30 March 1976), p. L-l.
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result in a second problem which is that of maintaining
stability and solidarity of a left-wing government when, "as
is right and proper to expect of a left-wing government- - it
actually embarked on profound reforms of the country's eco-
nomic and social structures with the remaining 49 percent
of the electorate and Parliament aligned in a hostile front
243
against it." Berlinguer was not voicing unfounded fears
because between 1970 and 1974 the centrist DC government
thwarted at least three right-wing plans to overthrow the
government.
The fear of driving the DC into opposition of a left-wing
alternative caused the semantic abandonment of the "front"
policy. The reason this is described as a semantic change
in strategy is because the PCI is still not willing to deal
with any hostile non-socialist forces in their present form.
Referring back to Berlinguer's plan for the "historic compro-
mise" it is clear that all of the other political forces will
be transformed into acceptable partners of the PCI before a
political coalition will take place. Once again, the PCI was
using new names to breathe new life into old plans and poli-
cies. In particular, the PCI's attitude toward the DC was
unchanged. The PCI was determined to retain its own ideolog-
ical unity while denying the DC theirs. Togliatti had written
in 1962 that, "a thorough going revision and transformation
of the Christian Democratic leadership must be pursued and
obtained, if we want to open the road to general political
243 FBIS, No. 34 (19 February 1975), p. M-3
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renewal," and in 1974 Berlinguer said, "this is still the
244
essential point." In essence, the process was to be a
slow transformation of the DC into what the PCI felt they
245
could deal with, another socialist party.
Two general problems were apparent in the "historic
compromise." One problem, which will be discussed later,
was the fact that once all parties become socialist there
will no longer be any opposition party. The other problem
was that the "historic compromise" seemingly locked the PCI
into a long term gradual ascent to power and denied them the
traditional tactical opportunity to seize the initiative, if
required. This, however, was not the case because, with the
Party's typical flexibility, they soon declared their intent
to use temporary "tactics" if required.
A situation which provoked the "tactical" maneuvering was
a poll in May of 1976 prior to the June elections which gave
246the PCI 55% of the vote. Sensing a victory for the left
wing forces, Berlinguer declared that although his Party was
not abandoning the strategy of the "historic compromise" that,
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more immediate needs of the country." Apparently once the
PCI became aware of the fact that it might be able to enter
the government immediately, all fear of right-wing reaction-
aries fated. The PCI seemed convinced that it could do what
Chile and Portugal had failed to do.
These two examples of PCI coalition strategy show the
tenaciousness with which the PCI pursues its alliances (as
in the case of the Catholic Church) , the flexibility of its
tactics (as in the "historic compromise"), and above all, the
retention of the Party ideology while pursuing coalition for
purely strategic and tactical reasons.
The Communists have made almost every conceivable type of
alliance and coalition and they seem inclined to continue to
do so until the coalitions no longer suit their purposes or,
as Macciocchi said, until the "war of position" is over and
the PCI is no longer threatened by reactionary forces.
In spite of all the concern for internal growth and flex-
ibility, the PCI has always maintained a close attachment to
249the international communist movement and the USSR. The
PCI's adaption of a flexible domestic strategy has had an
impact on its relations to the international movement.
247 FBIS , No. 96 (17 May 1976)
,
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The Italian Communists have had to adopt a seemingly more
liberal attachment to the international cause in order to
please its domestic audience but at the same time it has
steadfastly proclaimed its unity with the international
movement
.
The main factors in the PCI's persistence in maintaining
its international communist solidarity come from the desire
to maintain the natal bond of ideological unity which gives
the Party its unique character and the fact that the alle-
giance to communist ideology virtually forces the Italian
Communists to deal with the international movement for
financial and moral support. The communist parties naturally
are closer to each other than any heterogeneous outsider
because of similar desires to build socialism, aims, enemies
(i.e., capitalism) and methods. As Sergio Segre, Directorate
member, said in 1971:
We believe that the national character and international-
ism of a revolutionary force are both essential and
inseparable, and that only in this way can the working
class acquire ever growing importances, become the pre-
dominant class in its own country, and thus make an
effective contribution to the struggle of the Inter-
national proletariat . ^50
Just as the Socialists, Christian Democrats and other parties
in Europe work for common goals and ideals , so do the Commun-
ists, but the written ideology forms a more permanent bond
between communists of different countries. This common bond
alienates the communists from many of the other Western




at a meeting in Moscow.
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democratic parties. If the PCI were to break with the in-
ternational movement it would find itself isolated from all
sources of support except what it could muster internally.
Therefore, polemics between the PCI and other "fraternal"
parties should not be taken to mean that a rift has occurred.
In spite of the recent U.S. press reports of a "break"
between the PCI and international communism, the Italian
Communists have displayed solidarity with the other communist
251parties in Vietnam, Greece, Chile, Portugal and Angola.
The historical analysis showed how the PCI's attitude
toward the international movement seemed at times to alter
and yet the adjustment reflected more continuity than change.
As Togliatti said, he needed an international strategy to
suit his internal purposes and that meant polemics with any
252
"fraternal" parties whenever domestic situations required.
The outward manifestation of this policy was increased criti-
cism of other communist parties and yet each disapproving
comment ended with an assurance of solidarity with the inter-
national movement. Even declarations of autonomy were limited
to domestic pursuits and not foreign associations:
A workers' and socialist party must always maintain its
solidarity with these (socialist) regimes. If, for any
reason whatsoever, a workers and socialist party breaks
its solidarity with them, then it goes over to the other
side, it forgets its own essential function, it forgets
the objectives for which it is fighting. 253
251
FBIS, USSR , No. 44, Supp . 21 (4 March 1976), p. 19.
252 See the chapter in the historical context on the 1956
Hungarian uprising.





The destalinization process which allowed the PCI to
finally pursue its domestic strategy unhindered by Soviet
restraints also caused internal discussion over international
attachments and yet even at the height of the discussions in
1961 the PCI Central Committee declared:
Prolitarian internationalism is and will remain one of
the cardinal pillars of our policy, along with profound
attachment and adjustment to the national situation and
to search for new methods guided by the principles of
Marxism-Leninism. 254
At every Party Congress the PCI has echoed this same theme.
Berlinguer's opening remarks to the 14th Congress contained
the usual emphasis on solidarity:
The Italian worker movement and our party have healthy
internationalist traditions to which we intent to remain
faithful. _ Let no one think that there is any room among
us for any insinuations or exhortations to the effect
that we break with the principles and practices of pro-
letarian internationalism, that we withdraw from that
line of solidarity and common struggle with all of the
worker, socialist, and revolutionary forces anywhere
in the world, the line which we have chosen and which
we intend to pursue through our free choice and amid
the fullness of our autonomy. 255
The closing document of the Congress also took pains to stress
solidarity with the international communist movement.
The PCI's relationship with the USSR provides a special
case involving PCI ties with international communism since
actions of the Soviets have greatly affected the Italian
domestic scene. The PCI attitude toward the Soviets has
254 Dallin, p. 463.
255
FBIS , No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1975), p. 15.
256
FBIS, No. 58 (25 March 1975), p. M-3.
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paralleled the Italian Communists' stand on internationalism
up until 1956 when it was able to extricate the Party from
the tight control of the Soviets. The historical process
showed that this had been a gradual process until Khruschev
abruptly "freed" the Italians at the XX CPSU Congress. The
Italians still hold a strong ideological attachment to the
Soviets and respect what the USSR has done, but do not wish
to follow the Soviet model. The PCI has preferred instead
to devote the majority of its attention to the "Italian road"
(which at times involves polemics with the USSR) . By compar-
ison with other communist parties, the PCI may have seemed
daring and outspoken in its relationship with the CPSU and
yet by Italian standards it has been conservative. According
to Blackmer's book, The International Role of the Communist
Parties of Italy and France , there has been no depth to the
257Italian Communists' denunciations of the Soviets. Blackmer
saw this as merely a requirement of domestic strategy. In a
more recent interview with Angelo Codevilla, it was emphasized
that the same situation which Blackmer described happened
after Hungary, Czechoslovakia and that even today the PCI's
polemics lack sincerity:
The PCI has declared its independence from Moscow in
passages which are 1% declarations of independence, 49%
declarations of fidelity to proletarian internationalism
and praise of the Soviet Union, and a good 50% denuncia-
tion of the United States and of the West. 25 ^
257 Blackmer, International Role of the PCI
,
p. 26.
2 58 Codevilla, Angelo. "Italy after the Elections," p. 6
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Further proof of the PCI's continued attachment is displayed
by the fact that the PCI sends an average of one delegation
a week to Moscow and regular sessions of the Italian Party
Secretariat frequently convene in Moscow with CPSU leaders.
The economic ties with the USSR are a further block to any
disassociation from the CPSU (this will be discussed in a
later chapter)
.
Soviet attitudes toward the PCI have also been cautious.
They have been concerned about any ideological complications
the Italians' position posed but they also realized the
benefits to be derived from having a communist country in
NATO and Western Europe. Much has been made recently over
how the USSR would not like to have the PCI assume power
because of the ideological costs to the Soviets. This may
cause some problems but the interviews with Italian Commun-
ists shows that the PCI has not seen this as a factor. In
June 1976, Berlinguer commented that, "there has been no ex-
? f\ r\
plicit, direct CPSU position against our line," and in
September 1976, Napolitano reemphasized the same idea by
pointing out that:
The PCI has never been defined as revisionist by the
CPSU. One must not confuse articles containing gener-
alized polemics on Eurocommunism with a definition which
has never been made by the CPSU with regard to our party. 2 ^1
259 Ibid, p. 6.
260 FBIS
,
No. 13 (10 June 1976), p. L-5.
261 FBIS, No. 185 (11 September 1976), p. L-3.
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Earlier in the spring of 1976, when the CPSU held its
XXV Congress, Berlinguer met with Brezhnev and issued a
cordial communique which was said to be particularly pleas-
7 f\ 7
ing to the Italians. Obviously, there were no serious
problems in their joint relations as reported by many Western
sources. Even in the context of polemics over some item of
difference between the two parties the PCI would never resort
to such vituperative statements as it recently used to
describe the U.S. State Department officials and Kissinger:
We are not replying to the stupid slaves of the foreigner
who are always ready to follow the instructions given by
the U.S. Embassy's hall porter. 263
The Soviets' attitude is best characterized in terms of
a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the cost of ideological
problems against the gains to be made politically, economi-
cally and militarily by backing the PCI. It seems clear that
the Soviets feel that supporting the Italian Communists is
optimal
.
For the Italians, the situation is reduced to determining
priorities. Although the PCI has decided to give priority to
domestic strategy it has still maintained close relations with
the USSR. The question then becomes, what does the domestic
situation require and how far to push the criticism of the
CPSU without isolating itself from the world communist movement?
262 FBIS
,




No. 130 (7 July 1975), p. L-l.
Radio Free Europe Research Report #142, p. 2.
172





The PCI has found a balance between domestic and international
needs which complement each other. Pajetta described it as,
"a 'national road,' a tactic, a strategy which derives from
individual experience and from autonomous decisions (which)
does not, however, oppose an effective and- -we believe--
necessary internationalism."
After closely examining the PCI's actions within the
international communist movement it seems likely that the
PCI will continue to expound those "advanced" communist po-
sitions which correspond to its domestic needs. At the same
time the Party will continue to insist on its basic solidarity
with international communism and the USSR, adhering to the
latter's main foreign policy lines, while using what influence
it possesses to move other parties in its direction.
After examining the four dimensions of the PCI's strategy
it becomes clear that the Italian Communists have adopted
policies and plans which are uniquely suited to the Italian
situation. At times certain aspects of their strategy have
failed to achieve the desired results, but mainly because of
a lack of politicization of the Italians and poor communica-
tions. Two recent studies described in Blackmer's book,
Communism in Italy and France , reveal that the PCI has, in
fact, been very successful. In Peter Lange's study, "The
PCI at the Local Level: A Study of Strategic Performance,"
he showed that all lower echelons of the Party were doing an




effective job of performing strategic tasks. In the
second study by Giacomo Sani, entitled "Mass-Level Response
to Party Strategy: The Italian Electorate and the Communist
Party," the conclusion is that the strategy has been favor-
7 f\ T
ably received by the populace. The electoral growth of
the PCI is the final proof of the success of PCI strategy,
a fact which Gramsci emphasized when stating the idea of:
Number... the supreme law, (observing that through it)
you measure precisely the effectiveness and capacity
for expansion and persuasion of the opinions of a few,
of the active minorities, of the elites, of the van-
guards and so... that is, their rationality of historical
authenticity or specific functionality . 26B
One final element which has been a major factor in the
Party's success has been its continuity. This consistency
in Party goals has been of prime importance in maintaining
internal unity. Despite the continual adaption to the real-
ities of the Italian political situation there is no evidence
269
that the PCI has been altered or absorbed by Italian politics.
On the contrary, as Berlinguer reported to the PCI Plenum in
October of 1975, this unique Italian heritage has strengthened
266 Lange, p. 259-304.
267
Sani, Giacomo. "Mass-Level Response to Party Strategy:
The Italian Electorate and the Communist Party," Communism in
Italy and France , ed. Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney G. Tarrow




No. 64 (1 April 1976), p. L-5.
9 fc\ Q
For further discussion of this idea, see Blackmer,
Communism in Italy and France
,
p. 21, and Blackmer, "Strategy




the Party. The consistency in Party ideology has been
proclaimed at every opportunity by the PCI as well as a need
to safeguard always that continuity. At the PCI's 14th Con-
gress, Berlinguer stated that:
We have always tried to hold firm, even at moments of
extreme political tension, that is to say, we tried to
hold firm to the general objectives of our action; we
tried to maintain the link between immediate objectives
and historical goals, our very own goals, that is, the
emancipation of the world of labor, the democratic and
socialist revolution. 271
While emphasizing the need for flexibility and change, he
noted that:
...there is one thing that must never change, he said:
the dedication, the selfless devotion to our cause, the
revolutionary dash with which we must accomplish all of
our tasks, even the most humble and modest ones, along
with our own selflessness. The communists certainly are
also human beings and therefore have their shortcomings,
they have their ambitions, but these must never over-
rule the general interests of the party and of the
Italian worker movement. The entire party must there-
fore be attentive and alert so that these virtues, which
are alive, will never fade away, in any of our organiza-
tions, in any of our comrades, regardless of the level
and the field of their respons ibilities . 27
2
The effort to define the "Italian road" and the origins
of present strategy can be traced back to Gramsci and Togli-
atti. The PCI has made tactical and strategic shifts when
required by the realities of the Italian political situation
but in spite of attempts to characterize them as
FBIS , No. 215 (6 November 1975), p. L-5. For a concise
review of this aspect of the PCI, see Greene, "The Communist
Parties of Italy and France."
271 FBIS
,
No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1976), p. 42.
272 FBIS, No. 87, Supp. 8 (5 May 1975), p. 63.
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non- revolutionary and revisionist they have proven that they
remain true to Party goals and ideals and the revolutionary
spirit
.
In summarizing the goals and strategy of the PCI one must
remember two words, continuity and flexibility, in strategy
and tactics. The Party has always been dedicated to total
non-violent transformation of Italian society by penetration
of the socioeconomic and political structure. In transforming
society, any alliance or coalition is authorized as long as
it furthers the aims of the Party. In short, the PCI is_ a
communist party dedicated to the socialist revolution in Italy
177

XII. PARTY ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION
In the struggle for power in Italy there has been a
tendency to focus on the emotional and ideological conflict
and to forget that the actual battle is mostly an organiza-
tional one. Lenin noted that, "in the struggle for power
the proletariat has no other weapon but organization...,"
273
and went on to conquer Russia by using such an organization.
Since it has been established that the PCI seeks to transform
the system in which it exists, it can be assumed that the
political organization is being used as a weapon such as
described by Lenin. In his book, The Organizational Weapon:
A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics , Selznik explains
that this type organization is run like a machine and, like
274
a machine, much of the Party's essence is hidden from view.
Some of these shadowy tasks, such as penetration, mobiliza-
tion, indoctrination and manipulation, have already been
addressed but the over-all organization, composition and
electoral base are to be examined in this chapter.
Gramsci wrote in 1919 that he felt that, "the Communist
revolution is essentially a problem of organization and dis-
2 7 5
cipline." He felt that a strong organization was required












Leaders of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) celebrate
their June 1976 election gains from the balcony of party
headquarters in Rome. In the center (in the dark suit)
is PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer. To his right
are Giorgio Amendola and PCI President Luigi Longo; to
his left, Luigi Lama, Secretary-General of the Italian




to enable the Party to come to power and that it should have
three levels of organization, which basically correspond to:
the masses, "whose participation depends upon discipline and
faith, not organizational and creative spirit"; the intel-
lectual leadership, "the principal cohesive factor"; and the
cadres, "that articulate the first element with the second.
One of the crucial defining characteristics of the Party was
to be its organizational coherence; in other words, unified,
self-contained, trained and disciplined. Clearly the PCI has
proven by history to fit all of the categories well. Many of
these items have for the most part been covered in previous
chapters but the organization needs to be examined further
to determine its real cohesiveness
.
The Party statutes establish the basic structure of the
Party (see Figure 1 for general outline) . The Party is a
large organization, but the strong hierarchy controls the
organization well. This is evidenced by the fact that reso-
lutions at all Congresses and Plenums are effected unanimously,
and by the strong inter-party discipline discussed previously.
Only a short explanation will be given for each of the
major elements of organization since they correspond to the
Soviet model. The Central Committee is supposedly the supreme
organ of the Party but it functions, like the Soviet model, as
a rubber stamp. After modest beginnings in the post-war period
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permanent commissions which meet while the Central Committee
is not in session. In addition to the permanent commissions,
there are also smaller sections which are headed by members
of the Directorate. It is in these smaller sections that
the most of the policy is elaborated and communicated to
2 7 8lower units. (See Appendix G for names of members).
The Central Control Commission is the next element in the
hierarchy. The Central Control Commission is allowed a total
membership equal to one-third that of the Central Committee.
It is populated by senior PCI officials who have been phased
out of active Party participation and hence is a very pres-
tigious post. Its main role is that of judge, arbitrator
and policeman, but in addition it has a very important edu-
cational function. In concert with the Central Committee,
the Central Control Commission establishes curricula for all
Party schools and courses, and it also oversees the general
279
education of PCI cadres."
The Directorate is perhaps the most powerful part of the
hierarchy other than the General Secretary. This group runs
the organization. It controls the agenda of the Central Com-
mittee, makes many policy decisions and is the point of
departure for any discussion in the Party. Comparable to the
CPSU Politburo, this organization also is the starting point
for the principle of democratic centralism.







Within the Directorate there are also 15 departments
which correspond to those in the Italian government and are
like the British shadow government. They function daily to
put forth policy statements and await the PCI's "eventual"
accession to power to assume their full potential. The
Secretariat performs the same general role as the Soviet
counterpart, with perhaps more authority. The General Sec-
retary is the real leader of the Party. The personality
behind this post will be discussed later.
The Regional Organizations correspond to the political
regions of Italy and are the direct link to the central party
headquarters. They act as one more controlling device in
order to maintain closer control over the decentralization
of the PCI. The Provincial Federation actually performs a
more active role in organizing and grass roots manipulation.
It is set up like the Party headquarters and performs much
of the daily distribution of orders to lower echelons (see
Figure 2 for chart of organization). To increase control
over the lower echelons, there is much duplicity between
Regional and Provincial organizations. Additionally, many
of the PCI's powerful and important functionaries are located
at the Provincial Federation level.
The real secret of the mass party is the ability of local
organizations to activate a large number of sympathizers on
almost a regular basis. In the late 1960's the PCI moved
away from cell life and the over-all number fell, but mainly
183

2 8 Ddue to the abandonment of the territorial cell. Factory
and work-place cells are still an active part of the Commun-
ist life but the main emphasis has shifted to Sections. This
larger organization is almost akin to a typical Italian polit-
ical club and, as such, allows for greater socialization and
penetration. It is at this level that much of the presence
of the PCI originates. Here is where the "colonization" of
trade unions, cooperatives and all other labor organizations
begins. For example, the PCI controls the 3 , 82 7 , 000-man
CGIL, the 2 , 412 , 000-man National League of Cooperatives, the
Italian Youth Federation, Association of Democratic Lawyers
and Association of Democratic Journalists. There are also
many peripheral organizations which it controls or directly
influences such as: cultural (Italian-American Clubs);
sports, recreation and travel (Intersport) ; anti-fascist
(National Association of Italian Partisans); university,
labor, and professional groups which provide a catch-all for
any overlooked groups.
This massive and cohesive organization can best be com-
pared to the Catholic Church in Italy. Whereas the Catholic
Church reaches 99% of the people in Italy with 26,000 parishes,
the Communist Party has 11,000 sections and 20,000 cells. The
extens iveness of the PCI organization has enabled it to trans-
form a diffuse population into a source of political power.
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In order to run such a vast organization it takes money,
and the Communists are no exception. Fortunately, the PCI
is very well off financially and growing rapidly. Sales from
the Party newspaper L' Unita alone topped 5,128,000,000 lire
in 1975 and are expected to go over 10 billion lire in
2 82
1979. Although the PCI lists the normal range of political
income sources, there are hidden contributors which are not
reflected in the official statistics (see Table VII for 1974-
1975 official balance sheet) . Informed sources indicate the
9 83
PCI budget is closer to 1,200 billion lire a year. To
make up the difference, there are four sources not listed in
the official financial report. They are: the salaries of
Party members holding official positions, kickbacks for Labor
and Industry, brokerage commissions from trade, and direct
payments from the CPSU.
The reason that salaries of Party members holding office
are considered income is because these people are required
to turn their check over to the PCI which in turn reimburses
9 o a
them at a constant rate." This not only increases the
amount in the Party coffers but also increases PCI control
over subordinates. Additionally, it shows that the Party is
of primary interest to PCI members, and the State second.
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The budget also fails to mention contributions from labor
unions and businesses. Since this source is denied to the
public access, it is clear that either the PCI is extract-
ing a large amount from these sources or, for purposes of
legitimacy, wishes to deny any contact with these sources.
In April of 1976 an article was published by Michael
Ledeen and Claire Sterling entitled "Italy's Russian Sugar
Daddies" which exposed the rest of the PCI's clandestine
2 8 6financing. It indicated that one continuing major source
of income is derived from commissions and brokerage fees from
setting up transactions between Italian companies and the
governments of Eastern Europe. Since virtually all negotia-
tions must take place through the PCI, the communists collect
very large fees from Italy's 2,000 billion Lire ($3 billion)
2 8 7
a year trade with Eastern Europe.
In addition to the brokerage fees and commissions, Ledeen
and Sterling report that direct payments made from the USSR
amount to between 3 0% and 35% of the total PCI budget. The
bulk of these payments are still handled through diplomatic
?88
pouches and therefore very difficult to detect." One
example of cash contributions was the 18 billion Lire ($27
million) the USSR contributed to the PCI for the 1972 elec-
289tions
.
2 8 6 See Ledeen and Sterling, p. 16-21.
287 Atlantic , Vol. 235, No. 5 (May 1975), p. 13.
2 8 8
Ledeen and Sterling, p. 18.
289 Atlantic, Vol. 235, No. 5 (May 1975), p. 13.

In response to the Ledeen-Sterling article, the PCI
denied direct Soviet financing but the brokerage role of
the Party was admitted by Secretariat member Gianni:
...We have encouraged, occasionally even in the role of
promoters, the establishment of companies among comrades
over the past decades, mainly on a small scale and with
the aim of facilitating economic exchanges between Italy
and socialist countries . 290
After analyzing some of the PCI's strategy, it comes as
no surprise that they would prefer to keep some activities
from the public eye as well as disassociating themselves from
the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, several points about PCI
financing stand out: it uses more money than any other Ital-
ian party; most of the income and expenses of the PCI are




The composition of the 1.7 million member PCI is as di-
verse as one might expect considering the PCI's strategy of
presence; however, the Party does exercise selectivity in
recruiting and education, with special emphasis being placed
on the intellectual leadership. The importance of certain
types within the hierarchy reflects the character and devel-
opment of the present PCI. However, the total social makeup
was envisioned by Gramsci to encompass all classes in Italy
with the primary emphasis being placed on the workers.
290 FBIS , No. 74 (11 April 1976), p. L-l.
See Ledeen and Sterling for a more detailed description
of PCI finances. Also see Ledeen, Michael. "The Soviet Connec-
tion, " Commentary, LXII, No. 5 (November 1976), p. 51-54.
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The PCI membership meets the guidelines set up for the
over-all strategy very well. According to the Ascher and
Tarrow study, the Party's strategy of presence is working
well and the PCI has solid class support for mobilization.
One drawback in the over-all program is the fact that all
Party members are not full time activists so that some effect-
iveness is lost. This lack of activism is being corrected
by cultural and ideological education of the members, a Party
293imperative expressed by Gramsci in the 1920 's. The education
tends to stress closer orientation to Party ideals, thereby
reinforcing the communist "id" and internalizing values. To
do this job the Party has stepped up propaganda in cells, in-
creased attendance at section and federation schools, as well
as extended offerings at the three national schools in Bologna,
Milan and Rome to more of the leadership by offering courses
of three to six months' duration. 294 In 1975, 150,000 PCI
members attended Party schools. This education opportunity
has also given the Italian Communists a chance to recruit
from a more diverse social strata for Party membership.
With respect to over-all composition of the PCI, Table VIII
VIII shows the social composition of the Party. ~" One obvious
point that stands out is the preponderance of the proletariat,
292
Ascher, William and Sidney Tarrow. "The Stability of
Communist Electorate: Evidence from a Longitudinal Analysis
of French and Italian Aggregate Data," American Journal of
Political Science
,
XIX (3 August 1975), p. 494.
293 Pozzolini, p. 107-116.
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29 5Social Composition of PCI Membership














1948 1952 1956 1962 1971
45 42 39.8 39. 5 39. 5
18 17.1 12.7 8
12 11.8 11.9 10.7 9.69
5.6 4.3 5.0 5.2 4.65
4.0 3.5 4.7 5.6 3.02
3 . 5 2.5 2.1 2.2 3.35
.8 .6 .5 .6 .96
.7 .5 .5 .3 1.15
9.5 11.4 14 12.4 12.6
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2.1 5.4 4.2 9.8 2.18
29 5 1948-1962 period from Tarrow, Peasant Communism
,
p. 140. (One would suspect the "other" figure of Tarrow's
includes "retirees"). 1971 Figures from Lange, "The PCI




2 96Comparison of Social Composition of PCI and DC
Social Category % of Members
PCI DC
Urban workers 39.5 16.6
Agricultural workers 17.6 15.2




Mclnnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 61
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exactly as earlier planned by Gramsci. However, a comparison
with the DC in 1973 (Table IX) shows the lack of penetration
into the middle class. It is also interesting to note that
the PCI has not absorbed as much of the female vote as many
people believe. This is just another indication of some of
the problems of "presence."
This mass Party with a relatively diverse social strata
requires a strong, cohesive leadership to guide the member-
ship. Additionally, the emphasis on hierarchy and ideology
in a Communist system, and in particular the discipline-minded
PCI, almost dictates that those people occupying leading organ-
izational and external administrative positions are likely to
be quite similar in background, outlook and political style.
The importance of Party education reinforces this unity in




perpetuates itself and imposes itself at will. History has
shown the continuity of the Party hierarchy up to the pres-
ent day but a more detailed analysis of the elite structure
should provide insight into another key element of PCI char-
acter.
In Gramsci's early writings he was as concerned with the
leaders of the Party as he was with forming a broad-based mass
party
:
We speak of captains without an army, but in reality it
is easier to form an army than to find captains. It is
surely true that an already existing army will be
destroyed if it lacks captains; whereas a group of
captains, cooperative and in agreement on common ends,
193

will not be slow in forming an army, even where none
exists. L *
'
Much of his writings on the leadership of the Party was affected
by the disruption of the post-World War I era. In this period
it became obvious that a leadership was needed which could
unify the moral-cultural force that Gramsci had envisioned
would arise from the Party's presence. At the helm of the
Party would be the intellectuals, but not in the narrow sense
of the meaning of the word. He defined the intellectual as a
man who, apart from his chosen profession, "exhibits some
intellectual act ivity, ... shares a world view, has a conscious
line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustaining
2 98
or modifying a conception of the world." These intellectuals
had a functional role of exercising direction over society
(e.g., managers, administrators, etc.) as well as being the
organizers and educators of society (scholars, teachers, art-
299ists, etc.). Thus, Gramsci makes a vertical separation of
the visionaries who direct, at the highest level and special-
ists in organizing certain aspects of society at lower levels.
Gramsci also makes a horizontal distinction between "tra-
ditional" and "organic" intellectuals. The "traditional"
intellectuals are the philosophical, educated class which
historically had dominated the important social activities.
The "organic" intellectual is what could be considered a
product of the environment. He is the industrial manager,
297 Cammett, p. 196.
298 ibid, p. 201.
299 Ibid, p. 201
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the rising artist or the local administrative expert. Gramsci
does not rigidly separate the two individuals but his theory
shows that the "traditional" intellectual will aid and educate
the "organic" intellectuals in their progressive advance to
their rightful place in society.
Gramsci makes a further classification of intellectuals
by class and origin wherein he states a very obvious point
that an urban intellectual will be the industrial manager




The conclusion to be drawn from Gramsci ' s discourse on
intellectuals is that the hierarchy will be more educated
than the masses and that the Party apparatchiks should have
30 n
some concrete technical skill to support their position.
In analyzing the PCI elite it is best to divide the in-
vestigation into two parts: the national leadership; and
the lower level functionaries. This will allow a closer
scrutiny of the distinctive features of both and guard against
sweeping generalizations about hard core national leadership
which may or may not apply to the local politicians.
Nationally, the PCI is led by an intelligentsia elite,
which is firmly organized, well disciplined and adequately
financed. These leaders have become so entrenched in the
higher society of Italy that they have been referred to as
300 Ibid, p. 203.
501 Ibid, p. 203.
302 Pozzolini, p. 80
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"the Communists in the double-breasted suits," a term usually
303
reserved for bankers and industrialists.
Some of the key figures in the PCI hierarchy at this time
are: Luigi Longo, President; Enrico Berlinguer, General
Secretary; Giorgio Amendola, Directorate member and head of
the PCI Center for Economic Policy Studies; Paolo Bufalini,
Directorate member and Secretariat member; Armando Cossutta,
Directorate member and head of the PCI's commission on regional
and local government; Pietro Ingrao, Directorate member and
head of the PCI's Center for State Reform Studies; Giorgio
Napolitano, Directorate member, Secretariat member and head
of the PCI's commission on Labor; Gian Carlo Pajetta, Direc-
torate member, Secretariat member and head of the International
Policy Commission; Sergio Segre, Directorate member and head
of the PCI's Foreign Affairs Commission. Other key Party
members are listed in Appendix G.
In characterizing the present Party hierarchy it is useful
to begin with the earlier elites and then compare them with
the present leadership. The intellectual standard-bearer of
304
the Party was Antonio Gramsci. He was born in 1891, in
Sardinia, to a modest clerk. He proved to be a good student
and despite his financially thin upbringing he was awarded a
scholarship to the University of Turin in 1911. He distin-
guished himself while at the University but he soon became
preoccupied with the Socialist Party. The rest of his life





























has been adequately documented in the earlier chapters dealing
with historical analysis, but two important facts should be
noted. Gramsci was the philosophical fountainhead of the
Party ideology, and, in spite of upbringing by poor parents,
he was a well educated member of the intelligens ia.
Gramsci's cohort and successor, Palmiro Togliatti, was
also born in Sardinia (Genoa) , but two years later than
305Gramsci. He was the son of a bookkeeper of peasant origin.
Like Gramsci, Togliatti worked hard in school and won a
scholarship to Turin in 1911. Togliatti graduated second in
his class, to Gramsci's seventh place. After receiving his
law degree, he was drafted in the army but discharged after
a year because of lung trouble. He returned to school to
study philosophy where he soon teamed up with Gramsci to form
Ordine Nuovo . The rest of his political life has been described
in the historical analysis. Togliatti and Gramsci were very
similar in origin and political outlook. Perhaps the reason
why Gramsci became the theoretician and Togliatti became the
tactician was Gramsci's incarceration.
•7 n (L
Longo followed the mold of Gramsci and Togliatti. He
was born in 1900 to a family of peasants. He was able to break
out of the peasant life by becoming a Lieutenant in World War
I. After the war he joined the PCI at the split at Livorno.
In 1922 he was the PCI's youth representative at the Fourth
305
For more detail, see Wohl
,
p. 19-31.
306 See Caldwell, p. 503-525, for a concise biography
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Comintern Congress. Because of his anti-fascist activities
he was forced to leave Italy in 1924. Until his return to
Italy in 1943 he was active in the exiled PCI hierarchy and
Comintern. He was one of the senior members of the Partisan
leadership in Italy after 1943 and was awarded the Bronze
Star by the U.S. for his efforts in the resistance. In 1945
he became Deputy General Secretary to Togliatti and because
of his close adherence to Togliatti's policies he was a
logical successor to the General Secretary's post after
Togliatti's death in 1964. He remained as General Secretary
until 1972 when another of Togliatti's proteges, Enrico Ber-
linguer,. replaced him.
The ease of Berlinguer's succession to Longo ' s position
surprised no one because Berlinguer had been a close associ-
307
ate of both Togliatti and Longo since 1944. Born in 1922
on the island of Sardinia to a middle class lawyer, Berlinguer's
upbringing was more pleasant than his earlier predecessors'.
He studied law for three years but then dropped out and joined
the Communist youth movement in 1943. He was quickly promoted
by Togliatti to the leadership of the youth movement and later
became the President of the World Federation of Democratic
Youth. In 1955 he became a member of the PCI's Directorate
and swiftly moved up the ladder, joining the Secretariat in
1962 and the Politburo in 1966. Berlinguer has proven to be
an able tactician for the Party, dealing and maneuvering the
307 New York Times Magazine of 9 May 1976, p. 51, gives
a good account of Berlinguer's life.
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PCI into the government for the first time since 1947. He
is a centrist in the Party and more concerned with the
"Italian road" than anything else. He is pro- international
communism but definitely wants an autonomous PCI
.
A brief look at other major PCI members should help to
3 8
clarify the character of the hierarchy. Giorgio Amendola
is perhaps the most controversial of all PCI leaders but his
mastery of the Party organization and flexibility have kept
him out of trouble. At 69 years old, he is one of the older
members of the Party and yet maintains a vigorous schedule.
Although a protege of Longo, he is more outspoken concerning
autonomy from the USSR. In spite of his position on autonomy,
he supports the Soviet line in the same manner as Berlinguer.
Paolo Bufalini is the perfect "organization man." He
has enthusiastically supported the Party line in all of his
speeches. He is for a more independent PCI but is content
not to force his position in PCI meetings.
Armando Cossuta is the most pro-Soviet member of the PCI
hierarchy and because of this position he travels often to
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Speculation has it that he has
recently fallen out of favor with Berlinguer, however Est et
Quest says that part of the reason is because he is the head
309
of a new front organization for the PCI. He has firmly
3 8 Much of the information on the PCI personalities is
taken from bits and pieces of articles, speeches by the indi-
viduals and interviews with Dr. Angelo Codevilla of the Hoover
Institution on War and Peace.
309 Codevilla, YICA, 1976
,
p. 180, and Est et Ouest, No.




supported the domestic policies of the PCI without discussion
so the Est et Quest article may have the best analysis of his
present status. At 60 years of age, he is one year younger
than Bufalini.
Pietro Ingrao is one of the theoretical leaders of the
Party but is most well known for his borderline left-wing
stance on PCI affairs. As a borderliner he has opposed the
slow adaptation of the PCI to Italian politics for fear of
disrupting ideological unity; however, he too supports the
"historic compromise." He has been a constant critic of the
USSR since the PCI Central Committee discussions on destalin-
ization in 1961. Ingrao is 61.
One of the younger leaders in the Party is Giorgio Napoli
tano. At 51 years of age, he has risen to the highest levels
of Party leadership. He is a protege of Luigi Longo and has
been a centrist in his policies. He reflects the current
thinking of General Secretary Berlinguer in his writings on
the PCI's relationship with the USSR and domestic policy.
Gian Carlo Pajetta is one of the older members of the
Party. Born in 1911, he was able to join the PCI at an early
age and served on national and international communist organs
Like most older members, he became a leader of the resistance
and hence is a respected member of society. He is a firm be-
liever in current PCI strategies and in particular the idea
of "presence" to gain power.
His earlier comments of 1961 are listed in Dallin's
book on pages 446-447.
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Sergio Segre is the Foreign Affairs specialist with the
PCI. He helps formulate and carry out much of the foreign
policy of the Party. Although only 50, he commands great
respect in the Party. His policies toward the Soviets and
the USA reflect the Party's over-all political strategy
(which most often leads him to polemicize with the USSR)
.
In summary, the PCI hierarchy can be described as: part
of the intelligensia; with an average of around 55, relatively
young; holding a firm conviction for the "Italian road"; and,
except for Cossuta, they consider the relations with the USSR
as secondary to domestic priorities.
This character sketch clearly fits the ideological context
of the Party, and, the youth of the hierarchy leads to the
conclusion that present policies will continue for the next
several decades. The only problem in that continuity could
arise at the lower echelons. It is therefore appropriate to
analyze the lower echelon functionaries in addition to the
central elite to see if continuity is reflected at all levels
of the PCI
.
With a total of 12,000 salaried Party functionaries at
work, down to even the level of the smallest federation, the
311
PCI displays a very imposing apparatus. Unfortunately,
there are too few good people to fill all of the posts the
PCI wishes to control, so most Party functionaries also hold
public office. This dual positioning divides the work of
011 Hellman, "Generational Differences," p. 82
312 Taggiasco, p. 12.
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many officials and sometimes results in too much time being
spent at the non-Party business. Fortunately there are
benefits from holding down two jobs. As Sani has shown, the
presence of PCI functionaries in so many aspects of PCI life
cannot help but affect the perceptions of the mass of Italian
313people favorably.
To fulfill all of the requirements of the PCI, it would
be expected that the Party would draw from a varied background
for its functionaries while still maintaining Gramsci's direc-
tives of working class organic intellectuals. Table X shows
the recruitment of PCI functionaries by class. Even with the
change in distribution from lower to middle class in the
younger age group there is still a marked continuity in re-
314
cruitment from the lower class.
313 See the following articles by Sani: "Determinants
of Party Preference in Italy: Toward Integration of Comple-
mentary Models," American Journal of Political Science
,
XVIII, No. 2 (May 1974), p. 315-331; "Mass Constraints" on
Political Realignments: Perceptions of Anti-System Parties
in Italy," British Journal of Political Science , VI (January
1976), p. 1-32; "Political Traditions as Contextual Variables:
Partisanship in Italy," American Journal of Political Science
,
XX, No. 3 (August 1976), p. 375-405; and The Italian Election
of 1976: Continuity and Change . Paper delivered at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
2-5 September 1976.
See Tarrow, Peasant Communism
,
p. 226-246 for a




315Class Origins of PCI Functionaries, by Age Group
Class Totals Under 40 40 and Older
Middle 14% 31% 0%
Lower-Middle 23 13 32
Lower 63 56 68
Totals 100% 10 0% 100%
This change to other than lower class groups is more dramatic
in the list of party candidates for office, since technical
and managerial skills are required to effectively carry out
the duties of elected positions. For example, in the local
elections in Milan in 1975 workers held positions 5, 10, 14,
15 and 17 on the list of candidates and the top seven in the
„, , r i i 316Marche were as follows:
1. Economist
2. PCI National Treasurer
3. Professor of History
4. Female Teacher
5. Actress
6. Chairman of the Peasants Alliance
7. Shipyard Worker
In order to effectively utilize the elected positions of
its functionaries, the PCI has required a much higher educa-
tional level than seen in the populace as a whole. Table XI
shows the educational makeup of Party functionaries. Note
the increasing educational level of the younger functionaries
315 Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 362.




Educational Level of PCI Functionaries, by Generation"3
Level Totals Under 40 40 and Older
University a 18% 24% 12%
High School 5 21 24 18
Junior High c 32 24 41
Elementary 29 29 29
Totals 100 101 100
aIncludes those with at least two years' attendance
Completion of scuola media superiore , technical, or
professional institute.
Completion or near- completion of scuola media inferiore
Kellman's conclusion in his recent article, "Generational
Differences in the Bureaucratic Elite of Communist Party
Provincial Federations," is that the newer PCI functionaries
are much better educated and prepared to assume the roles
318
required by the PCI's strategy of presence.
7*1*7




Hellman' s article on "Generational Differences in the
Bureaucratic Elite of the Italian Communist Party Provincial
Federations" does an excellent job of point out the fact that
the new generations of PCI elite are more prepared for power.
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Another way to analyze the PCI elite is to evaluate the
reasons why they joined the Party in the first place. Table
XII shows these reasons by regions (i.e., red = strongly
communist, white = DC-controlled areas).
TABLE XII
319Functionaries' Reasons for Joining PCI, by Region
Motivation Total Red Areas White Areas
1. Idealistic or
intellectual m 4% (1) 31%
2. PCI in resistance 16 17 15
3. Other specific
occasion pushing
person to PCI 16 12 23
4. Personal example
or persuasion by
PCI friends 14 17 8
5. Area, environment, / / /
family, etc. 41 50 23
Total (N) 101 (37) 100 (24) 100 (13)
Clearly the biggest reason is traditional ties and associa-
tions with Communists. This demonstrates that while ideology
is a factor, the PCI's strategy of presence is of considerably
more importance. In fact, the partisanship in the PCI tends
Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 375.
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to continually reinforce itself, much more so than the other
Italian parties (see Table XIII). 320
This partisanship leads to an ideological encapusulization
despite daily interaction with non- communist politicians. The
PCI functionaries have a greater commitment to political values
than other Italian politicians, and, because of this and Party
strategy, they are more deeply involved at the local level in
Italian society. A survey of PCI mayors showed that 62% felt
that they were successful in contributing to the growth of
-t, * 321the country.
TABLE XIII




Who have held two or more Party
jobs
Who hold PCI jobs at provincial
or national level










3 20 Tarrow, Sidney, "Party Activists in Public Office:
Comparisons at the Local Level in Italy and France," Communism
in Italy and France , eds. Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney
Tarrow (Princeton, 1975), p. 147.
321 Ibid, p. 149 and 154.
322 Ibid, p. 147
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Naturally, an ideological movement would be self-per-
petuating and therefore each generation of PCI elites would
look for certain qualities which would fulfill the tasks and
requirements of the current leadership. Table XIV reveals
the qualities desired by the present elite. Note the close
correlation between domestic strategy mentioned earlier and
the first three qualities. Comparing this table and a study
done by Hellman on the most important factor in over-all Party
life, it is clear that most Party functionaries believe in the
3?3
same ideals as the national leadership.
Once again, the age factor demonstrates that the youth of
the PCI will be closely following the present strategy when
they take over. In Hellman ' s study, the elements which youth
of the Party stressed even more than some older elites were
Party discipline, democratic centralism and the need for
aggressive reform.
323 See Hellman, "Generational Differences" for a more




Qualities Mentioned Most Frequently as
Required of a Good Communist Leader324
Quality
% of Respondents Mentioning Quality






3a. Ability to lead
creating consensus
4. Closeness to masses
and movement
5. Sense of self
6. Self-sacrifice










16 30 8 (1)
11 9 (2) 15 (2)
11 9 15
(Respondents) (36) (23) (13)
Final confirmation of the PCI elite's adherence to the
over-all Party's aims was demonstrated by Tarrow's survey of
Italian mayors and Putnam's analysis of PCI politicians.
Putnam and Tarrow found that PCI mayors were more active in
Italian political life and found that accomplishing the goals
325
of the Party was the most satisfying experience.
524
325
Hellman, Organization and Ideology
,
p. 399.
Tarrow, "Party Activists," p. 143-172.
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In spite of being overworked, the mayors displayed a high
productivity, a firm commitment to transforming Italian
society and a deep involvement in Italian political and
social life.
In summarizing the characteristics of the Italian poli-
ticians at all levels, several important attributes stand
out.
l Putnam's studies show that the PCI politicians are
85% above average in ideological commitment and 90% above
average in partisan involvement compared with their oppon-
327
ents . They are more committed to political life and ac-
tivity and derive the most satisfaction from achieving Party
? 7 o
goals. " Since they are more ideological and politically
oriented, they tended to approach most problems in ideological
terms. This leads to programmatic rather than technical solu-
329tions to problems. Putnam stresses the point that the PCI
politicians are not merely "social democrats, content to
tinker with the surface manifestations of what they see as
fundamental social injustice," but rather, radical Marxists
-7 A
committed to the total transformation of society.
To complete the analysis of the PCI organization, it is
necessary to examine the sources of support for the Party
Putnam gives the best analysis of beliefs of the
Italian politicians in The Beliefs of Politicians , and "The
Italian Communist Politician."
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within the populace. Several factors affect the participation
of the people in Italian politics: national integration of
the country as a whole; the lack of understanding of politics
by most of the populace; and the general dissatisfaction with
the government. In short, the voting base contains most of
the country's most salient political and cultural features.
Italy's national integration was a problem as far back as
Mazzini and has still not been fully completed. As a result,
there is a tendency to focus on local problems and for a large
segment of the population there is no psychological involve-
7 71
ment in public policy making. Instead, the majority of the
populace is more concerned with the parochial centers of life,
T *T O
e.g., neighborhood, social groups, etc. This makes them
easy targets of the PCI's strategy of presence.
The frustrations generated by not being part of the
national policy-making group tends to radicalize people and
force them to seek alternatives in protest. The PCI has made
a science of mobilizing this popular dissent into electoral
support. Because it is an anti-system party, it provides a
legitimate alternative to the government as well as being a
vehicle of protest. The Party organization is able to crys-
talize the alienation and disaffection into a force which
3 31
See La Polombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner, eds
.
Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton,
1966)
.
00 Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 54.
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transcends the traditional class role granted to a Marxist
«.
333party.
The lack of involvement in national politics and general
dissatisfaction with the national government has led to an
over-all political apathy in the populace. Tables XV and
XVI graphically illustrate the voter apathy.
TABLE XV















The Ascher-Tarrow study shows that this protest vote
has become institutionalized. For further confirmation, see








Attention to Electoral Campaign, by Region335













Macciocchi ran into the same problem in her campaign in Naples
Most people were not concerned with major issues or ideology
but rather where the next Lire was coming from and how to
improve their plight. Macciocchi found that the electoral
tactics of the PCI, such as using catchy phrases and calling
for contemporary solutions, were successful in capturing the
masses. Since the PCI had a strong presence in much of
Naples' social and economic life, it was able to mobilize
the people around purely personal issues.
Since voting patterns in Italy have nothing to do with
ideology or national issues, the PCI's strategy of presence
is the most effective way of gaining new electoral support.
Because the Party makes use of local and personal economic







One unfortunate element of this system for the Italian populace
is that they do not realize the full impact of communism.
There is a feeling that detente has disintegrated any differ-
ences in East and West and that all that matters is to get
the best deal possible.
One final important element needs to be described before
moving on to an analysis of the strength at the polls, and
that is the age factor. Just as age is decreasing the Party,
so is it decreasing in the over-all electoral support. Fully
fifty percent of 18-20-year-olds vote for the PCI. 3 "37 This
signifies future increased strength for the Communists as
well as approval of the ways and means of the over-all strat-
egy-
Over 30 years the PCI has gained steadily in national and
local elections (see Appendix F) . The Provincial results of
1976 are compared to the most recent other non-national
elections in Table XVII. These figures are somewhat mislead-
ing in that the raw data shows a steady increase in the PCI's
strength and yet the percentage of votes won by the left has
remained virtually unchanged. Giacomo Sani's recent paper,
"The Italian Election of 1976: Continuity and Change,"
delivered to the American Political Science Association,
brings to light some interesting statistics concerning this




Sani, Giacomo. "Political Traditions as Contextual
Variables: Partisanship in Italy," American Journal of
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of the vote, whereas the PSI, PCI and other leftist parties
polled a combined total of 40% in 1972 and 44% in 1976.
Figures 3 and 4 and Table XVIII graphically depict where the
changes have taken place. To summarize the Figures and Table,
it can be seen that significant changes occurred in the com-
position of the electorate, i.e., the parties of the center
and right lost more cohorts to death, the left attracted more
young voters and very few defections took place. In effect,
the voting percentages remained relatively stable between the
left, center and right, with most flow taking place within
major groups.
Even after finding out from close analysis that the polar-
ization of the Italian electorate was not a result of mass
defections to the left, the fact remains that from whatever
source the PCI has made gains in its electoral base every
year. It has clearly done a good job of analyzing voter
340preferences and capitalized on these preferences. Although
the growth at the polls has been slow, the PCI strategy has
been specifically designed to increase the electorate at what-
ever rate is acceptable to the populace while at the same time
increasing the Party's presence. A comparison of provincial
and national results proves this point
339 Sani, The Italian Elections of 1976
,
p. 14-15.
See description of the methods of PCI in utilizing
votes in Sani, "Mass Constraints."
For a fuller discussion of this premise, see the
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Summarizing the organization and composition of the PCI
is not difficult because the Party adheres to the theoreti-
cal construction laid out by Gramsci. It is an ideologically
motivated, disciplined, hierarchical organization. The Party
elite has displayed definite continuity in composition and
goal orientation and the youthful look in the PCI portends
no changes for the future. The PCI possesses the organiza-
tional weapon and the personnel to make its strategy work
and accomplish its goals. As for the electorate, all that




Before summarizing the unique characteristics of the
Italian Communists, it is instructive to examine two further
questions about the PCI which have not been discussed previ-
ously. The questions are those of the PCI's adherence to
the principles of: (1) democracy and, (2) pluralism. These
precepts are central to Western political systems and are
the basis for reluctance on the part of many Italians and
Westerners to trust the PCI.
The main point of conflict centers around the fear of
many Italians that, once in power, the PCI will attempt to
set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. The problem of
the PCI's adherence to the principles of democratic politics
is complicated, as described previously, by the Communists'
perversion of the political vocabulary. The PCI has denied
that the dictatorship of the proletariat is its intent be-
cause, for the Italian Communist Party, the process of guid-
ance, in the event of their rise to power, will be called
the "hegemony of the working class." The question now arises
as to what hegemony means. Once again the Party turns to
Gramsci's theoretical writings for the basis of this policy.
According to Gramsci, hegemony is an equilibrium between
civil society and political society; more specifically an
equilibrium between leadership (or direction) based on consent
223

and domination based on coercion in the broadest sense.
A historical bloc is formed once there is equilibrium, e.g.,
when a class "succeeds in maintaining hegemony over society
through both direction and domination, persuasion and force.
The last part of the definition is important in that Gramsci
insisted that the hegemony was to be both a leadership and
347
a domination role. This whole process of hegemony ties
in with the strategy of presence because Gramsci said that
hegemony over society would take place in the cultural, social
and economic areas before as well as after the assumption of
348power. Theoretically then, the hegemony of the working
class seems to be identical to a dictatorship of the prole-
tariat, except the people are to be "led" by the Party before
as well as after the takeover of power. In addition, this
hegemony would allow for athe formation of a historical bloc
of forces which would be the new majority in society (a
notion expressed by Berlinguer in the "historic compromise")
.
The current leadership in the PCI describes hegemony as
a wide alliance of all forces seen "in the sense of capacity
for direction, conquest of consent, and construction of alli-
34 9
ances." This hegemony will then provide "the real guarantee




346 n A0Gramsci, p. 42.
347 Pozzolini
, p . 73
.
Camett, p. 206.





that socialism can develop protected from reactionary counter-
350
attacks..." The PCI does not deny the similarity between
"hegemony of the working class" and dictatorship of the pro-
letariat but prefers to associate hegemony with democracy:
If we do not use the term "dictatorship of the prole-
tariat" to indicate the historical function of the
working class and the objectives facing it, it is
because we want to stress the new way in which, pre-
cisely in the present situation, the working class and
the parties representing it are considering outside
any possible terminological misunderstanding of the
problem of alliances, of the full realization of the
democratic method, and of the full development of man's
and citizens' freedom in a society without exclusive
rights, monolithisms
,
privileges . ob -'-
It is easy to see how the Italian Communists can make such a
comparison when one understands that they feel that Lenin's
rule was democratic:
When Marx and Lenin talk of the "dictatorship of the
proletariat" it must be borne in mind that the term
which accompanies and is opposed to the "dictatorship
of the bourgeoisie" has the significance of a guide
and a determining political influence exercised by a
class which assumes a leading function through a pro-
found social upheaval. The term "dictatorship" in
either case is not to be confused with the adoption
of terrorist or even merely authoritarian and admin-
istrative measures in the administration of power. 352
Since the "hegemony of the working class" is to be utilized
over the minority, it is democratic and not an authoritarian





No. 259 (11 December 1975), p. L-2
352
Ibid, p . L-2
See Radio Fr
ruary 1976) for a more extensive explanation of this idea
3 5 3 ee Europe Background Report No. 35 (9 Feb
225

force in achieving this hegemony, the Party emphasizes that
force will be used only against the enemies of the state and
for the good of the "people":
Coercion certainly does not disappear, since one cannot
develop democracy and bring it on to socialism without
a rigorous and coherent action, within the framework of
state legality, against the reactionary and subversive
forces of big capital. The coercion, however, is
exercised in this case by the power bloc which must
steer the transformation of society and the state in
a socialist direction ... .Within the power bloc itself,
to build it and maintain it, the ruling function of
the working class must be exercised. 354
In spite of the PCI's semantic maneuverings and protests,
the "hegemony of the working class" emerges transparently as
dictatorship using coercion if necessary. Clearly this dic-
tatorship would be opposed to the principle of free will as
exercised in a democracy. It would mean that the workers
and their associated organizations, as guided by the PCI,
would direct the government, industry, education and all
social affairs
.
Freedom is the other important aspect of democracy which
would take on a new meaning under the PCI. Gramsci's idea
was that freedom and democracy were to be controlled by the
"majority" of the workers to speed the rapid development of
3 5 5
the socialist struggle. He distinguished between bour-
geosie democracy and freedom, and the new state in which
discipline would become a "democratic necessity" to protect
354




the majority from attacks by minority factions. This
discipline was fully consistent with Gramsci's idea of
democracy
:
Discipline therefore does not negate personality and
freedom; the question of "personality and freedom"
stems not from the fact of discipline itself, but from
the origin of the power that lays down the discipline.
If this origin is "democratic," if that is, the author-
ity is a specialized technical function and not "arbi-
trariness" or an outside and external imposition,
discipline is a necessary element of democratic order,"
of freedom. 33 '
One example of this application of "freedom" is the utiliza-
tion of the principle of democratic centralism by the Italian
Communists. Perhaps an even more telling example of the PCI's
idea of freedom is the opinion often stated by the Italian
Communists that the USSR is a free country and perhaps even
more so than Western countries. Napolitano expressed this
sentiment in February of 1976 when he answered an interviewer's
questions about freedom and equality in the USSR by saying,
"You will acknowledge that there is more equality there (in
the USSR) than in countries like our own." It is clear
that the Western idea of democracy and the PCI's idea of
democracy are not one and the same. Whereas in the West
free speech and almost unlimited personal freedom are the
norm, the PCI uses the standard dialectical rationalizations
when it discusses suppressing those political parties which
are counter-revolutionary, the strikers who aim to sabotage
356 Ibid, p. 65.
357 ibid, p. 65.
358 FBIS, No. 59 (26 February 1976), p. L-5.
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the people's mines and factories, the spies and fascists
who are abusing free speech or any other of the offenses
directed against the state.
Another important element of democracy is pluralism, or
the alternation of political parties. Since historical
experience has shown that one of the basic aspects of com-
munism after it achieves victory is to eliminate both allies
and real elections, many Italians are skeptical about the
PCI's profession of complete adherence to the democratic
principle of pluralism. In a poll in April of 1976, Italians
were asked whether the PCI, once it was in the government,
would accept a return to the opposition if it lost at the
polls: 30.4% said yes, while 4 5.8% thought the PCI would
359
not leave. The PCI is quick to protest, saying that it
is not like other communist parties. Of course the Italian
Communists have little choice but to protest, since they are
intent on following the parliamentary road and can scarcely
tell their fellow travellers that they will be liquidated in
the future. In response to remonstrances by the PCI as to
its firm support of democracy, the Italian news service has
noted that the Italian Communists' protests almost always
appear on the back page of the Communist Party newspaper and





No. 65 (2 April 1976), L-l.
360 The PCI's did not deny that this statement was true
but instead protested again that they firmly believed in
these principles. See FBIS , No. 118 (17 June 1976), p. L-3
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When the PCI speaks about pluralism, its basic emphasis
is on the fact that the multi-party system will remain and
that alternation of leadership of the country may occur.
The catch in the system stems from the fact that alternation
of parties has no meaning for a PCI-run government since the
PCI's plan for coming into power at the vanguard of a vast
majority coalition precludes any effective opposition. Longo
alluded to this in his speech to the 14th PCI Congress when
he said that:
Whereas hitherto the conservative and retrograde forces
have been at the country's helm, with the inception of
the so-called "compromise" it will be the progressive
Communist, Socialist and Catholic forces which will
govern and for once, the retrograde and conservative
forces of the old and obsolete which will form the
opposition . 362
Berlinguer further defined this new opposition as, "the extreme
right wing, the conservative forces, and the other forces
which do not share either the general outlines or specific
programs of the unity government." Essentially, this
brings us back to the same point that the opposition would
be so small or kept so ineffective by the "hegemony of the
working class," as in Poland or Hungary, that it would cease
to be an opposition in the democratic sense, i.e., an alter-
native force.
For his part, Berlinguer may sincerely believe in a type
of democracy, but he talks about it in terms of the future,
361 FBIS , No. 120 (21 June 1976), p. L-l.
362
FBIS , No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1975), p. 57.
363 FBIS
,
No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 24.
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after the socialist ideal has been achieved, and in terms of
a non-Western type of democracy. The point must be emphasized
that the PCI does not talk of democracy in a Western sense.
In his survey of Italian politicians, Putnam concluded that:
Italian Communists employ almost exclusively classical
and socioeconomic conceptions of democracy. Only rarely
do they stress elements of liberal or polyarchal
democracy-free speech, the rule of law, limited govern-
ment, political competition, and so on. Not Locke and
Schumpter but Marx and Rousseau are their intellectual
forbears . 364
The democracy, freedom and pluralism acknowledged by Western
statesmen is inconsistent with the principles of Marx or
Gramsci. The radical transformations would prove unpalatable
to all but the dedicated communists, which in turn would
surely lead to conflict and invocation of communist principles
of equality. The myth of "democratic communism" is perhaps
the most erroneous characterization of the PCI. With this
last characterization in mind, it is appropriate to summarize
the distinctive features of the PCI.
The character of the PCI is a product of national ideas,
particular conditions of history, and the men who participated
in the organization of the party. Although there has often
seemed to be a split between theory and practice, this has
been a result of the flexible strategy adopted by the Party
to meet the realities of the time. Even at times of conflict
there has remained a basic interaction between ideology,
364 Putnam, "The Italian Communist Politician," p. 194.
365 See The Communist Parties of Western Europe , by Neil
Mclnnes, p. 176-177, for further discussion of this idea.
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goals, strategy and organization. Throughout its history,
the basic philosophic and programmatic content of the
"Italian road" has been preserved intact: from Gramsci to
Berlinguer, the movement has always remained constant in its
goals
.
The first point to note about the character of the PCI
is that it represents a national form of communist ideology.
In other words, the character of the party was not shaped by
the occupation of the country by Stalin's army. It was born
in the national movement of the 19th century and raised to
consciousness by its own original theoretician, Antonio
Gramsci. The basic theory is Marxist- Leninist but Gramsci
altered it to fit the Italian situation. This Gramscian
ideology has been the basis for all policy formulation and
strategy since about the 1950's. The continuity of applica-
tion of his theories has remained unbroken to the present.
The rest of the world may have Marx and Lenin but Italy looks
decisively to Gramsci for guidance. Sergio Segre summed up
the Party's feelings on the PCI by saying that:
It did not just base itself on translations of Marxist-
Lenist texts. It had its own seminal thinkers in the
figure of Gramsci and others. Italian communism is not
an import. It had developed in the tradition of the
previous Italian culture. 366
An important element of this Italian ideology is that Gramsci
taught that his theories should not be dogmatically applied,
therefore flexibility became the key to party life.
366 Yergin, Daniel, "A Letter from Rome," The New Republic ,
LCXXII, No. 18 (1 November 1975), p. 12.
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In strategy, tactics and organization, nothing was too firm
to be altered to suit the ultimate Utopian goal. Thus we
have an ideology which has both unique national continuity
and flexibility.
The goal of the PCI is the political, social and economic
transformation of Italian society. In his speech to the PCI
Central Committee on 13 May 1976, Berlinguer stated the goal
quite clearly, "The socialist society we want to build in-
volves a transformation of the entire structure of society
•T f. "j
..." Its revolutionary goals, although perhaps in theory
non-violent, preclude any identification with a social-demo-
cratic movement. It is dedicated to the ruthless pursuit of
a communist state and one in which the Western ideas of society,
including democracy and freedom, do not exist. In attaining
the communist state, the Party has opted to achieve power by
parliamentary means. This has been misunderstood by many to
mean that the PCI has adapted to the democratic system, while
to the contrary such an opting means only that the Party
realizes it must use the system if it is to gain power. Once
in power, as it has often stated, the PCI would use the "he-
gemony of the working class" to oversee the transformation of
society
.
The PCI has forged a four-pronged strategy to achieve its
goals. It aims to continue to develop and maintain a mass
party capable of achieving and holding onto power.
367 FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 20.
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Secondly, it wants to create a "presence" in Italy by the
penetration of the social and economic foundations of the
country. Thirdly, it means to pursue coalitions and alliances
anywhere and everywhere to allow it to increase its electoral
base. Finally, it is determined to maintain fraternal links
with the USSR and the international communist movement with
which it feels such close ties. These strategies are all
linked by Gramscian theory but at the same time the flexi-
bility of his theory allows partial or conflicting strategies
to be used if the need arises. One important aspect of these
strategies which must be repeated is the continuity with
which they have all been pursued.
If continuity is the watchword of ideology and strategy,
pragmatism best describes the tactical applications used
daily. Party life is marked by political actions which are
flexibly geared to the realities of the moment. The PCI uses
cajolery most often but also uses coercion if the need arises.
In the over-all scheme of Party actions there may be partial
actions and tactical compromise which seemingly conflict with
the improvement of the plight of the workers, but, in reality
these both fit into the "war of position." Only after the
"war of movement" is entered into will the tactics no longer
be compromising or partial. Berlinguer described the Party's
actions by saying that it had always "tried to maintain the
36 8
link between immediate objectives and historical goals..."
368
FBIS, No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1975), p. 42
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To carry out the goals of the PCI, it was necessary to
build a mass party with a cohesive organization. This organ-
ization is well disciplined and uses the principle of demo-
cratic centralism to prevent any undue dissention or
factionalism. The PCI politician is ideologically dedicated
to the destruction of Italian capitalism. They have main-
tained a consistent belief in the PCI's goals since the time
of party formation. To sustain this consistency, the PCI
carries on a selective recruiting program, a rigorous educa-
tion program and performs periodic purges to cleanse the Party.
On the other hand, the vast majority of the people who vote
communist have no awareness of what the Party stands for or
what it means to them. They vote communist out of protest,
because they have received favors from the communists or
because their friends vote communist. The vote-getting capa-
bility of the PCI reflects the effectiveness of the organiza-
tion in mobilizing the populace when required. If there are
two words which could easily sum up the organization, they
would be discipline and success. Putnam stresses the fact
that the PCI politicians "are no mere social democrats, con-
tent to tinker with the surface manifestations of what they
see as fundamental social injustices," and that the people
m Italy are responding.
It seems clear from the summary of the main elements of
the PCI character that the PCI is a revolutionary communist
party with strong links to the international communist movement
369 Blackmer, Communism in Italy and France, p. 182.
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In short, the PCI is the sort of a threat which should give
the U.S. State Department serious cause for alarm. It is the
kind of party which could, if voted into power in Italy,
cause serious problems for Italy and the Western allies.
Perhaps a brief look at some of the possible ramifications
of a communist- led Italy will clarify the problem.
There are several points which seem to be the motivating
factors behind the U.S. Government's negative response to the
PCI. The most important are suggested by the following ques-
tions: What will happen in Italy when and if the PCI comes
to power? Will the U.S. or USSR benefit? What will a com-
munist Italy mean for NATO? And, what will such an Italy mean
for the Mediterranean in general?
First of all, it seems fairly obvious that Berlinguer is
dedicated to achieving power by peaceful means. He may even
believe the whole idea of an independent, national and demo-
cratic road to a communist transformation of society. Although
it is not a foregone conclusion that the PCI will achieve the
goal of government participation, if it does, the participa-
370tion will most likely be peaceful initially. ' This point has
been demonstrated often by the Communists' penchant for moving
slowly and cautiously along the "Italian road," always aware
that they are on trial with the Italians and the world as
See the Conference Report entitled, "The Political
Stability of Italy" at the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (CSIS) , Georgetown University, 2 April 1976.
The topics discussed at the Conference ranged from domestic
politics to foreign policy of the PCI.
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a whole. The need for alliances and coalitions would un-
doubtedly constrain the Party until it assumed power, but
the real dilemma would arise after power was attained. Once
the Italian Communists were in control of the government,
they would be faced with fulfilling the promises made to the
371people who put them in power. Many of these people, who
in the past have proven to be difficult to control, are now
going to demand quick solutions to problems. If the PCI
continues to move slowly, these people will probably carry
out unofficial economic expropriation in Italy as in the
recent case of Chile. To prevent this rapid loss of power,
the PCI is going to have to consolidate power and control
quickly and probably reduce some freedom. Even if the people
do not demand that the PCI carry out its promises, at some
point the Communists would find themselves confronted with
the problems of the transition to socialism. After analyzing
the PCI's organization and internal discipline, one can assume
that the PCI would not be reluctant to resort to the extreme
measures of control employed by so many other communist regimes
Whereby the Italian "democratic road" would have the appearance
of any other authoritarian regime. Djilas describes this
resort to coercion in action in his book, The New Class . One
further bit of proof of the PCI's ability to avail itself of
radical procedures lies in the continuity of Party discipline





to impose a coercive and repressive form of government,
then there would be less of a requirement to perpetuate
the organization, internal discipline and strategy that
characterize the Party.
It has been postulated that even if the PCI were to
achieve power in Italy that the USSR would suffer a greater
loss than the West because of the ideological disruption
37 2posed by the Italian brand of communism. This hypothesis
is hyperbolically optimistic. The PCI is not only emotion-
ally and ideologically attached to the USSR, but in part
financially dependent on them as well. Perhaps on a spec-
trum of strict conformity to the Soviet line the Italian
Communists would be to the left of Rumania but hardly as far
afield as Yugoslavia or China. It is also highly probable
that the USSR would suffer some discomfiture by having a
liberal communist party in Europe. It may even cause some
dissention in Eastern Europe, but the current Soviet state-
ments about the PCI do not portray a fear of, or violent
dissatisfaction with, the Italian Communists. The fact re-
mains that the USSR would find an ally, which has historically
declared its solidarity with the Soviets, in the midst of the
Medeterranean and outflanking the forces of NATO (the position
of NATO in Italy will be discussed next) . The USSR would
clearly benefit proportionately more than the West and the





The matter of NATO is a sensitive problem for the PCI
since it only recently (1974) , and largely out of pragmatic
necessity, decided to remain in the alliance. Even this
"acceptance" of NATO is conditional:
Communists consider Italy's presence in the Atlantic
Alliance and in NATO a negative fact which is a danger
to peace and national security. But they are not rais-
ing Italy's withdrawal from this system of alliances as
a point of order, because their aim is the obsolescence
of the military and political blocs within a perspective
of peace and gradual, controlled and balanced disarma-
ment. Communists oppose the acceptance of new military
and financial commitments and any attempt to overburden
the contents of agreements which were explicitly
declared to be defensive and geographically limited. 373
Perhaps even more enlightening is Berlinguer's statement
regarding the reasons why the PCI changed its mind on NATO,
"We believe any other solution would be damaging and sterile,
both because any unilateral exit from the two (power) blocs
would disturb the move towards detente, and because it would
374
create a break between Italy's democratic parties." The
last reason was enlarged upon by Berlinguer when he declared
that any pullout from NATO would reopen "a furrow on the
domestic level between our country's democratic and popular
375forces." Coming after the coup in Chile, these statements
seem to be geared more to the Party's coalition strategy than
to sincere acceptance of the spirit of NATO. Other statements
on the military such as the proposed reforms of the PCI which
would make the Italian army defensive in nature and pull back
373 FBIS , No. 130 (7 July 1975), p. L-l.
374 FBIS
,
Annex 95 (14 May 1976), p. 2.
375 FBIS, No. 54 (11 March 1975), p. L-l.
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the forward NATO forces, cast even more suspicion on the
Western character of the PCI's new policy. 376 These points
raise serious doubts about the PCI's willingness to partici-
pate effectively in NATO, to protect NATO classified data,
and most of all, to be a reliable Western ally in time of
crisis. If one can take the PCI's stand on SALT, the Panama
Canal, the Mideast, Angola and Portugal as examples of the
PCI's feelings in time of crisis, there is no question that
the PCI would not be a reliable ally for the West.
Another point which needs to be emphasized in conjunction
with the PCI and NATO is Italy's importance to the Mediter-
ranean. Any analysis of the Mediterranean will show that
Italy divides the two basins of the Mediterranean Sea and
could possibly control access to either basin in time of
t
-y 1
crisis. Given the recent attitude expressed by the Italian
Communists on NATO and the Mediterranean, the PCI could be
expected to pursue a position of neutrality or even hostility
toward the West in time of a conflict in the Mediterranean
3 7 8(especially in the Mideast) . One recent manifestation of
this attitude has been the attempts of the PCI to persuade the
376 Codevilla, YICA, 1976
,
p. 189. See also FBIS , No. 36
(21 February 1976), p. M-2.
377 For a more detailed analysis of the situation of Italy
in the Mediterranean see: Allsopp, George A. Soviet Naval
Challenge in the Mediterranean: Who Rules the Mediterranean .
Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 1972; Campbell, John C.
"The Mediterranean Crisis," Foreign Affairs , LIII, No. 4 (July
1975), 605-624; and Lewis, Jesse W.J. The Strategic Balance in
the Mediterranean. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1976.
378 See Lange, Peter. "What is to be done about Italian




Italian government to regain control of all U.S. bases in
Italy. In this same vein, during a recent interview of Ber-
linguer, a journalist asked what would be the response of the
Communist ministers in the Italian government if a conflict
were to break out in the Mediterranean area and the forces
of the Warsaw Pact or NATO requested limited and temporary
use of Italian territory as a support and supply base for
naval and air units? Berlmguer replied:
I am often asked the following question: How would you
behave in the event of a conflict involving forces both
of the Atlantic Pact and of the Warsaw Pact? And I must
say once again quite simply that this eventuality would
signify the outbreak of a nuclear war, and so I do not
see what the problems would be. 379
Berlinguer's ambiguous answer leads to the conclusion that he
either cannot decide on one side or the other, or he wishes
to remain neutral. In either case, the answer for Western
forces is clearly a problem, and little or no effective support
from Italy can be counted on once the PCI attains power.
Scenarios could continue to be built using the character-
ization of the PCI which have been constructed in this paper
but the main point is the following: the inclusion of the PCI
in the Italian government will prove to be detrimental to Italy
and to the West. Further, having the PCI in power will benefit
the Soviets while being detrimental to NATO and the strategic
balance in the Mediterranean.
In the final analysis, what is at stake is the ideological
control of men's lives and minds through the absolute use of
379 FBIS, No. 108 (3 June 1976), p. L-l.
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state power. The "accommodation of mutual interests" envi-
sioned by Western leaders can never come about because the
goals of the Communists do not include a Western democratic
society. Conversely, no society where the rights of man are
respected would tolerate the transition to communism. The
radical transformations required for communism would prove
unpalatable for Italian society. Berlinguer may try to stick
to a democratic road to communism, but as Djilas found in
Yugoslavia, no matter what circumstantial adaption and modi-
fications the communists make, the party will remain Marxist-
Leninist and eventually the democratic road will become more
TO A
undemocratic as communism progresses. For a telling fore-
cast of the future of democratic communism as characterized
by the PCI , one may turn to three quotes by recent "democratic"
leaders
:
The Communist Party should take into account that in the
present phase we are following the line of a national
and democratic revolution.
Klement Gottwald, 1945
Czech Communist Party Secretary
Popular democracy in Poland is not the dictatorship of
the proletariat. Our democracy is not the same as Soviet
democracy.
Wlodyslaw Gomulka, 1946
Polish Communist Party Secretary
In the past 25 years, the world's communist parties have
learnt that there are different ways to socialism, and
so we cannot construct socialism if we do not build our
own way, taking account of the particular conditions
For more on this comparison see Radio Free Europe
Research Report #35 (9 February 1976); also Mclnnes , The
Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 176-177.
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prevailing in the country. We have learnt our lesson,
and if we are reinforcing Hungarian democracy, we are
not doing so for tactical reasons, or in pursuit of
some secret objective, but in accordance with our deep
communist faith.
Madyas Rakosi, 1946 .,,,,
Hungarian Communist Party Secretary
Although these statements were made twenty years ago, they
reflect the attitude of the present PCI and bear ample warning
to the West.
The PCI has obscured its goals in a mass of ideological
rationalizations and rhetoric but the revolutionary goals
and radical views are as plain as those of Adolf Hitler in
Mein Kampf . The Party does not deny that it will radically
change the pattern of life in Italy nor does it disguise its
dislike of Western democracy. The Italian Communist elite
do not refuse the fact that they rigorously pursue communist
goals, nor do they hide their close association with the
international communist movement and the USSR in particular.
In short, they are a revolutionary communist party, flexible
and yet held together by an unchanging ideological continuity,
dedicated to the overthrow of Capitalism. The PCI made these
feelings clear at the 14th PCI Congress:
Italians ought not to delude themselves; the disintegra-
tion they see around themselves cannot be healed by
Western means. Only the advent of socialism will bring
moral health. 382
381 The Economist (28 February 1976), p. 54.
382 Codevilla, YICA, 1976, p. 183.
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This new Italy was described clearly by Berlinguer: "The
socialist society which we want to build involves a trans-
? O T
formation of the entire structure of society."
The alternatives for the United States are few. The
U.S. Government must resist any impulse to portray the PCI
as anything but dedicated communists. Western leaders need
to recognize that the PCI will never become another social
democratic party. The only course of action, therefore,
must be to dissuade the Italian people from allowing the
communists to participate in the government. And finally,
the Western governments must aid the democratic parties in
Italy in their efforts to resist communist gains which are
based on the subtle tactics of pragmatically working within
the existing system. Without this vigilence and active
resistance to Italian "democratic communism" the struggle
between Western civilization and the "mediation of earthly
paradise" of Marxism will be over and the PCI's new revolu-
tionaries will have won.




GENERAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL




That the emancipation of the working classes must be
conquered by the working classes themselves; that the
struggle for class privileges and monopolies, but for equal
rights and duties, and the abolition of all class rule;
That the economical subjection of the man of labor to
the monopolizer of the means of labor, that is, the sources
of life, lies at the bottom of servitude in all its forms,
of all social misery, mental degradation, and political
dependence
;
That the economical emancipation of the working classes
is therefore the great end to which every political movement
ought to be subordinate as a means;
That all efforts aiming at that great end have hitherto
failed from the want of solidarity between the manifold
divisions of labor in each country, and from the absence of
a fraternal bond of union between the working classes of
different countries;
That the emancipation of labor is neither a local nor a
national, but a social problem, embracing all countries in
which modern society exists, and depending for its solution
Giinther Nollau, International Communism and World





on the concurrence, practical and theoretical, of the most
advanced countries;
That the present revival of the working classes in the
most industrious countries of Europe, while it raises a new
hope, gives solemn warning against a relapse into the old
errors, and calls for the immediate combination of the still
disconnected movements;
For These Reasons--




That all societies and individuals adhering to it will
acknowledge truth, justice, and morality, as the-basis of
their conduct towards each other and towards all men, without
regard to color, creed, or nationality;
That it acknowledges no rights without duties, no duties
without rights; and in this spirit the following rules have
been drawn up.
1. This Association is established to afford a central
medium of communication and cooperation between Working Men's
Societies existing in different countries and aiming at the
same end, viz., the protection, advancement, and complete
emancipation of the working classes.
2. The name of the Society shall be "The International
Working Men's Association."
3. There shall annually meet a General Working Men's
Congress, consisting of delegates of the branches of
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the Association. The Congress will have to proclaim the
common aspirations of the working class, take the measures
required for the successful working of the International
Association, and appoint the General Council of the Society.
4. Each Congress appoints the time and place of meeting
for the next Congress. The delegates assemble at the appointed
time and place without any special invitation. The General
Council may, in case of need, change the place, but has no
power to postpone the time of meeting. The Congress appoints
the seat and elects the members of the General Council annual-
ly. The General Council thus elected shall have the power to
add to the number of its members.
On its annual meetings, the General Congress shall
receive a public account of the annual transactions of the
General Council. The latter may, in cases of emergency, con-
voke the General Congress before the regular yearly term.
5. The General Council shall consist of working men
from different countries represented in the International
Association. It shall from its own members elect the officers
necessary for the transaction of business, such as a treasurer,
a general secretary, corresponding secretaries for the differ-
ent countries, etc.
6. The General Council shall form an international agency
between the different national and local groups of the Associ-
ation, so that the working men in one country be constantly
informed of the movements of their class in every other coun-
try; that an inquiry into the social state of the different
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countries of Europe be made simultaneously, and under a
common direction; that the questions of general interest
mooted in one society be ventilated by all; and that when
immediate practical steps should be needed--as, for instance,
in case of international quarrels- -the action of the associ-
ated societies be simultaneous and uniform. Whenever it
seems opportune, the General Council shall take the initia-
tive of proposals to be laid before the different national
or local societies. To facilitate the communications, the
General Council shall publish periodical reports.
7. Since the success of the working men's movement in
each country cannot be secured but by the power of union and
combination, while, on the other hand, the usefulness of the
International General Council must greatly depend on the cir-
cumstance whether it has to deal with a few national centres
of working men's associations, or with a great number of
small and disconnected local societies; the members of the
International Association shall use their utmost efforts to
combine the disconnected working men's societies in their
respective countries into national bodies, represented by
central national organs. It is self-understood, however,
that the appliance of this rule will depend upon the peculiar
laws of each country, and that, apart from legal obstacles,
no independent local society shall be precluded from directly
corresponding with the General Council.
7a. In its struggle against the collective power of the
possessing classes, the proletariat can act as a class only
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by constituting itself a distinct political party, opposed
to all the old parties formed by the possessing classes.
The coalition of the forces of the working class,
already achieved by the economic struggle, must also serve,
in the hands of this class, as a lever in its struggle against
the political power of its exploiters.
As the lords of the land and of capital always make
use of their political privileges to defend and perpetuate
their economic monopolies and to enslave labor, the conquest
of political power becomes the great duty of the proletariat.
8. Every section has the right to appoint its own secre-
tary corresponding with the General Council.
9. Everybody who acknowledges and defends the principles
of the International Working Men's Association is eligible
to become a member. Every branch is responsible for the
integrity of the members it admits.
10. Each member of the International Association, on
removing his domicile from one country to another, will receive
the fraternal support of the Associated Working Men.
11. While united in a perpetual bond of fraternal cooper-
ation, the working men's societies joining the International
Association will preserve their existent organizations intact.
12. The present rules may be revised by each Congress,
provided that two-thirds of the delegates present are in favor
of such revision.
13. Everything not provided for in the present rules will





THE 21 CONDITIONS 385
The Second Congress of the Communist International puts
forward the following conditions of adherence to the Communist
International
:
1. All propaganda and agitation must be a genuinely-
Communist character and in conformity with the program and
decisions of the Communist International. The entire Party
press must be run by reliable Communists who have proved
their devotion to the cause of the proletariat. The dicta-
torship of the proletariat is to be treated not simply as a
current formula learnt by rote; it must be advocated in a
way which makes its necessity comprehensible to every ordin-
ary working man and woman, every soldier and peasant, from
the facts of their daily life, which must be systematically
noted in our press and made use of every day.
The periodical press and other publications, and all
Party publishing houses, must be completely subordinated to
the Party Presidium, regardless of whether the Party as a
whole is at the given moment legal or illegal. Publishing
houses must not be allowed to abuse their independence and
pursue a policy which is not wholly in accordance with the
policy of the Party.
t o r
Gunther Nollau, International Communism and World
Revolution (New York, 1961), p. 337-344.
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In the columns of the press, at popular meetings, in
the trade unions and cooperatives, wherever the adherents of
the Communist International have an entry, it is necessary
to denounce systematically and unrelentingly, not only the
bourgeoisie, but also their assistants, the reformists of
all shades.
2. Every organization which wishes to join the Communist
International must, in an orderly and planned fashion, remove
reformists and centrists from all responsible positions in
the workers' movement (party organizations, editorial boards,
trade unions, parliamentary factions, cooperatives, local
government bodies) and replace them by tried Communists, even
if, particularly at the beginning, "experienced" opportunists
have to be replaced by ordinary rank-and-file workers.
3. In practically every country of Europe and America
the class struggle is entering the phase of civil war. In
these circumstances Communists can have no confidence in
bourgeois legality. They are obliged everywhere to create
a parallel illegal organization which at the decisive moment
will help the Party to do its duty to the revolution. In all
those countries where, because of a state of siege or of
emergency laws, Communists are unable to do all their work
legally, it is absolutely essential to combine legal and
illegal work.
4. The obligation to spread Communist ideas includes
the special obligation to carry on systematic and energetic
propaganda in the Army. Where such agitation is prevented
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by emergency laws, it must be carried on illegally. Refusal
to undertake such work would be tantamount to a dereliction
of revolutionary duty and is incompatible with membership of
the Communist International.
5. Systematic and well-planned agitation must be carried
on in the countryside. The working class cannot consolidate
its victory if it has not by its policy assured itself of
the support of at least part of the rural proletariat and
the poorest peasants, and of the neutrality of part of the
rest of the rural population. At the present time Communist
work in rural areas is acquiring first-rate importance. It
should be conducted primarily with the help of revolutionary
Communist urban and rural workers who have close connections
with the countryside. To neglect this work, or to leave it
in unreliable semi-reformist hands, is tantamount to renounc-
ing the proletarian revolution.
6. Every party which wishes to join the Communist Inter-
national is obliged to expose not only avowed social-patriot-
ism, but also the insincerity and hypocracy of social-pacifism;
to bring home to the workers systematically that without the
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism no international court
of arbitration, no agreement to limit armaments, no "demo-
cratic" reorganization of the League of Nations, will be able
to prevent new imperialist wars.
7. Parties which wish to join the Communist International
are obliged to recognize the necessity for a complete and
absolute break with reformism and with the policy of the
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"Centre," and to advocate this break as widely as possible
among their members. Without that, no consistent Communist
policy is possible.
The Communist International demands unconditionally
and categorically that this break be effected as quickly as
possible. The Communist International is unable to agree
that notorious opportunists, such as Turati Modigliani,
Kautsky, Hilferding, Hilquit, Longguet, MacDonald, etc.,
shall have the right to appear as members of the Communist
International. That could only lead to the Communist Inter-
national becoming in many respects similar to the Second
International, which has gone to pieces.
8. A particularly explicit and clear attitude on the
question of the colonies and the oppressed peoples is neces-
sary for the parties in those countries where the bourgeoisie
possess colonies and oppress other nations. Every party which
wishes to join the Communist International is obliged to ex-
pose the tricks and dodges of "its" imperialists in the col-
onies, to support every colonial liberation movement not
merely in words but in deeds, to demand the expulsion of their
own imperialists from these colonies, to inculcate among the
workers of their country a genuinely fraternal attitude to the
working people of the colonies and the oppressed nations, and
to carry on systematic agitation among the troops of their
country against any oppression of the colonial peoples.
9. Every party which wishes to join the Communist Inter-
national must carry on systematic and persistent Communist
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activity inside the trade unions, the workers' councils and
factory committees, the cooperatives, and other mass workers'
organizations. Within these organizations Communist cells
must be organized which shall by persistent and unflagging
work win the trade unions, etc., for the Communist cause.
In their daily work the cells must everywhere expose the
treachery of the social-patriots and the instability of the
"centre." The Communist cells must be completely subordinate
to the Party as a whole.
10. Every party belonging to the Communist International
is obliged to wage an unyielding struggle against the Amsterdam
"International" of the yellow trade unions. It must conduct
the most vigorous propaganda among trade unionists for the
necessity of a break with the yellow Amsterdam International.
It must do all it can to support the international association
of red trade unions, adhering to the Communist International,
which is being formed.
11. Parties which wish to join the Communist International
are obliged to review the personnel of their parliamentary
factions not only verbally but in fact subordinate to the
Party Presidium, requiring of each individual Communist member
of parliament that he subordinate his entire activity to the
interests of genuinely revolutionary propaganda and agitation.
12. Parties belonging to the Communist International must
be based on the principle of democratic centralism. In the
present epoch of acute civil war the Communist Party will be
able to fulfill its duty only if its organization is as
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centralized as possible, if iron discipline prevails, and if
the Party center, upheld by the confidence of the Party mem-
bership, has strength and authority and is equipped with the
most comprehensive powers.
13. Communist parties in those countries where Communists
carry on their work legally must from time to time undertake
cleansing (re-registration) of the membership of the Party in
order to get rid of any petty bourgeois elements which have
crept in.
14. Every party which wishes to join the Communist Inter-
national is obliged to give unconditional support to any
Soviet republic in its struggle against counter-revolutionary
forces. Communist parties must carry on unambiguous propa-
ganda to prevent the dispatch of munitions transports to the
enemies of the Soviet republics; they must also carry on
propaganda by every means, legal or illegal, among the troops
sent to strangle workers' republics.
15. Parties which still retain their old social -democratic
programs are obliged to revise them as quickly as possible,
and to draw up, in accordance with the special conditions of
their country, a new Communist program in conformity with the
decisions of the Communist International. As a rule, the pro-
gram of every party belonging to the Communist International
must be ratified by the regular Congress of the Communist
International or by the Executive Committee. Should the pro-
gram of a party not be ratified by the ECCI, the party concerned




16. All the decisions of the Congresses of the Communist
International, as well as the decisions of its Executive
Committee, are binding on all parties belonging to the
Communist International. The Communist International, work-
ing in conditions of acute civil war, must be far more cen-
tralized in its structure than was the Second International.
Consideration must of course be given by the Communist Inter-
national and its Executive Committee in all their activities
to the varying conditions in which the individual parties have
to fight and work, and they must take decisions of general
validity only when such decisions are possible.
17. In this connection, all parties which wish to join
the Communist International must change their names. Every
party which wishes to join the Communist International must
be called: Communist party of such and such a country (sec-
tion of the Communist International) . This question of name
is not merely a formal matter, but essentially a political
question of great importance. The Communist International
has declared war on the entire bourgeois world and on all
yellow social-democratic parties. The difference between the
Communist parties and the old official "social-democratic" or
"socialist" parties, which have betrayed the banner of the
working class, must be brought home to every ordinary worker.
18. All leading Party press organs in all countries are
obliged to publish all important official documents of the
Executive Committee of the Communist International.
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19. All parties belonging to the Communist International,
and those which have applied for admission, are obliged to
convene an extraordinary Congress as soon as possible, and
in any case not later than four months after the 2nd Congress
of the Communist International, to examine all these condi-
tions of admission. In this connection, all party centers
must see that the decisions of the 2nd Congress of the Com-
munist International are made known to all local organizations
20. Those parties which now wish to join the Communist
International, but which have not radically changed their
former tactics, must see to it that, before entering the Com-
munist International not less than two-thirds of the members
of their central committee and of all their leading central
bodies consist of comrades who publicly and unambiguously
advocated the entry of their party into the Communist Inter-
national before its 2nd Congress. Exceptions can be made
with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International. The ECCI also has the right to make exceptions
in the case of representatives of the center mentioned in
paragraph 7.
21. Those members of the party who reject in principle
the conditions and these put forward by the Communist Inter-
national are to be expelled from the Party.





PCI PARTICIPATION IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Premier Period
Parri June 1945 - December 1945
De Gaspari December 1945 - July 1946
De Gaspari July 1946 - January 1947




CONGRESSES OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
Congress Date Place
First January 1921 Livorno
Second March 1922 Rome
Third January 1926 Lyon
Fourth March-April 1931 Cologne-Dusseldorf
Fifth December 1945 - Rome
January 1946
Sixth January 1948 Milan
Seventh April 1951 Rome
Eighth December 1946 Rome
Ninth January- February 1960 Rome
Tenth December 1962 Rome
Eleventh January 1966 Rome
Twelfth February 1969 Rome
Thirteenth March 1972 Milan




















































































Note: Statistics compiled from numerous sources which often-
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Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose. The International
Almanac of Electoral History . New York: The Free Press, 1974.





On 11 April 1975 the CC (Central Committee) and the CCC
^Central Control Commission) of the PCI (Italian Communist
Party) unanimously approved the following key positions for
the party working sections, publications and commissions;
organization (Gianni Cervetti) ; administration (Guido Cappel-
loni) ; party training (Gastone Gensini) ; labor (Giorgio Napol-
itano) ; programs and reforms (Luciano Barca) ; agriculture
(Emanuele Macaluso) ; middle classes and economic association
(Rodolfo Mechini) ; southern Italy (Pio La Torre) ; emigration
(Guiliano Pajetta); press and propaganda (Paolo Bufalini)
;
RAI-TV (Carlo Galluzzi); culture (Aldo Tortorella) ; schools
advisory board (Guiseppe Chiarante) ; mass cultural activities
(Dario Valori) ; regional and local government (Armando Cosutta)
;
women's affairs (Adriana Seroni) ; foreign affairs (Sergio
Segre) ; L'UNITA [central organ of the PCI] chief editor, Luca
Pavolini; co-editor, responsible for Milan edition, Claudio
Petruccioli; RINASCITA [theoretical weekly] chief editor,
Aldredo Reichlin; co-editor, Romano Ledda; CRITICA MARXISTA
[bi-monthly journal] chief editor, Emilio Sereni.
In addition, the CC and the CCC made the following presi-
dential assignments: Center for Economic Policy Studies
FBIS
,
No. 87, Supp. 8 (5 May 1975), p. 3-5,
and FBIS , No. 208 (27 October 1976), p. L-ll
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(Giorgio Amendola) ; Center for State Reform Studies (Pietro
Ingrao) ; International Policy Commission (Gian Carlo Pajetta).
Paolo Bufalini, Gerardo Chiaromonte and Giovanni Cervetti,
have not been assigned any section responsibilities, but are
engaged in general functions of the Secretariat. Responsi-
bility for the coordination of the party's work in economic
and social affairs was assigned to Giorgio Napolitano.
The following presidents of the five commissions of the
CC were also nominated:
Commission I --foreign policy; relations with communist
labor parties, and with liberation movements; emigration;
Tullio Vecchietti;
Commission II - -democratic institutions and Parliament;
Umberto Terracini;
Commission I II -- economic and social affairs: Vincenzo
Galetti
;
Commission IV--press and propaganda, ideological and cul-
tural activities: Renato Zangheri;
Commission V - - organization and party life: Alessio Pasquini
Central Committee
Longo, Luigi Fanti, Guido Pecchioli, Ugo
Berlinguer, Enrico Fanto, Vincenzo Peggio, Eugenio
Aito, Vincenzo Ferrara, Maurizio Perna, Edoardo
Alinovi, Abdon Ferri, Franco Petroselli, Luigi
Ambrogio, Franco Fibbi, Guilietta Petruccioli, Claudio
Amendola, Giorgio Fieschi, Umberto Pieralli, Piero




































































Li Causi, Girolamo Salvietti, Gabriella
Li Vigni, Mario Sandirocco, Luigi
Lombardo Radice, Lucio Sanna, Anna
Luporini, Cesare Schettini, Giacomo
Macaluso, Emanuele Segre, Sergio
Mafai, Simona Sereni, Emilio
Manfredini, Wilier Seroni, Andriana
Marazzi, Francessca Serri, Rino

Cecchi, Alberto Margheri, Andrea Sicolo, Tommaso
Ceravolo, Domenico Mari, Alga Sintini, Lorenzo
Ceredi, Giorgio Marzoli, Miliana Spagnoli, Ugo
Cerroni, Umberto Massolo, Oreste Spriano, Paolo
Cervetti, Giovanni Mazzarello, Graziano Stefanini, Marcello
Chiarante, Guiseppe Mechini , Rodolfo Tato, Antonio
Chiaromonte, Gerardo Miana, Silvio Tedesco, Giglia
Ciofi, Paolo Micaelli, Emilio Terracini, Umberto
Colajanni, Napoleone Milani, Armelino Terzi, Riccardo
Conti, Pietro Minucci, Adalberto Torchio, Mirella
Corallo, Salvatore Montessoro, Antonio Torri, Gino
Cosenza, Saul Napolitano, Giorgio Tortorella, Aldo
Cossutta, Armando Natta, Alessandro Trebbi, Ivonne
Cuffaro, Antonio Nono , Luigi Trivelli, Renzo
D'Alema, Giuseppe Occhetto, Achille Trupia, Lalla
DaPonte, Rosa Oliva, Angelo Vacca, Giuseppe
DeFelice, Giuseppe Olivi, Mauro Valenza, Pietro
Degli Abbati A , Maria Pajetta, Gian Carlo Valori, Dario
DePasquale, Pancrazio Pajetta, Giuliano Varnier, Giuliano
DiGiovanni, Arnaldo Parisi, Giovanni Vecchietti, Tullio
DiGiulio, Fernando Pascolat, Renzo Verdini, Claudio
DiPaco, Nella Pasquali, Anita Vianello, Elio
Dosio, Andrea Pasquini, Alessia Vidali, Vittorio
Elmi, Marino Passigli, Marisa Vizzini, Gioacchino











Cecati, Vittorio Modica, Enzo
Grassucci, Lelio Scardaoni, Umberto
Janni, Guido Terenzi, Amerigo
Landini, Goffredo Tognoni, Mauro
Mannino, Antonio Treccani, Ernesto
Marangoni, Spartaco Valente, Giuliana

























Papapietro, Giovanni Fredduzzi, Cesare
Pellegrini, Giacomo Franco, Pasquale
Peruzzi, Silvano Farneti, Ariella
Facchini, Adolfo
Central Auditing Committee
Barontini, Anelito Bramhilla, Giovanni Passoni, Luigi













Amendola, Giorgio Ingrao, Pietro Quercioli, Elio
Barca, Luciano Jotti, Leonilde Reichlin, Alfredo
Bufalini, Paolo Macaluso, Emanuele Seroni, Adriana
Carossino, Angelo Minucci, Adalberto Serri, Rino
Chiaromonte , Gerardo Napolitano, Giorgio Terracini, Umberto
Colorabi, Arturo Natta, Alessandro Tortorella, Aldo
Conti, Pietro Occhetto, Achille Valori, Dario
Cossutta, Armando Pajetta, Gian Carlo Vecchietti , Tullio
Cervetti, Gianni Borghini, Gian FrancoTr ivelli , Renzo
Secretariat
Berlinguer, Enrico Chiaromonte, Gerardo Birardi, Mario
Bufalini, Paolo Napolitano, Giorgio Gouthier, Anselmo
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